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    Black Archer

    " The reliability of the DARIN proved to be ten times better than the old system and was well received by the IAF. IIO also modified six Jaguars with Thomson CSF Agave radar and DARIN system for maritime patrolling. These were enabled to use the Sea Eagle missiles "

    So basically the first set of Jaguars had dodgy unreliable avionics. BTW the Sea Eagle? The IAF/IN experience with the type was abysmal. Unreliable & prone to failure. Hopefully, the Harpoon + EL/M-2032 combination will be better and not get stuck due to integration hassles.

    Comment


      Blue Fox radar acquired by the IN for a naval fighter,
      http://www.livefistdefence.com/2009/...rget-test.html

      According to Navy sources in South Block, the LUSH programme has made the Sea Harriers fully new aircraft. The heart of the upgrade is of course the replacement of the venerable old Ferranti Blue Fox monopulse airborne intercept radar with the time-tested EL/M-2032 multimode advanced pulse doppler radar. The new radar, in the words of one of the pilots, has put the aircraft in "a different league". While sea clutter proved to be the bane of look-down missions with the Blue Fox radar (the sweep would be swamped), the Elta sensor has none of those issues.
      Good luck in intercepting low flying aircraft or targets .. err... which also happened to be the main role of the Sea Harrier, a shining example of "basic issues" which were quite clearly not basic. "Other programs didn't have such basic issues" indeed.

      We all hear of the oh so great Blue Vixen radar & the AMRAAMs, but hey lets ignore the Blue Fox & its shortcomings even while it was deployed in service.

      Comment


        What about the basic Vickers MBT deployed by the Indian Army as its frontline MBT, till it (luckily) managed to get its hands on Russian tanks which their much publicized flaws vs newer gen Abrams apart, were widely liked because of their reliability.

        India decided to put its own armor on the tanks. From day1, the Vijayanta was disliked on account of its unreliable automotives. They even explored changing the armor package and putting in the T-72 engine.

        "Field trials were also carried out with retro-fitting these Vijayantas with the T-72 power pack. This would not only compensate for the weight increase due to the application of the Kanchan armour but would also be a step forward as compared to the L60 Leyland diesel engine. The obsolete Leyland engine is a maintenance intensive unit, affecting the Vijayanta's serviceability."
        Source: Archived webpage on the Vijayanta on the BR Main site.

        The program was dropped once the IA got funds to replace the Vijayantas aka the Vickers MBT with the T-72s.

        Basic issue - the engines didn't work. Standing joke in IA - the engine decides your advance

        Comment


          Originally posted by Teer View Post
          At this point, I really think you should start re examining your behavior. Apart from bringing up Nazis via a reference to the term uber (stupid in itself), you then bring in "If shying away from recognising and addressing weaknesses is an Untermensch characteristic or is a 'third world' trait".

          I see, so third world folks the Untermensch, need their betters like you to talk about "inferior project management. inferior decision making and inferior accountability." based on dodgy reports.
          Firstly, I do not use the word uber. Someone else brought it up so I replied using the terminology that had been used.

          Secondly, I have a history of studying organisations or departments within organisations with a view to improving their performance. In my experience, there are organisations with a culture that clearly runs counter to enhancing performance. And yes, I have lived in a country which could have been termed third world where evading decisions, evading responsibility when one has got things wrong or has failed to get things done as promised etc was the norm. Such a business/organisational culture is an inferior culture in my book and I think my view is a realistic one.
          Sum ergo cogito

          Comment


            Originally posted by Teer View Post
            First, no aircraft can enter service with ZERO flaws to be detected later. The perfect design does not exist. Having said that, the probability of the LCA entering service with most of its flaws removed has a high probability.
            Well, I guess that most of the flaws being removed has a high probability, too.

            Originally posted by Teer View Post
            I do suspect though the LCA team cares little about your congratulations (or your constant griping based on dodgy reports and references) and are only concerned with what the end user & the GOI expect them to do.
            I would be amazed if the LCA team cared one jot about what I think but as it happens I have been hoping for many years that the LCA project has a successful outcome. I'm not a fanboy of the project (or any other I can think of) so I criticise what I see as compromising reaching that goal. But I am impressed that despite all the internal and external factors working against the project, India has created a fast jet design capability. And for peanuts.
            Sum ergo cogito

            Comment


              ^ More then fanboy ... it seems few are being allergic and irritated that India is developing solutions consuming Peanut budgets (be it space, areo, MBT or missiles).

