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By: - 15th June 2011 at 07:49 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
I'd be more interested to see photos of the Sovremennys from the Pacific and Northern fleets. Most of the latest I've seen are from 2005-2008.
By: - 15th June 2011 at 08:27 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Trust me, you don't want to see Pacific Fleet 956s. Even in the pic above, one of the Sovs needs some engine repairs to be truly deploy-able. Overall shape is much better than some of the Pacific 956s though. They are in a deplorable state, aside from Bystry, which is very much active. Boyevoi is dying, Bezboyazennyi is right next to, and not doing much better, waiting for repairs. Burny might be repaired by 2013.
Baltic Fleet has Nastoichivy and Bespokoiny, the latter needs engine change, but at least its not rusting half assembled like the Pacific Fleet ships.
North has Rastoropnyi, under repairs that are barely moving. Admiral Ushakov is active, and the Gremyshii is moored "in reserve", though it seems to me its been stricken from the fleet list. Supposedly was going to be dry docked in 2010, but never happened.
All in all. Not good.
By: - 15th June 2011 at 10:13 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Big Renovation Program for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet
Mikhail Barabanov
A total of 15 frigates and conventional submarines will be built for the Russian Black Sea Fleet by 2020, Russian Navy Commander Adm. Vladimir Vysotskiy has said. Speaking to a RIA Novosti correspondent on 23 June, he said the proportion between the frigates and the submarines will be “60 to 40” – i.e. nine frigates and six submarines. He added that the construction of one of each will begin before the end of this year. “The Black Sea Fleet will be renovated using newly built ships rather than transferring old ones from the other fleets,” the Navy commander said.That statement has officially confirmed the decisions made in the last 18 months by the top Russian civilian and military officials completely to renovate and significantly strengthen the Black Sea Fleet. The ongoing revival of partnership between Russia and Ukraine on military issues following the election of Viktor Yanukovich as the Ukrainian president last spring will greatly facilitate the implementation of that decision.
Plans are afoot to build new ships of several types so as to renovate the core of the fleet by as early as 2015, giving it a much greater fighting ability. The schedule for the construction of these ships is therefore fairly tight. In order to bring forward the delivery dates and cut costs, the Navy will use the existing mass-produced ship designs. It is quite possible that the funding of the program will be augmented by ad hoc financing from the national budget.
In 2010, Admiralty Yards in St Petersburg was in the final stages of negotiations on an MoD contract for three diesel-electric submarines for the Black Sea Fleet. The subs will be built using a modified Project 06363 design. It is based on Project 636, the successor to Project 877 (Kilo class), which was widely used in the Soviet and several foreign navies. The first of these new submarines, the Novorossiysk, was laid down at Admiralty Yards on August 20, 2010.
The decision to use the tried and tested Project 877/636 design is explained by the ongoing delays to the operational launch of the new generation Project 677 (Lada class). The first Project 677 sub, the Sankt Petersburg, was delivered to the Navy for limited operational service only in May 2010 after almost six years of trials. The two other Lada class subs now being built by Admiralty Yards will not be completed before 2015. The Navy therefore rightly decided to fall back on the reliable and relatively cheap Project 877/636 design. The three new subs can be delivered to the Black Sea Fleet by as early as 2013 - 2014. According to the latest statement by Adm. Vysotskiy, the number of the new subs of this class to be built for the Black Sea fleet could be as high as five. The new Project 06363 submarines will be armed with the Kalibr/Club (SS N-27) advanced anti-ship and land-attack missile systems.
Very shortly the Russian Navy is also expected to place an order with a Russian defense contractor for three frigates of the modified Project 11356M design (Talwar class). Project 11356 was specially designed for India. Three of those frigates were built by Baltiyskiy Shipyard in St Petersburg and delivered to the Indian Navy in 2003-2004. Another three (Talwar class Batch 2) are now being built for India at the Yantar shipyard in Kaliningrad using a modified Project 11356M design. India has indicated that it might place an order for three more of those ships, for a total of nine.
Project 11356M frigates have produced quite an impression on foreign and Russian navy specialists. They have been recognized as some of the best designed, technologically advanced and well-balanced ships of their class in the world. No wonder then that the Russian Navy, which had long shown keen interest in those ships, has now decided to have several of them built for the Black Sea Fleet. Taking into account the ships already delivered to India and those now being built for New Delhi, Project 11356M has, to all intents and purposes, entered mass production. That will undoubtedly have a very positive impact on costs and the delivery schedule for the future Russian frigates of this type. The new ships will carry the Onyx (SS-N-26) and Kalibr/Club (SS-N-27) advanced anti-ship missile systems and the Shtil-1 (SAM-17) medium-range SAM systems with a vertical launching system (VLS).
The contract for the modified Project 11356M frigates is expected to be awarded to either the Yantar shipyards in Kaliningrad or the United Industrial Corporation (Severnaya Verf Shipyard and the Baltic Shipyard) in St Petersburg. But as of mid-September 2010 the Navy has not yet invited bids. Part of the reason is that the government is now considering the possibility of the United Industrial Corporation’s shipyards becoming part of the state-owned United Shipbuilding Corporation. So far, no firm decision has been made as to where exactly the new frigates are to be built. Nevertheless, Adm. Vysotskiy has confirmed the Navy’s determination to make sure that the first Project 11356M frigate is laid down before the year’s end. That means that all three could be commissioned in 2013-2015, becoming the core of the renovated Black Sea Fleet’s surface strength.
The decision to use the mass-produced Project 11356 design for the new frigates appears entirely justified. The first two frigates of the new-generation Project 22350 (the Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov and the Admiral Flota Kasatonov) are still sitting half-finished in the dry docks of the SevernayaVerf Shipyard. Their completion, testing and commissioning will inevitably take very long, given all the new systems they carry. Project 22350 will not be able to enter mass production until after 2015. Since Adm. Vysotskiy said nine frigates will be built for the Black Sea Fleet by 2020, it is possible that six of them will arrive after 2015 using the Project 22350 design.
