Anti-BVR tactics

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18 years 10 months

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A couple of combat accounts in the 1991 Gulf War seem to suggest Doppler notch maneuver was effective in breaking radar lock.

In the age of AESA radar and stealth, will the same Doppler notch maneuver still be effective as an anti-BVR tactics?

Iraqi MiG-25 broke radar lock by flying perpendicular to approaching F-15Cs on 19 Jan 1991 (page 49 of F-15C Eagle Units in Combat)
"Kluso" got a good lock, and was ready to shoot at targeting range, when the MiG went to the beam [perpendicular to Tollini and Pitts] and took it down low. We lost them, "Kluso" never got his missile off and we totally lost SA for a little bit.

F-15C tried to break radar lock (page 55 of F-15C Eagle Units in Combat)
I locked onto a target at eight miles and initiated my ID matrix, at which point I had an RWR indication that I had a "Slot Back" radar (MiG-29) locked onto me. I notched to the south and passed as much information to "Mole" as I could - "Altitude 8000 ft, off of my nose". My concern was self-preservation. I had 580 knots on the jet, I was well below 5000 ft and I was trying to stay on the beam while my ECM and chaff did all that they could.

Sea Harrier FRS1's anti-BVR tactics (pages 64 and 65 of Sea Harrier - The Last All-British Fighter)
The F/A-18 always used to play Red Air "Alamo" tactics for us and it used to be quite easy for us to defeat their AIM-7 Sparrows, turn on the beam, and then run in to the visual fight.

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15 years 8 months

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I think the pattern here is that all three of your accounts describe Continuous-Wave illumination.

With more modern missiles such as R-77 and AMRAAM that use a data link, the doppler notch is less effective, but i might be wrong.

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12 years 4 months

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I think with radars becoming more accurate these maneuvers are less and less effective...

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This becomes even less effective when considering AESA radars backed up by networked IRST tracks.

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A couple of combat accounts in the 1991 Gulf War seem to suggest Doppler notch maneuver was effective in breaking radar lock.

Which only affirms the Soviet logic of focussing on IR missile load-outs instead of radar guided BVR and having IR R-27 variants as well as the R-73.

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Which only affirms the Soviet logic of focussing on IR missile load-outs instead of radar guided BVR and having IR R-27 variants as well as the R-73.

indeed, as well as helmet mounted target sights, IR sensors, VTC...

however I believe that the WVR strategy is pretty much done for: as technology becomes increasingly better, it is possible to securely identify a target from an increasingly larger distance

stealth will counter this trend to a degree, but as soon as you are detected for even a moment (when engaging an enemy for example), an oppponent will probably be able to track and thus attack you
if you remain outside the enemy's missile envelope then you can disengage (the F-22's preferred strategy), but if you're fighting at short range you will be immediatly targetted by multiple enemies as data links put you in the sight of every fireing computer in the area

I believe that in the future this will only get worse and short ranged combat will by definition equal destruction, as HOBS missiles and lasers will kill anything within range, regardless of stealth, evasive manoeuvres or counter-measures

and in time even BVR will become always more dangerous
which is why I'm for UAVs for air combat: cheap ones to swarm the enemy with sheer expendable numbers, and more expensive stealth UCAVs to exploit enemy weak points, attacking AWACS, tankers, airfields and setting up cross fires

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indeed, as well as helmet mounted target sights, IR sensors, VTC...

however I believe that the WVR strategy is pretty much done for: as technology becomes increasingly better, it is possible to securely identify a target from an increasingly larger distance

stealth will counter this trend to a degree, but as soon as you are detected for even a moment (when engaging an enemy for example), an oppponent will probably be able to track and thus attack you
if you remain outside the enemy's missile envelope then you can disengage (the F-22's preferred strategy), but if you're fighting at short range you will be immediatly targetted by multiple enemies as data links put you in the sight of every fireing computer in the area

I believe that in the future this will only get worse and short ranged combat will by definition equal destruction, as HOBS missiles and lasers will kill anything within range, regardless of stealth, evasive manoeuvres or counter-measures

and in time even BVR will become always more dangerous
which is why I'm for UAVs for air combat: cheap ones to swarm the enemy with sheer expendable numbers, and more expensive stealth UCAVs to exploit enemy weak points, attacking AWACS, tankers, airfields and setting up cross fires


I don't entirely buy that, mostly because I don't believe that a detection can guarantee a track, and I don't think a track can guarantee a lock. Each of these requires different beaming strengths from the radar, and despite AESA's flexibility, power, and range, those limitations will still persist. Furthermore, there will always be electronic countermeasures. If your enemy is in range to lock onto you, you are probably in range to scramble their signal. That said, radars will get more powerful as time goes on, but that can mean both a stronger ability to detect, track, and lock as well as an ability to interfere.

Member for

18 years 10 months

Posts: 479

I think the pattern here is that all three of your accounts describe Continuous-Wave illumination.