              Comment


                Originally posted by Teer View Post
                If you thought the comparison was not germane, you should have stopped it there, instead of putting up a defense of an aircraft claiming it did not have "basic flaws"
                I'm afraid that's not quite what I wrote.
                Gnat was a new type, not used by the RAF when it was bought by Finland & India, & never operated as a fighter by the RAF, so it's understandable that there might have been teething problems on introduction into operational service, but AFAIK there was nothing as basic as some of the problems reported with Tejas.
                Note the caveat - 'As far as I know'. And my statements that it was developed fairly quickly, a private venture (& Folland was a small company with limited resources), & the original fighter version that India bought was never wanted or accepted by the RAF. It only bought the later, extensively modified, trainer. The main focus of my criticism was that it's not a good benchmark to measure a modern fighter against, any more than old cars. I thought I'd been clear enough, but perhaps not.

                Valid benchmarks to compare the development of Tejas with are types that are still current: JF-17 (noting that it's much more conservative), Gripen, Rafale, Typhoon, T-50 & its armed versions, Ching Kuo. Not a 1950s private venture light fighter from a small firm, which was rejected by the air force of its home country. One might as well compare the Suzuki Swift with the Morris Oxford, & criticise the latter for its obsolete technology.
                Juris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.
                Justinian

                Comment


                  Originally posted by rkumar View Post
                  ^ More then fanboy ... it seems few are being allergic and irritated that India is developing solutions consuming Peanut budgets (be it space, areo, MBT or missiles).
                  Think you misunderstood when I said I was not a fanboy (play down any negatives, play up any positives) of the Tejas. I am a fan, though. I am sure it will be vastly superior to the MiG-21 it will be replacing. You talk of irritation at India developing solutions consuming peanut budgets. I think that's great. I would love to see Tejas being sold to the sort of customer base that bought MiG-21/Mirage III in a few years' time - I assume that supplying the IAF will be the priority for quite a few years to come.
                  Sum ergo cogito

                  Comment


                    Originally posted by Spitfire9 View Post
                    Firstly, I do not use the word uber. Someone else brought it up so I replied using the terminology that had been used.
                    Correlating uber to untermenschen and the third world inhabited by untermenschen is silly, especially when the word uber in popular culture and common usage has little to do with Nazis. Next what, if somebody mentions German efficiency, would you start off describing German excesses in WW2?

                    Secondly, I have a history of studying organisations or departments within organisations with a view to improving their performance. In my experience, there are organisations with a culture that clearly runs counter to enhancing performance. And yes, I have lived in a country which could have been termed third world where evading decisions, evading responsibility when one has got things wrong or has failed to get things done as promised etc was the norm. Such a business/organisational culture is an inferior culture in my book and I think my view is a realistic one.
                    Which makes it even more ironic that most of your diatribes have little to do with actual facts and rely on sketchy reports.

                    Comment


                      Originally posted by swerve View Post
                      I'm afraid that's not quite what I wrote.

                      Note the caveat - 'As far as I know'. And my statements that it was developed fairly quickly, a private venture (& Folland was a small company with limited resources), & the original fighter version that India bought was never wanted or accepted by the RAF. It only bought the later, extensively modified, trainer. The main focus of my criticism was that it's not a good benchmark to measure a modern fighter against, any more than old cars. I thought I'd been clear enough, but perhaps not.
                      Swerve, the larger issue is that whether there be a Gnat or a Jaguar or multiple other programs, "basic flaws" have been detected years into the service of those aforesaid types.

                      In the case of the Tejas, the IAF is seeking to bypass the entire teething trouble issue (as far as it can anyhow) by being highly demanding at the test stage itself. Hence the insistence on a near perfect Mk1 translating to a Mk1A or a Mk2 as versus taking something which is still better than what they operate (Mk1).