Plans have also been confirmed to build five new Project 21631 (Tornado class) guided missile light corvettes for the Black Sea Fleet at the Zelenodolsk Shipyard on the Volga. The design is based on Project 21630 (Buyan class) Astrakhan small gunboat built for the Caspian Flotilla. The 900-tonne Project 21631 light corvette will carry the A-190 100mm artillery system and the Kalibr/Club advanced anti-ship missile system. It will be equipped with a vertical launch system (8 launchers). The first ship of this class, the Grad Sviyazhsk, was laid down at the Zelenodolsk Shipyard on August 27, 2010, with the likely completion date in 2012.
There have also been reports that five Project 21820 (Dugon class) fast-speed air cavity landing craft could be built for the Black Sea Fleet at the Volga Shipyard in Nizhniy Novgorod.
Finally, two Project 11540 frigates of the Baltic Fleet, the Neustrashimyy and the Yaroslav Mudryy, are expected to be transferred to the Black Sea Fleet some time in 2011. The Yaroslav Mudryy was completed and delivered to the Russian Navy only last year.
There are also plans to augment the Black Sea coastal defenses, following the show of strength by US Navy warships in the area in August 2008. The Black Sea Fleet has recently gained the newly formed 11th Independent Coastal Missile-Artillery Brigade, stationed along the Russian coast of the Black Sea. To equip this brigade, the MoD placed an urgent order with NPO Machine-Building for a battalion (three batteries on four mobile launcher vehicles) of the latest K300P Bastion-P (SSC-5) mobile coastal defense missile systems armed with the Yakhont (Onyx export version, SS-N-26) advanced supersonic anti-ship missiles. The first two Bastion-P batteries were delivered to the 11th Brigade in late 2009 – early 2010. The third is to follow in 2011. The brigade is also armed with the Rubezh (SSC-3) and Bal (SSC-6) mobile coastal defense missile systems, as well as the 130 mm Bereg coastal defense self-propelled guns.
It is therefore safe to say that with sufficient funding to pull off all these plans, the fighting ability of the Russian Black Sea Fleet will be growing in leaps and bounds over the next five years.
The decision comes not a day too soon. The fleet is now essentially a small and rather quaint collection of sundry old ships, many of which belong in a museum. It has only one sub that can still put up a fight, the diesel-electric Alrosa of Project 877V (Kilo class). The repairs of the fleet’s only other submarine, an obsolete Project 641B (Tango class), have been abandoned. Of the surface ships, only the Project 1164 Moskva guided missile cruiser and two Project 1239 (Sivuch Class) fast-speed cushion guided missiles corvettes can be moderately useful in battle. All the other ships of the fleet are little more than floating junk, including the old Project 1134B (Kara class) Kertch large anti-submarine ship, three old frigates, a few guided missile and ASW corvettes, missile boats, minesweepers, and seven large tank landing ships. All of them are old and obsolete, or will be within a decade. Until recently, the additions of new ships to the fleet were very few and far between, due to Russia’s financial difficulties and Ukraine’s obstructionism. In the past decade, there was only one new ocean minesweeper and a few boats.
Meanwhile, the continuing strategic importance to Russia of its Baltic and Black Sea fleets has been amply demonstrated by the August 2008 campaign against Georgia, when US Navy warships showed up (if for no other reason than to give Tbilisi moral support). The likelihood of the Black Sea Fleet – and, to a lesser degree, the Baltic Fleet – being put to real combat uses in the coming years seems much higher than for the ocean-going Northern and Pacific Fleets. It therefore comes as no surprise that huge resources are now being diverted to build new ships for the Black Sea Fleet and boost its fighting ability. The western theater still remains the priority for the Russian armed forces; hence the continuing importance of the two western seas, the Black Sea and the Baltic. It is there that Russia should restore its naval strength as a matter of priority before bulking up the two ocean-going fleets.
By: - 15th June 2011 at 16:26 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
“The Navy should reflect the national interests and economic potential of our country”
Interview with Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, Commander of the Russian Navy
Q: How would you describe the current state and the prospects of the Russian Navy?
A: The Navy is an instrument of foreign policy, its military support component, and an element of our country’s naval presence. It is needed in the areas where we need to defend the political and economic interests of our country. We believe that the shape of our Navy should be based on two key premises. First, the Navy should reflect the national interests and economic potential of our country, and second, the Navy should be well-balanced. Right now, everything is in place for us to develop the Russian Navy in this direction, and that is where we are heading. We cannot allow an imbalance in favor submarines of surface ships. We need to pursue well-balanced development, but the nuclear-missile carrying fleet remains out priority. And we are not talking just about ships or subs, we are talking about entire combat systems. And proceeding from the premise that the Navy needs to be well-balanced, we also need to understand that this type of the armed forces should be built using open architecture, where combat systems are fully fit to serve the key tasks facing the Navy. The choices we are making now will shape the Russian Navy beyond 2020 or 2030 - they will shape it up until 2050. So there is simply no room for mistakes.
Q: What is going on with the Bulava missile? Why is it not flying?
A: The situation is difficult but not hopeless, as some seem to believe. The overall idea behind the Bulava is sound. The problem is that our technological and manufacturing capability, as well as our ability to bring various defense contractors together to deliver this project have turned out to be much weaker than we expected. We are facing a crisis in some areas of technology. The Bulava is a litmus test that will show whether we can overcome this crisis or forever become a third-rate world power.
Q: So what now for the Bulava?
A: We need to finalize the designs and eliminate all the teething problems. We need to obtain a result, a reliable result. And then we need to start thinking about the day after tomorrow. We need to start thinking now - in fact, we should have already started. We have already laid some foundations. But if we start redesigning the whole system, we will not see any serious results in missile building over the next few years. So, to answer you previous question, the missile is not flying YET, but it will fly. It will have to fly. It just needs to be built properly. But that is something our manufacturers need to sort out.