With more modern missiles such as R-77 and AMRAAM that use a data link, the doppler notch is less effective, but i might be wrong.

In case of an F-15C armed with the AMRAAM, I guess the situation would be more or less the same before the AMRAAM's own active radar seeker acquires its target?

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I think this is a topic that can do well with input of some combat fighter pilots. 35AOA is on this board, if i recall he is an active USN Hornet pilot, perhaps he should be roped into this conversation for some actual prospective :) But given what happend to dozer back a few years, not sure how freely he would be able to answer some of our questions..

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You pretty much guessed my response bring_it_on. Three things I won't comment on: tactics, capabilities, and threat assessments. Call it self preservation if you like :)

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I think this is a topic that can do well with input of some combat fighter pilots. 35AOA is on this board, if i recall he is an active USN Hornet pilot, perhaps he should be roped into this conversation for some actual prospective :) But given what happend to dozer back a few years, not sure how freely he would be able to answer some of our questions..

No pilot or expert should awnswer these questions. ;) How about you learn them by yourself. :)

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15 years 5 months

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General tactic how to get to WVR is not a state secret, unless explicitly stated,
i think 35 AoA can give some pointers here :)

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The greater the distance involved the better the chance to overcome that threat. Active flight time of AAM and small envelope of its seeker-head reduces practical distance to less than 50 km in closing conditions at height. Much less in tail-chase, lower altitudes, EW conditions and/or an alerted pilot when it comes to WVR distances. Whatever is claimed the main limitation for every shooter was/is the IFF issue. Here every optical view enhancer under day-time conditions becomes important. Some people still forget that every modern radar gives just a synthetic picture of the reality. A situation not covered by the software or dropped by filters will not shown at all. Datalink can enhance your SA and reduce it as well, when you run into conflicting or not verified informations.
The claim of Robert L Shaw in mind. No longer in active flight the G capability of every missile is not enough to be better to a fighter and dropping even below very fast. Every lofting mode to overcome that demanded a target showing up in the predicted area under the calculated conditions. Just an option against targets bound to a known target run, like cruise-missile or bomber guiding stand-off weapons. .

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I'm with you on the great tactical advantage of optical view enhancer,
what are the top of the crop as of now or projected ?

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12 years 1 month

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Not to be nationalistic, but i think most recently upgraded optical view enhancer is OSF-IT from Rafale.

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16 years 8 months

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Those tactics rely on the "Doppler notch" which is a weakness of pulse-Doppler radars. Pulse-Doppler radars operate by detecting the frequency shift in the reflected signal as range to a target changes. These radars have a minimum velocity ("velocity gate") below which they will not display a target, so as to filter out clutter. Anything moving at less than this gate velocity is said to be "in the Doppler notch". The tactic of "Beaming" or "notching" is the tactic of changing your heading to be perpendicular to the target's heading, which temporarily reduces closure rate enough that the target loses lock.

Someone earlier said this is a weakness of Continuous Wave illumination. This is not true, it applies to any radar that relies on the Doppler effect.

With modern digital radar processing this is no longer a viable tactic.

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15 years 5 months

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Bump.
Does anyone have a good compilation of data? If that exists I might put it in a fancy graphical chart.

Maybe this is from the stone age but here it goes http://www.powershow.com/view1/11f3a5-MWViZ/Beyond_Visual_Range_BVR_AirtoAir_Combat_powerpoint_ppt_presentation


Try as i might, i cant view it, when i press 'play' it finish in ~3 sec.
Is there an alternative way to view the info ?

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11 years 5 months

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Try as i might, i cant view it, when i press 'play' it finish in ~3 sec.
Is there an alternative way to view the info ?

Try pressing "next" or the >| button a couple of times.

Member for

15 years 5 months

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Try pressing "next" or the >| button a couple of times.

tnx, i did it at last, and now have a definition of what constitutes 'BVR'

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AFM january/2011 page 76
Author Ade Orchard - retired RN Harrier pilot (also fly F/A-18B/D/F and AV-8B in 3 year exchange) desribes 2 anti AMRAAM tactics:
1-run the missile out of energy (turning away)
2-defeat the radar ( radar may lost the track when deal with Doppler effects - when target fly 90 deg to the fighter radar).
But probably AESA radar are much more resistant in second case.

3.I think another big problem for BVR missiles is advanced jammer like SPECTRA, AIDEWS, EWS-39, DASS, etc... According to polish F-16C/D blk52+ pilots active jamming (AIDEWS) is very effective aganst SAM system (red flag alaska 2012), so why not against BVR AAMs ?

Gen. W.Usarek:

Practicing in Alaska for the first time we had a chance to use the AIDEWS system as a function of actively jamming enemy radar. This innovation has provided the pilots of interesting experiences. AIDEWS has tremendous power and is effective.

sources:
http://lotniczapolska.pl/ZLOT-2012:-doswiadczenia-i-plany,26687