                      Valid benchmarks to compare the development of Tejas with are types that are still current: JF-17 (noting that it's much more conservative), Gripen, Rafale, Typhoon, T-50 & its armed versions, Ching Kuo. Not a 1950s private venture light fighter from a small firm, which was rejected by the air force of its home country. One might as well compare the Suzuki Swift with the Morris Oxford, & criticise the latter for its obsolete technology.
                      Thing is technology being old does not correlate necessarily to reliability. As you would appreciate, the fighters you mention have newer technology but are far more complex, increasing the chances of any point of failure being catastrophic as well. A FBW system failure will crash a FBW aircraft. An earlier gen aircraft could still have been salvaged depending on the situation.

                      In the above examples, the notionally simpler platforms ended up having what we'd describe as having "basic issues" much after induction.

                      The Jaguar & Sea Harrier both had systems reliability issues. The Gnat overall had issues and necessitated a Mk2.

                      Decades after induction, the Vickers MBT was still having issues with its engine. Its armor was subpar not too long after induction.

                      The MiGs- especially the MiG-23/27 have frequently been singled out by IAF folks for having design issues which had to be fixed locally.
                      http://www.livefistdefence.com/2010/...as-mig-27.html
                      Former IAF flight safety chief Air Marshal PS Ahluwalia has long argued that the MiG-27 engine has fundamental flaws that make it a dangerous machine to fly, and should be phased out forthwith.
                      In all these cases, the IAF managed with what it had.

                      The larger point is that comparing what the IAF is doing with the LCA vis a vis all these programs ends up being a meaningless exercise because of the context of local procurement decisions and the customers background.

                      The IAF is expecting far more of the LCA and being rigorous with its test schedule partly because of its tendency to expect more of local firms & also, because there is no WW firm in the background to jump in and make things better (not that they always have).

                      That has to do a lot with trust issues with HAL (IAF does not want to have to go back to them again and again) but also, IAF tendency to brochure bash and ask for more and more. On a positive note, when they do get it, it will be usable (and not a wasted acquisition unlike some of our fancy toys which have been useless).

                      Also HAL needs to be weaned off its addiction to imports and not depend on Sukhoi et al to do the platform level heavy lifting.

                      If the LCA sees service after even a far more demanding IAF eval, as janus faced as it may appear to local industry, IMHO, its still a net positive because the local industry would have to meet those standards of reliability over a 150 production run which would be a first.

                      The flip side is constant testing and jumping through hoops set by the IAF which can appear positively endless. So there will definitely be a time impact. Since the LCA is a national program and its costs are still far lower than comparable programs (let alone imports), its the time aspect which usually takes a hit when IAF asks for modifications. Industry cannot wait forever just on account of patriotism.

                      There have been a few notable big ticket local wins in recent years for missiles, radars and sensors. Each item builds more faith in AHQ that buying local is not risky.

                      OTOH, issues such as Rafale price (perversely) also contribute to a mindset change. Its no longer a candy shop wherein just because India is growing at x% GDP (which is notional, as versus the real money available in the budget), the IAF feels it can ask for anything and everything.

                      The IAF has long been behaving unreasonably about imports and with the new Govt, they seem to be getting a wake up call.

                      Comment


                        Originally posted by rkumar View Post
                        ^ More then fanboy ... it seems few are being allergic and irritated that India is developing solutions consuming Peanut budgets (be it space, areo, MBT or missiles).
                        Very much this.
                        Sadly, expect more to come.

                        Comment


                          Originally posted by swerve View Post
                          Who's said anything about anything British being perfect? Why the defensiveness? Big chip on your shoulder there.

                          You can't deny that Indian military procurement is notoriously badly managed, & Tejas development hasn't exactly been a shining example of best practice, or rapid development. Saying 'but British cars used to be crap' is a playground argument, not to be taken seriously.

                          Why the lashing out whenever there's any criticism of anything Indian?
                          So what does one say about the UK's SDSR and the kind of decisions that were made as a result of it? Quite something isn't it? I could just go to that thread and copy paste the kind of criticism that British posters themselves made of British MoD procurement decisions. Doesn't show the Brits in shining light there.