Q: What was the cause of the failure during the latest tests?
A: The cause of the failure? What does it matter, whether it was the ejection cartridge or not? Yesterday it was the ejection cartridge, before that is was the poor engineering and manufacturing of the steering mechanism of the first stage, next time it could be something else. It makes no difference. The real question is whether or not our defense contractors can manufacture such a missile. Are they up to the task? I think we have what it takes to build such missiles. Our defense industry has that capability, we just have some problems that need to be resolved.
Q: What about the Sineva liquid-fuel missile, which is already operational? Can it become a replacement for the Bulava?
A: Replacing the Bulava with the Sineva is just empty talk. Even those who have never served in the Navy understand this. These are two completely different weapons systems, with very different launch requirements. The Sineva may be a good missile, but it cannot serve as our main missile up until 2050, because it was designed back in the late 1990s. And what we are trying to do now is lay the foundations for the Navy that will last up until 2050. As for redesigning the Borei-class subs to carry the Sineva missiles, we are not going to do that either - such a redesign is simply impossible.
Q: Any chance of the Bark program being resurrected?
A: We should not be going back, we should be moving forward. Resurrecting the Bark missile complex, which was designed 20 years ago, would be an admission of defeat. We need new technology. Why resurrect something that can be nothing more than a stopgap? Our strategy is to overcome these problems we are facing now and move on to a new generation of technology. Let me remind you that the Bark missile weighs about 100 metric tons. It is yesterday’s generation of technology.
Q: How many submarines, including strategic subs, does the Russian Navy require to ensure our country’s security and deal with any threats from the sea?
A: We have a clear understanding of what we should get rid of, and what we should keep. Of course, we should have a nuclear fleet, and it should have a very high degree of standardization in terms of the components that we have now. But we are not talking about numbers. I am not going to talk about the numbers at all. What is really important is the quality, the capability that we can achieve. Once we achieve the quality that we need in some areas, then we can talk about the numbers. We already have the strategy of how the Navy should be used, it has already been approved. But the strategy of building this Navy has been under discussion for many years, and it has yet to be approved.
The Navy should be made up of diversified forces, not just ships and submarines. No Navy has fought on its own in the second half of the 20th century. Naval strength has always been deployed as part of a diversified group of forces. The essence of this approach is to have a diverse structure in the Armed Forces to fight on the ground, on the seas and in the air. The Navy, with is missile carriers and auxiliary ships, will be an element of that. There is nothing new in this approach, but that is the right approach.
Q: What will be the role of aircraft carriers in the whole strategy of building the Russian Navy?
A: An aircraft carrying fleet is not just aircraft carriers. It is a powerful combined-services group of forces. It has a general purpose, but it is also an element of strategic offensive forces, which serves a wide range of purposes. The most important for us is the issue of missile defense, air defense and space defense, where we have a serious gap. The aircraft carrying fleet should be an integral component of our single missile defense, air defense and space defense system.
Q: At what stage is the development of the new aircraft carrier?
A: Development is already under way. Under the existing schedule we should have the basic designs with the key tactical and technical specifications by the end of next year. After that, work will commence on more detailed designs.
Q: When can we expect the launch of the new ship?
A: It is difficult to give a specific time frame. We need a separate federal program to finance this work - funding this project from the general military procurement budget would hardly be feasible. With a bit of luck I think the ship can be launched by 2020.
Q: What will be the role of the Mistral-class helicopter-carrying ships, which the Navy is planning to buy from abroad?
A: For us the technology of building such ships is more important than the actual ships. We need to learn how to build such ships here in Russia, using the latest technologies. This experience will help us in building the future aircraft carriers, so this has relevance to your previous question.
Q: How many Mistral-class ships are you planning to buy from France?
A: We have determined that we need to buy one such ship, and build at least three more at the Russian shipyards, using technical assistance from the French.
Q: And what if the French refuse to provide such technical assistance in building the ships in Russia?
A: In that case we will work with other countries, which also have very modern and advanced technologies in building such ships - including the Netherlands, Spain, and others.
Q: There have recently been some reports in the media that the naval Su-33 aircraft will soon be replaced with the new MiG-29K.
A: It is true that the service life of the Su-33’s expires in 2015. We are preparing for their replacement, and in the very near future we are planning to buy a batch of at least 24 aircraft to be based on our aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. The first tests of these fighter jets have been successful. Over the period of September 28 - October 2, several MiG-29K’s performed successful landings and take-offs from the aircraft carrier.
Q: Does the Russian Navy command have any plans to modernize the logistics base in the Syrian port of Tartus?
A: The Russian Navy command has plans to create a naval station for combat ships in Tartus, including the ships of the Black Sea fleet. Right now this Navy logistics base there is the only Russian military base in the far-abroad [foreign countries that were not part of the former Soviet Union]. If an agreement is reached with the Syrians, the opportunities are very good there. The plan now is to create a proper naval station there, where ships of the Russian Navy will be able to replenish their water and food supplies or undergo repairs, and where the crew can spend some time ashore. By the way, in mid-July two Black Sea Fleet tug boats brought a new mooring float to Tartus. Of course, it is a bit too early to speak now about creating a fully-fledged military naval base there, but we have such plans for the distant future. We have a lot of respect for our Syrian colleagues. They are our allies who did not turn away from the Russian Navy even during the most difficult times, which I am glad to say are now in the past. At the same time, the Russian Navy’s financial capabilities are not what they were even as recently as 2008. We have to take into account that our finances have taken a hit in 2009 and 2010 compared to 2008 due to the economic crisis.
Q: Have there been any negotiations with other countries about setting up Russian naval bases there, for example, to counter piracy?
