Falklands war and the shambles that it was behind the scenes

By: DragonRapide - 13th March 2019 at 15:14 Permalink

Re the Vulcan in-flight refuelling kit - XJ824 was delivered to Duxford on 13 March 1982 by a then-unknown Flt Lt Withers. (Just noticed the date - 37 years ago today!)

Less than 3 weeks later, Argentina invaded the Falklands. Very soon afterwards, my father (Deputy Director IWM Duxford at the time) took a phone call from the MOD along the lines of "You know that Vulcan we've just given you..." and he thought they were going to ask for it back! A crew from Waddo soon arrived to strip all the useful bits off it!

By: David Burke - 13th March 2019 at 16:45 Permalink

DaveF86 - a former instructor recounted to me that he was in Chile in civillian clothes circa 1982. He was a Canberra PR.9 guy . Chile in some wats provided valuable assistance to the degree that we gave them Canberra PR.9's and Hunters as a thank you .

By: ZRX61 - 13th March 2019 at 19:23 Permalink

The general opinion is the Canberras never made it to Chile, although the Nimrod R1 probably operated out of San Felix.

Heard a well known former F4 pilot at Dx hint that RAF Phantoms were in Chile. Not sure they'd have managed to keep that under wraps all this time though.

By: bazv - 13th March 2019 at 20:38 Permalink

"would a civvy tanker company have risked getting 'involved?'"

What nonsense, the ships were STUFT the owners has no choice.

It was a question Smirky - that is what a question mark generally means - innit ?? ;)

By: smirky - 13th March 2019 at 21:04 Permalink

Yes sometimes, especially with two question marks. The answer is that the decision was taken for them as their ships were requisitioned. :)

By: bazv - 13th March 2019 at 21:14 Permalink - Edited 13th March 2019 at 21:26

Yes I realise that some ships were req'd but we did not req a Large Tanker - otherwise we would not have needed the US Tanker - n'est pa ?

By: Creaking Door - 13th March 2019 at 21:59 Permalink - Edited 13th March 2019 at 23:57

Tankers (date requisitioned / chartered):

British Esk - 29,905 tons (05/04/1982)
British Tamar - 25,498 tons (07/04/1982)
British Tay - 25,000 tons (05/04/1982)
British Test - 25,641 tons (09/04/1982)
British Dart - 25,651 tons (09/04/1982)
British Trent - 25,147 tons (12/04/1982)
Eburna - 31,374 tons (13/04/1982)
G A Walker - 30,607 tons (16/04/1982)
British Avon - 25,620 tons (20/04/1982)
Anco Charger - 25,300 tons (18/04/1982)
British Wye - 25,196 tons (19/04/1982)
Scottish Eagle - 56,490 tons (26/04/1982)
Balder London - 33,751 tons (07/05/1982)
Alvega - 57,372 tons (01/05/1982)
Fort Toronto (water tanker) - 31,400 tons (10/04/1982)

The dates are important; remember, the Falklands were only invaded on 2nd April 1982 and not a shot was fired (on the Falklands) until the 1st May 1982, and yet not only had almost all these tankers been requisitioned by then but all of them were fitted with Replenishment-At-Sea gear (RAS) so that they could refuel Royal Navy warships and other ships (and each other) while underway at sea. Somebody was certainly expecting a 'shooting war'!

Then there were the (large) tankers of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary:

RFA Olwen - 25,000 tons
RFA Olna - 25,000 tons
RFA Olmeda - 25,000 tons
RFA Tidespring - 18,850 tons
RFA Pearleaf - 18,711 tons
RFA Plumleaf - 19,434 tons
RFA Appleleaf - 33,595 tons
RFA Brambleleaf - 33,257 tons
RFA Bayleaf - 30,000 tons

By: bazv - 13th March 2019 at 22:03 Permalink - Edited 13th March 2019 at 22:04

The request to the USA was for 8 Million Galls of Avtur within 7 Days and then the same amount every 7 days hence (from memory) - c'mon guys you know the Tanker I am posting about LOL

By: Creaking Door - 13th March 2019 at 22:44 Permalink - Edited 14th March 2019 at 00:04

Fair enough.....I just couldn't resist the 'did not requisition a larger tanker' line!

My point is, while we were grateful for the offer of assistance from the USA and not too 'proud' to accept that assistance, we probably could have managed without that assistance, although it would undoubtedly have made things more difficult (and probably cost more lives).