                          As for the "big chip on your shoulder" rubbish, I would turn around and say get off your high horse. Design issues that may have sprung up late in the development program is not an Indian specific issue.

                          Why are you being so defensive the moment Indians point out that even British designed, developed and supplied equipment have had failures and issues in service with the Indian armed forces? Are you trying to say that British product development is free of bugs, or no British equipment supplied to their own services or to other nations have had issues after entering service??

                          Just look at the SA80 rifle and its issues decades after entering service with the British Army. Just some excerpts that I'm posting here. The entire article talks about shoddy design and incompetence. Certain British cars that I mentioned in an earlier post were emblematic of similar traits.


                          Another junior designer, who later rose to a senior position in the Royal Ordnance hierarchy, says he had become alarmed at early design meetings over the apparent failure by his bosses to understand that pressed steel and plastic parts couldn't be expected to fit together as well as machined parts:
                          "People that were in charge were demanding tolerances from plastic moulding that could really only be achieved by the precision of being carved from solid steel. I'm talking microns [thousandths of a millimetre]. Plus or minus one or two microns is very tight."

                          The same mixture of overconfidence and lack of knowledge among the Enfield team showed up elsewhere.
                          Many of the key parts of the SA80 were copied from the US Armalite AR18, then made in Britain under licence by the Sterling gun factory in Dagenham, using the pressed-steel technique. The former owner of the factory, James Edmiston, says that his chief designer had seen an early prototype SA80 at an arms fair, stripped it down and discovered that bolt, bolt carrier, magazine, springs and firing pin had been taken from an AR18. "Not once did Enfield ever ask Sterling for information on the AR18," he says. "I know of at least one component that they 'copied' incorrectly which could well have made a difference to reliability."


                          The firing pins broke, the magazine fell off, the bolt-release button broke, the triggers got stuck, the cleaning kit wouldn't clean, the butt plate broke, the cheek-pad fell off, the cheek-pad melted, the cartridge cases wouldn't eject properly, the bolt carrier didn't fit properly, the locking pins holding the gun together were inadequate, and the safety catch wasn't safe. "I think - had it ever gone into serious combat in the early days - it would very quickly have been abandoned and replaced with a [foreign] rifle," one senior former executive says.


                          The SA80, the armourer explains, was held together with two locking pins, which had to be removed for the gun to be dismantled and cleaned. They were designed in such a way that a soldier could easily pull them out of the gun completely, and, in trying to force them back in, puncture the thin steel the gun was made of. The gun would then have to be thrown away.

                          He picks up the Soviet pin. It has a groove channelled down one side and, inside the groove, two dimples to lock the pin in place. "That will just go ping, ping, ping, for ever and a day. They can make that. Why can't we? Ours is so fragile," he says, recalling how, when his unit received its first batch of SA80s in 1988, he returned half as defective.

                          ...

                          In 1985, the German gunmakers Heckler & Koch, who had been asked to do some sub-contracting work on training ammunition, were sent two of the new rifles. Shortly after the consignment arrived, the officer who had sent them got a phone call. The voice at the other end said he was calling about the British rifle. He said: "You know it goes off when you drop it?" The officer admitted that he didn't. He fetched a gun from the armoury and dropped it. It went off. German experts had discovered a dangerous safety flaw in a British rifle which, after supposedly exhaustive testing and acceptance into service, the Brits themselves had failed to find.

                          Robin Budden, who worked as project manager on the gun in 1985 and 1986, takes up the story. "Immediately, the Infantry Trials and Development Unit (ITDU) came back to us and said: 'Why did you design a weapon with a push-button safety catch?' We told them that until seven years earlier we'd had a lever, but an earlier captain at ITDU asked us to put a push button safety catch on, because he preferred it. So that's what we did."

                          There was pressure to find a quick solution. The dangerous metal safety catch was replaced with a plastic one. But it, too, was defective. "The new safety would break if you pulled hard on the trigger, particularly in cold weather, which made it even more brittle," says Jan Stevenson, who became a vociferous critic of the new gun. "If it rained, the plastic would swell, jammed firmly on or off, and would not budge. It also jammed solid from sand or debris or mud. Finally, a stronger polymer was identified... production began in May of 1990, nearly half a decade after adoption."