A: There have been, let us say, discussions rather than negotiations. There is an understanding of the need for this. When the right time comes, we can talk about it. It is a very delicate issue.
Q: Will Russia use Abkhazia as a base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet?
A: There will be a naval station in Ochamchira for several ships. Before this happens we need to complete the discussions with the Abkhaz side - that will happen in the very near future. But there will not be any large naval bases there, there will just be a good naval station. We will just keep a limited number of small ships there, ships of the second or third rank - no more than what we strictly need there.
Q: What awaits the Black Sea Fleet after 2017? Some politicians in Ukraine say that the Russian fleet needs to start preparing right now for future withdrawal from Sevastopol, so that no Russian ships are left there by 2017.
A: That is a matter of international relations and politics. Withdrawal of the Russian fleet from Sevastopol is not a pleasant topic for discussion for either Ukraine or Russia. But I have never heard Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko talk about it. On the contrary, he has always said that all of Ukraine’s commitments in terms of stationing the Black Sea Fleet will be fulfilled. Geographically, there is no better location on the entire Black Sea coast than the Akhtiarskaya Bay in Sevastopol to serve as a naval base. But apart from geography, there is also history. Have our relations with Ukraine really become so bad that we need to withdraw from Sevastopol after 2017? Does the majority of Ukrainian citizens demand the Russian fleet’s withdrawal after 2017? There is a great many people in Ukraine whose opinion on this issue is very sound. The presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol is a firm guarantee of stability along the entire Black Sea coast of the CIS nations. This needs to be considered very seriously. There are also proposals about [using the Black Sea Fleet] as an instrument to jointly address shared problems, taking into account Russian and Ukrainian national interests. The Black Sea Fleet is a very powerful instrument. So the situation is not hopeless. We should not harbor any delusions, but we should not despair either.
Q: Could the military naval base in Novorossiysk be used as an alternative to Sevastopol?
A: There have never been any plans to turn the Novorossiysk military naval base into the main base of the Black Sea Fleet. What we are talking about is having the capability for some of the Black Sea Fleet ships to be based on the northern coastline of the Russian Caucasus. So let us not confuse this with actually moving the main base of the fleet there. What we are now doing in Novorossiysk is not dependent on whether or not we are going to stay in Sevastopol. We are creating a capability for the entire group of Russian Armed Forces in the region, including the Navy, to have a base on the Russian territory. That is our main and only purpose. Everything that can be used as a base for the fleet on the Russian territory will be used, within reason – and that is what we are already doing now.
Q: The Black Sea Fleet command has repeatedly complained about problems with rearming the fleet. Part of the problem is Ukraine’s negative attitude to this issue. The fleet is becoming old and obsolete, while new armaments are not being delivered. How are you going to address this problem?
A: To begin with, Ukraine cannot forbid us from doing what needs to be done here. And second, starting from this year and every year after that, we will begin the construction of one new ship and one new submarine for the Black Sea Fleet. That is starting from 2010. Those ships will be earmarked specifically for the Black Sea Fleet. We need to take into account that the area of the Black Sea Fleet’s operations is the entire Mediterranean. And much depends on what kind of fleet we want to have in the Black Sea in the first place. I, for one, am not at all sure that we really need to have heavy cruisers or nuclear-powered submarines there.
Q: There have been many reports lately that the Caspian Flotilla is ceasing to exist. Is it true that the flotilla will be replaced with an operational command?
A: This is all at the stage of discussion for now. We are now reaching the point where will be able to deploy the Caspian forces even beyond the Black Sea region. So the question is, should all those forces be placed under the single command of the Black Sea Fleet? They probably should. This needs to be considered. But for now, this is only a discussion.
Q: Before the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia, ships of the Black Sea Fleet took part in the NATO anti-terrorist operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean. Will our ships continue taking part in that operation?
A: We made a deliberate decision to end our participation in Active Endeavour. In August 2008, NATO took a very clear stance on that conflict. We were actually asked to recall the Ladnyy ship, which had been specially prepared for the operation and which was already on its way to take part in the exercise. We are not saying we should not take part, but we need to see what we are doing this for. If there is a need, if it is in Russia’s interests, then we will take part.
Q: Will Russia continue its participation in countering piracy off the Somali coast?
A: The anti-piracy effort is a completely different matter. It is a task for the entire civilized world. We believe that this effort should be held under the auspices of the United Nations, but we are prepared to cooperate with everyone, with any potential ally, in whatever way is practical. I stress – we are ready to cooperate with any potential ally. But that does not mean we are going to work under their command. We can participate in joint operations with NATO, as well as with others - such as the European Union, first of all, but also with the naval forces of Egypt, China, Turkey and other countries. There is no doubt that we need a coordination of joint efforts – but without our forces being subordinated to anyone else.
Q: Will only the Pacific Fleet ships be taking part?
A: The Russian Navy ships will be taking part, predominantly the ships of the Pacific Fleet, because the Indian Ocean is its area of responsibility. It is easier, simpler and cheaper to use the Pacific Fleet for this. The time it would take to deploy a Black Sea Fleet ship in that area is about the same as for a Pacific Fleet ship. But it would be more expensive – sending just one ship via the Suez Canal will cost us several hundred thousand dollars, maybe even more. We could be talking millions of dollars here.
Q: There have been reports in the media that the Black Sea Fleet ships on patrol off the Georgian coast have taken to shooting down Georgian drones.
A: Shooting down foreign drones is allowed only in one’s own territorial waters. In the open seas, you are allowed to shoot them down only if you are sure they are attacking you. Apart from the events of August 2008, there have been no such incidents with the Black Sea Fleet.
Admiral Visotskiy was interviewed by RIA Novosti correspondent Sergey Safronov for Moscow Defense Brief March 2010
By: - 15th June 2011 at 16:53 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Austin,
You succeeded in confusing me until I realized that the articles you posted are over a year old.