My overriding fear is, knowing the British fondness for self-deprecation, that the 'myth' of the Falklands Conflict will eventually become one of incompetence, disorganisation and luck, and the 'accepted' version of events will become that if we hadn't been bailed-out by the United States it would have been, another, 'typical British shambles'...

...when, in fact, nothing could be further from the truth.

By: smirky - 13th March 2019 at 23:10 Permalink

According to my calculator that's about 32000 tons of fuel. Was this for fuelling ships as well as aircraft? Seems a lot to use in 7 days.

By: Creaking Door - 13th March 2019 at 23:22 Permalink - Edited 13th March 2019 at 23:45

Yes, that's an interesting point; 'Avtur' (aviation turbine?) would seem to suggest it was all for aircraft?

This is exactly the sort of thing I was talking about; these often quoted 'facts' that become so mythologised that their origin, and truth, is often impossible to fathom. I first heard of this fuel tanker requirement in the book 'Vulcan 607' I think?

The Royal Air Force Historical Society document linked in the original post has some fascinating insight into this:

So, encouraged by all that US military enthusiasm, I was ushered into the office of J4 (Logistics). The admiral sat me down and asked what he could do for me. I explained that we were going to have to use Ascension as the mounting base for our operations against the Falklands, and that Wideawake, although a US airfield, was on territory leased from the UK. We therefore felt that the US would not object to our increased use of the Wideawake facilities. I pointed out that the fuel storage capacity at Wideawake had been designed to allow for little more than a weekly C-141 or two to service the US satellite tracking station and we were going to need a good deal more than that. I asked if the US would help in providing whatever was necessary. The admiral said that, of course they wanted to help, and asked how much fuel were we thinking of. I told him that we would like an eight million gallon tanker full of jet fuel off the settlement of Georgetown within the next seven days. The UK could not provide one, but we hoped the US military could help us out. The admiral pulled the screens back on the big plotting chart on his wall showing the whereabouts of every tanker in which the military had an interest. After some discussion on the telephone, he fingered one of the plots and said they could divert it to do what we wanted. I seem to remember that it was a tanker on its way to Guantanamo. ‘How are you going to store and use the fuel?’, the admiral wanted to know. I told him that the ship would have to lie off Georgetown with lines ashore and be used as a floating fuel station until empty. ‘How long will that take and will you need any more?’, was his next question. I said that we would need a similar tanker seven days after the first, and then another in seven more days, and so on. ‘You can’t use that much fuel!’, he said. I assured him we were going to try, and he thereupon set about making long-term plans to meet the requirement. The only snag appeared after three weeks or so, when the admiral told me that the tanker then en route to Ascension had broken a shaft, and was not going to make our deadline. He had found a replacement but it would be at least three days late. It rapidly became apparent that we would be out of fuel before then. Wideawake was up to over 400 aircraft movements per day. I asked him if we could use US stocks then on the island, limited though they were. He agreed, but it was soon obvious that they would be used up too. Confronted with what seemed to be an intractable problem, the admiral produced a chart showing US war stocks at Ascension. The war emergency fuel supply was just enough to fill the gap until the next ship arrived. ‘Hell!’, he said, ‘there is a war on, isn’t there?’ and we got our fuel.

And from later in the same Royal Air Force Historical Society document:

Fuel: The one bulk fuel farm is sited near Georgetown some 5 miles from the airfield. Aviation fuel was supplied by US Sealift Command tankers discharging their cargo through a floating pipeline to the fuel farm. Initially the fuel was then transported by road to ‘ready use’ tanks on the airfield. The critical link in the supply train was the speed at which fuel bowsers could be filled and driven from Georgetown to Wideawake. Although twelve RAF bowsers were imported to supplement the Pan Am fleet, the bulk fuel farm could dispense fuel to only one bowser at a time and the system was under continual pressure to meet the demand for fuel at the airhead. One unforeseen problem was the very high rate of bowser tyre wear caused by the extremely abrasive surface of the linking road; 3000 miles was a useful life. In late April the fuel supply to the airhead improved when, in a matter of days, the Royal Engineers assembled and commissioned a temporary pipeline from the bulk fuel farm to the ‘ready use’ tanks at Wideawake where fabric pillow tanks were installed to increase the capacity to 1,000,000 US gallons. Although the pipeline required continuous maintenance and the repeated filling of the pillow tanks accelerated wear and caused leakages, it significantly improved fuel availability at the airfield and reduced the time taken to prepare an aircraft for its next mission. At the end of hostilities, air operations from Ascension had consumed 5½ million US gallons of aviation fuel.