                          Even as mass production of the SA80 was in crisis, disturbing reports such as these about the performance of the weapon in the field were filtering back to the MoD. The trials carried out before the weapon was accepted into service had been antiseptic: troops running across Salisbury Plain, shooting on ranges, putting the gun in climate-controlled tanks to see how it responded to extreme heat, cold and mud. As soon as the gun was given to real soldiers to use in real conditions, its weaknesses became apparent. It would jam, and bits would fall off. The army realised, too late, that there was a vast difference between the guns in the pre-acceptance trials, which had been handbuilt by technicians in the Enfield toolroom using traditional techniques, and the mass-produced ones rolling off the assembly line.

                          In a parliamentary inquiry into the SA80 in 1993, General Anthony Stone admitted that in the mid-80s the government did exactly the opposite of what it should have done. Instead of starting production slowly, and introducing modifications as soon as faults became apparent, the MoD made every effort to rush the weapons into service, regardless of the stream of complaints that came in.
                          "We had the problem of the in-service date, we were slipping like mad, and there was increasing pressure from [the army] to get this weapon into service to replace the ageing SLR, so we made the error, if you like, of increasing the rate of production."

                          From the start, a pattern was established: soldiers would demand a change to the weapon; engineers would make the change; the change wouldn't be properly tested; the change would fail; the problem would be fixed again, properly this time, but it would take years to alter each of the more than 300,000 rifles eventually produced; the weapon's reputation among soldiers would sink lower.

                          At an early stage, for instance, Enfield engineers were forced by Whitehall to change their design of magazine to an American pattern to accommodate the new size of ammunition. To make room, they moved the magazine release catch. Unfortunately, this meant that when a heavy magazine, full of ammunition, was slotted into the gun, and the soldier was moving, his body would rub against the catch and the magazine would fall out. But this was only discovered after the weapon went into production, because in the early trials soldiers didn't put full magazines in until they reached the firing range.

                          The magazine itself, made at another Royal Ordnance plant called Radway Green, turned out to be a shoddy piece of equipment. It was so bad that during trials in the mid-80s the testing troops never used it, using a US-made magazine instead, because the British magazine caused the rifle to jam up to five times more often. When desk-based MoD officers on the project were told about this, to the fury of the trialling units, they refused to recall all the magazines, saying they would only replace those that fouled up on the job.

                          The firing pin has now been replaced three times: in 1985, because it wasn't "durable"; in 1991, because it wasn't "materially robust"; and in 2000, because it wasn't durable - again.
                          ..

                          A damning report from an army inspection team concluded that the SA80 was unreliable in the desert, jamming frequently despite valiant efforts to keep it clean. "It is... quite clear that infantrymen did not have confidence in their personal weapons. Most expected a stoppage in the first magazine fired," the report said. "Some platoon commanders considered that casualties would have occurred due to weapon stoppages if the enemy had put up any resistance..."


                          In December 1986, at the very time the unreliability of the weapon and production delays were creating a crisis, the Thatcher government cancelled another massive defence project - the Nimrod airborne radar system, which turned out not to work. An incredible 1bn had been poured down the drain on the Nimrod in a sequence horribly similar to that of the SA80.

                          ...
                          Lol..yes, a shining example of best practice. Indeed, what is happening on the Tejas program is exactly the opposite of what the Brits did on the SA80 program. Test heavily and introduce mods as soon as faults become apparent, rather than rushing into production and then facing issues after service entry, possibly threatening lives of those using it. that whole inferior culture thing that Spitfire mentioned, was clearly demonstrated by the British. Not even going into the disaster that was the Nimrod program.
                          Last edited by BlackArcher; 13th April 2016, 22:34.

                          Comment


                            Originally posted by Spitfire9 View Post
                            Firstly, I do not use the word uber. Someone else brought it up so I replied using the terminology that had been used.