By: - 15th June 2011 at 19:28 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Old but still interesting
By: - 15th June 2011 at 21:00 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Trust me, you don't want to see Pacific Fleet 956s. Even in the pic above, one of the Sovs needs some engine repairs to be truly deploy-able. Overall shape is much better than some of the Pacific 956s though. They are in a deplorable state, aside from Bystry, which is very much active. Boyevoi is dying, Bezboyazennyi is right next to, and not doing much better, waiting for repairs. Burny might be repaired by 2013.Baltic Fleet has Nastoichivy and Bespokoiny, the latter needs engine change, but at least its not rusting half assembled like the Pacific Fleet ships.
North has Rastoropnyi, under repairs that are barely moving. Admiral Ushakov is active, and the Gremyshii is moored "in reserve", though it seems to me its been stricken from the fleet list. Supposedly was going to be dry docked in 2010, but never happened.
All in all. Not good.
All I have of Boyevoy; 2006.
Bezboyaznenniy; 2005.
Burniy; 2009.
By: - 16th June 2011 at 04:43 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
http://s44.radikal.ru/i104/1106/b0/d3800c40d1d9.jpg
Excellent photo of Dolgoruki.
By: - 16th June 2011 at 05:52 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Yura is a joke, those 2 Akulas (Typhoons) are bombass.. :cool:
By: - 16th June 2011 at 11:22 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
http://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/pod_kaliningradom_proshli_trenirovki_1506.html
Good footage of Steregyschy.
By: - 17th June 2011 at 21:04 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
http://en.dcnsgroup.com/2011/06/17/nouveau-succes-a-l%E2%80%99export-pour-dcns-avec-le-bpc-mistral/
So, Mistral deal is happening. This link says transfer of technology is happening. It has damn better well happen.
By: - 18th June 2011 at 00:58 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Some excellent photos and informative posts in this thread.
Keep it up TR1, been good reading.
By: - 21st June 2011 at 17:06 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
So, Mistral deal is happening. This link says transfer of technology is happening. It has damn better well happen.
They sure do make it sound like a done deal:
By: - 22nd June 2011 at 11:14 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Deep-water submersible (Project 16811 Consul) passed 2nd phase of state trials
By: - 22nd June 2011 at 11:29 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Reform of the Russian Navy in 2008-2011
Moscow Defense Brief 2/2011
Dmitry Boltenkov
The Russian Army and Air Force underwent a radical reform in 2008-2011, with sweeping changes in the structure of their units, a revamped command and control system and a new support and logistics setup. By contrast, the reform of the Russian Navy has proceeded at a much more deliberate pace.The reshaping of the Navy into the New Look model has followed what has now become a traditional path. The MoD has aimed to bolster the Navy’s fighting ability by bringing its various units to 100 per cent of their full wartime strength in terms of manpower; entering into service new ships and submarines; offloading non-military assets, such as housing, to municipal authorities; outsourcing some jobs to civilian contractors, reducing the numbers of non-combat officers, and merging the existing units to save costs.
Navy command structure
The status of the Navy’s Commander and Main Staff remains uncertain since it is still unclear which of their current functions they will retain. It is very likely that the MoD will follow the model already used for the Army and the Air Force, i.e. limit the Navy Commander’s remit to strategic planning and development, monitoring of the shipbuilding programs, cooperation with research institutions, etc. It is not clear though who will command the Navy groups in the oceans, especially if said groups are put together from ships belonging to more than one Navy Fleet. In Soviet times such groups were commanded directly by the Main Navy Command. But that is probably the only argument in favor of leaving the command and control remit with the Main Navy Command. One proposal is to set up a separate Command for overseas operations.1 Be that as it may, the Navy’s main operational command body, the Central Navy Command Post, has already become part of the General Staff’s united Central Command Post, along with the central command posts of all the other armed services.2At this stage the structural reform of the Navy has consisted of subordinating the Navy Fleets to the newly created Operational Strategic Commands (i.e. the new Military Districts). The Northern and Baltic Fleets are now part of the Western Military District, the Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla are part of the Southern Military District, and the Eastern Military District has taken over the Pacific Fleet. The HQs of these districts now have Navy departments, which provide coordination between the fleets and the other forces commanded by the respective districts. As a result, there is now closer horizontal cohesion between the Army and Navy forces. But very little has changed for the structures subordinated to the fleet commands3; they still take their orders from the commanders of the fleets.
Reform of the Navy fleet formations
When the reform began, the size of the Russian Navy’s command bodies was not proportionate to the number of ships and submarines in service. The support and logistics services were also bloated.The ongoing restructuring has aimed to reduce the headcount at the HQs (in the Northern Fleet, 15 per cent of officers and 17 per cent of civilian personnel have been made redundant4). The service in charge of upholding morale (the former political propaganda bodies inherited from Soviet times) also saw very serious cuts. The axe has fallen on the departments that do not directly contribute to the Navy’s fighting ability.5 Many non-combat servicemen have become civilian contractors. In the support and logistics services, many officers who have reached retirement age have been let go.
Overall, the ongoing reform of the Russian Navy has spared the ships and the frontline services (there is simply no room for cuts there), but slashed the oversized command structures and rear services.
Nevertheless, there has been some optimization of the Navy’s frontline units.
The 11th and 12th Submarine Squadrons of the Northern Fleet have become the new Submarine Command6.
The former detachments (Russian ‘divisions’, not ‘diviziya’) that hosted decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines awaiting their turn at the scrapyard (the 366th in Sovetskaya Gavan, the 304th in Vilyuchinsk and the 346th in Vidyaevo) have been disbanded because almost all those submarines have already been scrapped.
Following the bankruptcy of the Avangard Shipyard in Petrozavodsk, which used to build and repair minesweepers, the 94th ‘Division’ that hosted ships awaiting repairs at the plant has been disbanded.7
The Vydyaevo base area has been downsized to become a coastal base of the 7th Submarine Division.