So, by the end of hostilities, only five-and-a-half million US gallons of aviation fuel consumed...

...but apparently, multiple eight million gallon tankers were required?

Something doesn't add-up?

By: smirky - 13th March 2019 at 23:56 Permalink

Hard to predict how long a war is going to last, given the slow speed of tankers and the distances involved I think I would have ordered an extra one too.

By: Creaking Door - 14th March 2019 at 00:36 Permalink - Edited 14th March 2019 at 00:39

Yes, but the implication was that eight million gallons were going to be used per week!

I told him that we would like an eight million gallon tanker full of jet fuel off the settlement of Georgetown within the next seven days. I said that we would need a similar tanker seven days after the first, and then another in seven more days, and so on...

By: Creaking Door - 14th March 2019 at 13:49 Permalink - Edited 14th March 2019 at 14:40

Yes, but I don't think they use 'Avtur' in them (they can obviously, but too expensive, normally at least); the Frigates, Destroyers and even HMS Invincible used something called 'dieso' I think?

The large number of tankers requisitioned and fitted with RAS gear were used to support the Royal Navy warships on their way to the Falklands, and in some instances in more 'frontline' positions when down there, although that was usually the preserve of the RFA tankers.

I've often wondered about the fuel storage arrangements on HMS Invincible during the Falklands; she has her own four Olympus gas turbines plus several large diesel generator-sets and then, of course, there are the Sea Harriers and helicopters she embarked. Did they all use different fuels? I'm guessing that they probably 'shared' a common fuel to a certain extent although maybe not the Sea Harriers? I took a photograph of a Wasp helicopter the other day that would seem to support the use of 'other' fuels being used in it.

By: bazv - 14th March 2019 at 14:44 Permalink

Difficult to prove the total amount of Avtur used on ascension in 1982,a figure of 12.5 million USG (US Gallons) has been quoted a few times but regardless of the total amount used - the original request to the USA was 8 Million US Gals within 7 days and the Americans did not so much as bat more than One Eyelid - ''You cannot be planning to use that much fuel ?'' - I believe Ron Dick's reply was along the lines of ''We are sure going to try''.

The US was not exactly reluctant to assist us - which was my original point.

Below is an excerpt from.....

The other major political agreement that was crucial for British logistics was the United States’ decision at the start of the campaign not to obstruct British access to its facilities at Wideawake US Air Force Auxiliary airbase on Ascension Island, and to provide considerable informal co-operation, even before the United States’ public announcement of support for the British on April 30, following the failure of its mediation attempts. The exact use that the British could make of Wideawake airbase could have been severely limited by the United States’ government. The airfield had originally been built by the Americans during the Second World War, and under an agreement of 1956 (amended in 1962) the British could use the 10,000 foot runway at 24 hours’ notice for just one military aircraft, and 72 hours’ notice for more than one aircraft. But this agreement had not been renewed since 1962, and might have been considered by either side to have lapsed. In fact, the United States’ level of co-operation went far beyond allowing the British use of the runway at Wideawake, including by granting them almost complete access to the airfield’s 1,200,000 US gallons of aviation fuel stocks, and later by agreeing to the British storing their own fuel stocks in the facilities at Wideawake.

By: Creaking Door - 14th March 2019 at 15:14 Permalink

No, I'm not disputing the excellence of the material assistance given by the United States but I'm still convinced that it would, materially at least, been possible without that help; it would have taken longer and probably cost more lives, but it would still have been possible.

Where the United States did assist the United Kingdom was in the UN and in other political arenas...

...but then the Russians and Chinese 'helped' the UK in the UN too!

By: jonny - 14th March 2019 at 17:48 Permalink - Edited 14th March 2019 at 17:49

As the thread title says " Falklands war and the shambles that it was behind the scenes"
I wonder how many extra lives were lost because of lack of equipment and the "mend and make do necessity" ,we don't learn ,the amount of deaths in the Middle East 20 years later because the troops didn't have the correct equipment.

It's a fact of life that militaries normally fight the next war with the equipment that they used in the last. Certainly a second tier military powers like the UK does, because it costs shed loads of cash to do anything else. The SDR of 1998 did not (and could not) predict the requirement to equip / train HMF to deal with 2 concurrent medium scale COIN centric operations. Exactly the same principle applies to the Falklands War, which saw UK land forces, trained and equipped to fight a high intensity conventional war in mainland Europe, projected 6000 miles by a RN Task Force whose primary task was to combat the Soviet Navy. The fact that we Brits pulled it off, is testament to the adaptability and professionalism of the men and women involved.