                            Secondly, I have a history of studying organisations or departments within organisations with a view to improving their performance. In my experience, there are organisations with a culture that clearly runs counter to enhancing performance. And yes, I have lived in a country which could have been termed third world where evading decisions, evading responsibility when one has got things wrong or has failed to get things done as promised etc was the norm. Such a business/organisational culture is an inferior culture in my book and I think my view is a realistic one.
                            Enfield's organizational issues and culture (as laid out in the article on the SA80 gun I posted earlier) or the British MoD's organizational culture or the general civil service culture of the UK (which unfortunately, India inherited) are exactly that then, right? -> inferior cultures. Surely you'd agree with that.

                            Comment


                              Since the topic is lemons designed and developed in Britain and sold to India (maybe we could explore the topic of other nations that had similar issues with British products), here is another one..Westland and its WG30 lemons sold to Pawan Hans of India, most likely with the aid of some hand greasing of Rajiv Gandhi's govt.


                              Back in 1985, India bought 21 Westland helicopters after Margaret Thatcher (then British Prime Minister) persuaded her Indian counterpart Rajiv Gandhi to ignore the advice of his experts, who were against the sale.
                              The money for the deal, put at nearly 65 million, came out of Britain’s aid budget, and was given to India specifically for purchasing the helicopters.

                              Westland at the time was a solely British aerospace company that manufactured helicopters after World War II.

                              However, the copters that were sold proved to be a disaster- two of them crashed in accidents in August 1988 and February 1989, killing over 10 passengers.

                              “It was no secret back then that the helicopters were a safety hazard. There were a number of defects, and pilots were scared to fly them. They just wouldn’t step into those helicopters,” said a source with the direct knowledge of the matter.

                              “The whole deal was pushed through as a means of reviving Westland, which, at the time, was going through a difficult financial situation,” the source added.

                              In 1991, the helicopters were withdrawn from service on safety grounds, after a number of subcommittee reviews, by the Director-General of Civil Aviation. In 1993, Pawan Hans, the state-owned helicopter firm that operated the Westland copters, put out a global tender for the defective helicopters. Eventually, British firm AES Aerospace emerged as the sole bidder, and the entire fleet of Westland helicopters was packaged off to Britain for the scrap value of just 900,000.


                              During the period of operation of those helicopters, Pawan Hans incurred an aggregate loss of Rs. 95.67 crore, while the British national audit office concluded that its government lost more than 105 million due to the deal.
                              ..
                              These lemons were so bad that their civil airworthiness certificate itself was revoked !! After a grand total of 6 years in service, with 3 fatal crashes, and a period during which they spent most of their time on the ground thanks to abysmal reliability.

                              Westland WG30 helicopters scam in India

                              The WG30 helicopters were delivered to Pawan Hans in 1987 but after two crashes, they were grounded.

                              Soon after their arrival in India in 1987 two crashed – one in the north Indian state of Jammu, and another in Nagaland killing 10 people. They proved to be unsuited needed constant servicing and repairs.

                              In 1991, the helicopters were withdrawn from service on safety grounds.
                              Two years later, after obtaining permission from the British government under the original 1985 "sale" agreement, Pawan Hans invited global tenders for the Westland 30s.

                              India sold its entire fleet of Westland helicopters back to Britain for the scrap value of just 900,000; nine years after the machines were found to be technically faulty and grounded.


                              But no one wanted to pay the 1.9m reserve price. Eventually AES Aerospace emerged as sole bidder. British aviation specialist company, AES Aerospace, offered 900,000 to buy and refurbish them and sell their spare parts. So far, it has paid 450,000, half the sale price.

                              The 19 remaining Westland 30s were sold but after six had been shipped to the UK, the deal failed.

                              An auction to sell off the helicopters did not succeed and most of the helicopters are still in a yard in Mumbai and Delhi.

                              The money from the sale would be given to the Indian government to use on poverty relief programmes approved by Britain's Department for International Development.

                              The civil aviation authority withdrawn its airworthiness certificate for the helicopters on the instructions of Westland, making them unsellable.


                              Because of this AES Aerospace left with half of the unsalable helicopters in Britain after spending 1m shipping them from India only to store them in containers.