In late 2010 Aurora cruiser, which became a floating museum in St Petersburg in the early 20th century for its prominent role in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, was formally decommissioned from the Russian Navy. All its crew, apart from the captain, are now civilians.
The 74th Submarine Division, which was made of boats awaiting repairs at the Nerpa Shipyard, has been disbanded.8 There have been cuts in the Navy engineering units.
The 269th Naval Aviation Communications Station has been reformatted to become part of the 301st Central Navy Communications Station.9
The HQ of the Leningrad Naval Base was relocated to Kronstadt in November 2008.
There have been a series of big cuts in the naval support and hydrographic fleets. A number of divisions have been downsized to become naval support groups, etc.
Reform of the support and logistics system
The support and logistics units of the individual Fleets and the units taking orders directly from the Navy Command have also undergone substantial reforms. The primary objective was to rid the Navy of responsibilities that should by rights lie elsewhere, so that the central command could devote all its energies to bolstering the Navy’s fighting ability.Each naval Fleet now has supply and logistics bases (SLBs) which provide the Russian Navy units with fuel, food, various equipment and hardware, and other supplies. These bases have subsumed all the former supply and logistics units of the Navy. There are now five SLBs: in St Petersburg, Astrakhan, Krymsk, Murmansk and Vladivostok.
Several arms and munitions bases have been merged.
As part of the effort to rid the MoD of non-military assets, the government has set up the JSC Oboronservis holding company, which has taken over the housing and utility assets and the heating and power plants which used to be on the Russian Navy’s balance books. Oboronservis has also assumed ownership of the naval communications equipment repair plants, munitions warehouses, and rocket and artillery equipment repair plants.
In late 2009 the 6th Arsenal of the Northern Fleet in Burmakovo was restructured and split into two parts: the No 81269 military unit and the JSC Repairs Center company. The military unit was left in charge of munitions, and the company took over maintenance, repairs and disposal of decommissioned weapons. The Northern Arsenal unit of the MoD (the former 2708th Torpedo Weapons and Ammunition Base) was restructured in March 2010 to become JSC Severnyy Arsenal company, and then incorporated into JSC Oboronservis. Several construction units have been taken over by JSC Oboronstroy; the farms that previously belonged to the Navy by JSC Agroprom; the local electricity grids by Oboronenergo; the wholesale and retail trade departments of the fleets by Voentorg; the aircraft repair plants by JSC Aviaremont; and the car and truck repair plants by Spetsremont.
All these measures are expected to improve the Navy’s fighting ability and enable its combat units to focus on training. Nevertheless, such large-scale reorganizations always result in some early problems.
The reform has also affected the medical provision system. For example, the Baltic Fleet’s hospitals in Kaliningrad Region have been reorganized into a single medical center, the 1409th Navy Clinical Hospital. It includes the Main Hospital of the Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad and its branches in Baltiysk and Chernyakhovsk.10
Another typical example is the former 412th Plant of the White Sea Naval Base, which was used for refueling nuclear propulsion reactors. The plant was disbanded on December 1, 2009; its nuclear activities have been taken over by the civilian Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center.11
The Navy’s training and education system has also undergone a radical reorganization. Its research institutes and schools have been merged into a territorially distributed Naval Academy Research and Training Center, which includes the Naval Academy itself, the Higher Special Officer Courses, five naval research institutes, three MoD research institutes (the 1st, the 24th and the 40th), the Nakhimov Naval School and the Kronstadt Naval Cadet Corps. The new center is now subordinated to the education and training department of the MoD rather than the Navy Command.12 The plan is to relocate the center’s HQ to Kronstadt at some point in the future.13
Plans for the naval Fleets
Prospects for further reform of the Russian Navy can be illustrated by the Black Sea and Pacific fleets.
In 2008 Russia adopted a special program to prioritize the development of the Black Sea Fleet. The decision was made in view of the general military-political situation in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, tense relations with Georgia, the need to provide security during the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi,14 the ongoing operation against piracy in the Indian Ocean, and other foreign policy considerations.
The bulk of the Black Sea Fleet ships are still seaworthy, but most belong in a museum and need to be replaced as a matter of priority. In October 2010 the government announced that the fleet will receive up to 18 new ships and boats by 2020, including nine frigates and six diesel-electric submarines.
Meanwhile, the Pacific Fleet needs to be strengthened because of the growing global importance of the Asia Pacific region, continuing territorial claims against Russia by Japan, and the need to combat piracy in the Indian Ocean. The first in line for a refresh is the strategic component of the Pacific Fleet; several new Project 955 (Yuriy Dolgorukiy class) nuclear-powered missile submarines will enter service. It is also quite likely that the Mistral class amphibious assault ships for which the Russian MoD has placed an order in France will be assigned to the Pacific Fleet. It has been announced that Marshal Ustinov15 and Admiral Nakhimov16 guided missile cruisers, which currently serve with the Northern Fleet, will be transferred to the Pacific Fleet after repairs. As part of the overall effort to strengthen the Russian forces in the Southern Kuril Islands the MoD also plans to deploy a Bastion-P mobile coastal defense missiles battery there.17
Marines and Coastal Troops
The Russian Navy’s Coastal Troops have been reformed and the remaining units brought to their full wartime strength. Several units have changed their status, including the former 61st (Northern Fleet) and 22nd (Kamchatka) Marines Brigades, which have become regiments but retained all of their manpower. The reason for the decision was the state of these units’ barracks and living quarters. At some point in the future the two regiments will become brigades once again.18 Meanwhile, the 810th Marines Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet has been brought up in size to a full brigade, gaining a lot of manpower in the process. Under the terms of the 1997 agreement with Ukraine on the stationing of the Russian armed forces on Ukrainian territory, the strength of the Black Sea Fleet’s marines and naval aviation units is limited to 1,987 people. But according to several recent reports, the number of the Black Sea Fleet’s marines stationed in Sevastopol is as high as 2,473 people.19
The Russian Navy’s only remaining marines division, the 55th, based in Vladivostok, has been formally downsized to become the 155th Marines Brigade – but its manpower has actually gone up.
The 77th Marines Brigade of the Caspian Flotilla has been disbanded (the brigade was created to take part in the counter-terrorism operation in the North Caucasus), but the bulk of it – two marines battalions in Astrakhan and Kaspiysk – have escaped cuts.
The Baltic Fleet’s Coastal Troops and Ground Forces in Kaliningrad Region have also undergone restructuring. All the skeleton-strength formations have been either disbanded or reorganized. The arms depots have ceased to exist; the weaponry they held has been used to equip the remaining units. As part of the program to create larger garrisons by 2012 the 336th Marines Brigade will be relocated to a new base now being built in Baltiysk.20 The numerical strength of the brigade will increase from the current 2,500 servicemen to 4,000 by 2012.21
There have been serious changes in the personnel structure of the Navy’s marine and coastal troops. The units previously manned only by professional soldiers serving under contract now use conscripts as privates; only junior officer and sergeant positions are filled with professional soldiers. A case in point is the assault battalion of the Northern Fleet’s marines, which was manned only by professional soldiers. Now conscripts account for 70 per cent of its manpower.22
Many units have also received some new weapons. Several have taken delivery of new or upgraded BTR-80M and BTR-70M APCs, new trucks, small arms, communication instruments, and 120mm 2S9 Nona-S artillery systems. The MoD has also begun to rearm the Navy’s coastal defense missile and artillery units.23,24
Naval aviation
Early on during the reform the naval aviation and support units were reorganized into 13 airbases. Only the 279th Independent Ship-based Fighter Regiment (Su-33 aircraft) has retained its former status. Most of the new airbases were formed through merger within a single chain of command of all the units stationed at the same airfield.During the second stage of the reform the airbases of each Fleet were merged into territorially integrated structures (“greater” airbases). To illustrate, all the naval aviation units of the Baltic Fleet have been merged into a single airbase with an HQ at the Chkalovskiy airfield.25 The former airbases now have the status of air groups. All the air defense units of the Baltic Fleet have been merged under the 3rd Aerospace Defense Brigade.
The MoD has formed a new naval aviation training center in Yeysk on the Azov Sea. The center has incorporated the former 859th Training Center and the 444th Combat Training Center in Ostrov. There are plans to build in Yeysk a analog of an aircraft carrier deck for naval pilots to practice take-offs and landings; the simulator will be similar to the NITKA training range in the Crimea.26
The initial plan of the reform included the transfer of several naval aviation and air defense units to the Air Force – but so far that has not been implemented. The idea was resurrected in the spring of 2011. It was said that naval missile-carrying long-range aviation units (Tu-22M3 aircraft), as well as naval attack (Su-24) and fighter aviation (Su-27 and MiG-31) units, apart from a single attack aviation unit stationed in the Crimea, will become part of the Air Force by the end of 2011.27 The MoD has even considered the feasibility of transferring the 279th Independent Ship-based Fighter Aviation Regiment to the Russian Air Force.
One of the top priorities for the naval aviation fleet refresh program is the Black Sea Fleet.28 But due to political reasons (i.e. the need to secure Ukraine’s consent) the implementation of these plans is likely to see long delays.
The naval aviation fleet refresh program includes the delivery over the coming decade of the first batch of the MiG 29K carrier-based fighters, as well as the Ka-27M, Ka-29M, Ka-31 and Ka-52 helicopters. The MoD has also launched the development of a new carrier-based helicopter, the Ka-65. But the current status of the programs to develop new patrol and submarine hunter aircraft is unclear. Meanwhile, the MoD has stepped up the Navy aircraft repair programs (for the Su-33, MiG-31 and Su-27 fighters and the Su-24M attack aircraft).
Shipbuilding and ship repairs
The bulk of the Russian Navy fleet is made of old Soviet ships built in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There is only a handful of ships in service that were built after the fall of the former Soviet Union. The Russian Navy has essentially “skipped” a whole generation of warships.The main problem now is to maintain the existing ships, most of which have already been in service for more than half of their allotted lifespan, until the new generation begins to arrive en masse. With timely upgrades and proper maintenance, the existing Soviet-designed ships still have many years of service left in them.
In late 2010 the government unveiled the new State Armament Program for 2011-2020 (GPV-2020). A very impressive 19 trillion roubles will be spent on buying new weaponry and hardware for the MoD, of which the Navy will account for 4.7 trillion.29 It has been announced that about 100 new warships and submarines of various classes will be built by 2020, including 20 subs, 15 frigates and 35 corvettes.30
Based on media reports, this is what it known about the program:
The core of the strategic naval forces will be made of eight new nuclear-powered missile subs Yuriy Dolgorukiy class (Project 955 and its modifications) armed with the Bulava SLBM.31
Up to 10 Project 855 (Severodvinsk class and modifications) nuclear-powered attack submarines should enter service by 2020.32 They will be the last fourth-generation nuclear-powered submarines to be built for the Russian Navy. The development of the future fifth-generation attack subs has already been announced.33
Six Project 06363 (Novorossiysk class) diesel-electric submarines will be built for the Black Sea Fleet. The last two Project 677 (St. Petersburg class) subs that have already been laid down will be completed. Once that is done, the Russian shipbuilders will launch production of new non-nuclear subs with AIP power plants (based on Project 677).34
Two series of frigates will be built; six Project 22350 ships (Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov class) to be built at the Severnaya Verf shipyards35, and six modified Project 11356 (Admiral Grigorovich class) frigates to be built at the Yantar shipyards. After that the MoD will probably launch an entirely new class of frigates.