                              It refused to ship over and pay for the rest of the helicopters, after that, it faced a problem that Pawan Hans, their Indian owners may sue or go to court of law for breach of contract.

                              That time Vic Avens, managing director of the company told to guardian that -"We purchased the Westland WG30 helicopters in good faith. When we got them, there was no question that they did not have an airworthiness certificate. Only when we got them to Britain did we find out that the CAA would not issue a new certificate. We feel we have been commercially manipulated."
                              ...
                              Last edited by BlackArcher; 13th April 2016, 22:19.

                              Comment


                                Originally posted by swerve View Post
                                I'm afraid that's not quite what I wrote.

                                Note the caveat - 'As far as I know'. And my statements that it was developed fairly quickly, a private venture (& Folland was a small company with limited resources), & the original fighter version that India bought was never wanted or accepted by the RAF. It only bought the later, extensively modified, trainer. The main focus of my criticism was that it's not a good benchmark to measure a modern fighter against, any more than old cars. I thought I'd been clear enough, but perhaps not.

                                Valid benchmarks to compare the development of Tejas with are types that are still current: JF-17 (noting that it's much more conservative), Gripen, Rafale, Typhoon, T-50 & its armed versions, Ching Kuo. Not a 1950s private venture light fighter from a small firm, which was rejected by the air force of its home country. One might as well compare the Suzuki Swift with the Morris Oxford, & criticise the latter for its obsolete technology.
                                comparing the JF-17 to the Tejas is difficult. Chinese programs rarely ever have any real issues publicized or openly written about. One can only infer that despite the "all is fantastic" attitude shown by sales folks at Aero shows, there will be issues with the JF-17 that would have had to be dealt with when it entered service. Just an example- the placement of the IFR probe that seemed to be borrowed from the Atlas Cheetah..that was the design shown initially as what the Block 2 would feature..months later we saw a completely different placement of the IFR probe on FC-1 prototypes being tested in China. Obviously, some flaw was discovered during testing that needed a re-design and a different position for the probe. Have you read anything on that? no, but had it been an issue on the Tejas, dozens of articles castigating HAL and ADA would've emerged saying how they got it all wrong the first time and how it wasted time, money and effort.

                                Or for example, despite tom-tomming the JF-17 to the world with Chinese targeting pods and what not that were claimed to have been integrated, we now find out its as good as useless in the fight against Taliban since it has no precision targeting capability...that's something that the Tejas has been demonstrating in live fire wargames like Iron Fist before it's even entered service. Swing role capability that included switching from air to air mode to firing off an LGB lased by itself, all within 90 seconds. Was the Typhoon even capable of that when it entered service?
                                Last edited by BlackArcher; 13th April 2016, 22:37.

                                Comment


                                  Originally posted by Spitfire9 View Post
                                  Well, I guess that most of the flaws being removed has a high probability, too.
                                  The IAF won't accept it otherwise, its that straightforward. The good part is if it gets reasonable, the current Govt will ensure the IAF sticks to its promises, unlike others which would have rather the LCA was supplanted by an import for various reasons.

                                  I would be amazed if the LCA team cared one jot about what I think but as it happens I have been hoping for many years that the LCA project has a successful outcome. I'm not a fanboy of the project (or any other I can think of) so I criticise what I see as compromising reaching that goal. But I am impressed that despite all the internal and external factors working against the project, India has created a fast jet design capability. And for peanuts.
                                  The point I am making is simple. They hardly care what you (or I) think since their every moment is spent in a)managing IAF expectations b) getting vendors to deliver c) getting the production agency to deliver d)managing the MOD which funds the program.

                                  In the meantime sketchy to outright idiotic, vested reports will constantly emerge. The Indian media is very lacking in any sort of ethics & bias is evident & glaring as are their susceptibility to special interest groups. The LCA is an outright 200 aircraft move away in the arms manufacturers kitties. Judging by the Rafale deal, its easily worth several tens of billions considering service requirements.

                                  So, all I can say is watch, observe & do tone down on the constant negativity based off of the clearly dubious reportage.