Twelve Project 20381 and 20385 (Steregushchiy class) corvettes are to be built at the Severnaya Verf shipyards36 or the Amur Shipyards. The MoD is also expected to launch the development of a new corvette series; up to 22 are to be built by 2020.37 The contract is likely to be awarded to the Zelenodolskiy shipyards (which will also complete the Project 11611K Dagestan corvette now being built).
The MoD is likely to continue building Project 11711 (Admiral Gren class) large tank landing ships. Some kind of decision is also expected on the proposal to build two to four French-designed Mistral class amphibious assault ships; negotiations between Russia and France are still under way.
The repair and upgrade component of the GPV-2020 includes the refurbishment of the existing Project 1144 nuclear-powered guided missile battlecruisers; the Admiral Nakhimov is the first in line for refurbishment.38 The MoD will also upgrade its fleet of third-generation Project 971, 949A and 945 nuclear-powered submarines.
One interesting change is that each Fleet will now be assigned an individual shipyard to be in sole charge of that Fleet’s ship repair program. The ships belonging to the Northern Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla and the Novorossiysk Naval Base will be handled by the Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center company.39 The Baltic Fleet’s ships have been assigned to the Yantar Shipyard.40 In addition, there is now a special department within the central MoD that oversees these contracts, whereas previously that was the remit of the Navy’s technical department.
Conclusion
The reform of the Russian Navy is still a work in progress. It appears that the early reform plans have undergone a substantial transformation, and new changes are sure to be announced. But given the MoD’s gyrations over the transfer of the Navy HQ from Moscow to St Petersburg and the continuing uncertainty over the handover of naval aviation to the Air Force, it is safe to conclude that the government has no clear unanimous vision of the Navy reform. The reason for that is that the government is still trying to decide what kind of Navy Russia actually needs.
1 http://www.flot.com/news/navy/?ELEMENT_ID=65995
3 http://www.redstar.ru/2011/03/23_03/3_03.html
4 http://twower.livejournal.com/520535.html
5 It must be remembered, however, that efficiency is not everything; there are also long-standing Navy traditions that need to be taken into consideration.
6 murman.rfn.ru/rnews.html?id=849491
7 http://www.ryadovoy.ru/forum/index.php?action=printpage;topic=1973.0
8 http://www.mbnews.ru/content/view/22586/
10 http://www.newkaliningrad.ru/news/community/k1194720.html
11 http://www.proatom.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1959
12 http://www.navy.ru/news/navy/?ELEMENT_ID=65047
13 http://nvo.ng.ru/forces/2009-06-26/4_Kronshtadt.html
14 http://www.navy.ru/news/navy/?ELEMENT_ID=66969
15 http://www.lenta.ru/news/2011/03/23/atlant/
16 http://lenta.ru/news/2011/03/25/cruiser/
17 http://lenta.ru/news/2011/03/01/bastion/
18 http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/voensovet/729189-echo/
19 http://sannews.com.ua/2010/09/drugoj-chernomorskij-flot.html
20 http://www.redstar.ru/2011/03/22_03/2_02.html
22 http://www.redstar.ru/2010/11/24_11/5_03.html
23 http://www.gostorgi.ru/2010/91/2010-10-14/91-46055.xml
24 http://www.redstar.ru/2010/05/27_05/2_01.html
25 http://www.redstar.ru/2010/10/13_10/2_02.html
26 http://www.livekuban.ru/content/news/palubnaja-aviacija-prizemlitsja-v-ejske
27 http://www.rian.ru/defense_safety/20110323/356933280.html
28 Black Sea Fleet to receive 18 new ships // Interfax, October 26, 2010
29 http://www.redstar.ru/2010/12/15_12/1_01.html
30 http://lenta.ru/news/2011/02/24/ships/
31 http://www.redstar.ru/2011/03/17_03/1_04.html
32 http://www.redstar.ru/2011/03/17_03/1_04.html
33 http://www.arms-tass.su/?page=article&aid=93156&cid=25
34 http://lenta.ru/news/2011/03/18/submarine/
35 http://www.spbgid.ru/index.php?news=213130
36 http://flotprom.ru/news/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=65497
37 http://shipbuilding.ru/rus/news/russian/2011/03/10/Trosenko_dizain_100311/
39 http://flotprom.ru/news/?ELEMENT_ID=64393
40 http://www.shipyard-yantar.ru/docs/G_vpered/2011/06%2811%29.pdf
By: - 22nd June 2011 at 17:13 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
http://www.lenta.ru/news/2011/06/22/compens/
Latvia will seek compensation from NATO if Mistrals are based in Baltics.
/facepalm.
By: - 22nd June 2011 at 20:28 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
http://www.lenta.ru/news/2011/06/22/compens/Latvia will seek compensation from NATO if Mistrals are based in Baltics.
/facepalm.
NATO should donate them couple of german 206 submarines, USN v-adm was complaining recently that their defence budget is too low. And their whole budget will go to the drains.
By: - 23rd June 2011 at 06:17 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Which ship is behind the '620' Bespokoynyy in the first photo of the thread?
------
Oh and about Latvia.
They have every right to complain, I mean . . . water is the ONLY way that the Russian Bear could get to them... :o
By: - 23rd June 2011 at 09:09 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
The ships in the pic are the Steregushy, Neutsrahsimy, and 610 is Nastoichivy.
By: - 23rd June 2011 at 10:14 Permalink - Edited 1st January 1970 at 01:00
Where is Kuznetsov based now ?
Posts: 9,579
By: TR1 - 15th June 2011 at 05:17
Following the tradition, new thread.
Some photos from a few days ago:
A very interesting photo, not only does it show a large proportion of the Baltic Fleets combat strength, but a good study of the Stereguschy next to other ships.
http://balancer.ru/forum/punbb/attachment.php?item=228962&download=1
Yaroslav Mudry, and some small missile ships behind it.
http://balancer.ru/forum/punbb/attachment.php?item=228967&download=1
Several Zubrs.