                                  Comment


                                    HAL In Talks with Swedish Firm for Upgraded Tejas

                                    (Source: Press Trust of India; published April 14, 2016)

                                    NEW DELHI --- State-run Hindustan Aeronautics Limited or HAL is in talks with Swedish aerospace major Saab, makers of single engine Gripen fighter planes, to collaborate on the upgraded version of the indigenously developed Light Combat Aircraft 'Tejas' which will replace IAF's aging fleet of MiG combat jets.
                                    http://www.defense-aerospace.com/art...a-upgrade.html
                                    Sum ergo cogito

                                    Comment


                                      From an interview with HAL Chairman Suvarna Raju

                                      (Source: Economic Times; published April 15, 2016)

                                      By Manu Pubby

                                      The man leading India's top military aviation company feels that the US offer to produce F 16 and F/A 18 jets in India is not attractive, as both jets failed to meet the cut at an air force competition for new fighters. The chairman of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Suvarna Raju, says that any gaps in the fighter force can be met by shoring up production of Indian-developed Light Combat Aircraft, to which the private sector can contribute 80% of parts.
                                      Q: How involved will the private sector be in the production of the LCA aircraft in India?
                                      A: The first 20 aircraft will be completed by 2018, by when we have to make a Mk 1A version of the aircraft. We are ramping up production to 16 aircraft a year. We have recently issued request for quotations to the private players to supply modules like fuselage parts and wings. If we can get this from the private sector, we can increase production to 25 aircraft a year.

                                      So, we are looking for capacity augmentation with these private players. We are looking at a concept in which HAL is an integrator that has some 20% (of total) work in the hangers. The remaining 80% of work can be off loaded to the industry. If a private company for example is setting up a shop for composites manufacturing, it will be assured for business for many years.
                                      http://www.defense-aerospace.com/art...hal-chief.html
                                      Sum ergo cogito

                                      Comment


                                        Originally posted by Spitfire9 View Post
                                        You referring to the incorrectly drilled holes the Germans found? Yes, very embarrassing. I think the company that made the mistake put their hand up to getting it wrong (and I presume it will cost them. Not sure on that, though).

                                        You talk of things that are uber. That's a German word, used indeed by the Nazis in the term bermensch (literally 'above being/person' ie 'superior being') in contrast to Untermensch (literally 'under being/person' ie 'inferior being'). Correct me if I'm wrong but the Indian fast jet design capability owes its existence to the LCA programme, does it not? Whatever level of capability there now is, I would say it has been achieved in spite of inferior project management. inferior decision making and inferior accountability. As long as there is no acknowledgement of this inferiority, I suspect that little will be done to start changing things for the better. If shying away from recognising and addressing weaknesses is an Untermensch characteristic or is a 'third world' trait, to me the LCA project looks like a good example of that sort of approach.

                                        I just hope that there are those with the courage to try to address the problem before the MCA project gets under way (should that happen).
                                        Yep embarrassing enough that the uber euro manufacturers could figure out to drill holes correctly after 9 years in service? Considering its just one of the several issues EF faced during and after induction? How could ber or "Marvellous" Euro factories run by bermensch fall to such third world lowly standards?

                                        LCA is indeed inferior, mainly because inferior Public relations, spicy food, tropical heat, engineers wearing chappals to work etc.

                                        And oh yes, I used a Greek word: et cetera (in English; /ɛtˈsɛtərə/; Latin pronunciation: [ɛt ˈkeːtɛra]) (rare: etceteros) (abbreviation: etc. or &c.) is a Latin expression that means "and other things", or "and so forth" or "yadi yada". It is taken directly from the Latin expression, which literally means "and the rest (of such things)" and is a calque of the Greek "καιὶτα τέρα" (kai ta tera: "and the other things"; the more usual Greek form is "και τα λοιπά" kai ta loipa: "and the remainder"). Et means "and"; cētera means "the rest".

                                        Comment


                                          Originally posted by Spitfire9 View Post
                                          HAL In Talks with Swedish Firm for Upgraded Tejas



                                          http://www.defense-aerospace.com/art...a-upgrade.html
                                          Dunno, How true it would be, considering why would SAAB help in setting up line for LCA, which is basically helping LCA in becoming SAAB's Gripen's competitor.

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