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  • DonClark
    Toujours propos

    #21
    Cheers, Baz.

    This has piqued my Battle curiosity now. Although I can't find the dashed figure again, I do agree 258mph looks wrong. The Pilot's Notes should give an answer, but I don't [sic] have a set in the collection.

    Oddly enough, despite the numbers in RAAF service, there are no Fairey Battle publications now in the AWM Library, National Library, or National Archives, all in easy reach from where I sit, and none for sale per the Aus Books & Collectibles listing service.
    Last edited by DonClark; 16th February 2018, 06:27. Reason: sic
    Don Clark
    www.211squadron.org

    Comment

    • DonClark
      Toujours propos

      #22
      I've made this a separate post, for convenience, and just as well as it turns out.

      I have a considerable collection of AM publications, in print, on CD, and/or as PDF file. For some reason I lost sight of these latter sources. In fact I have Battle I Pilot's Notes safely filed in PDF form.

      Just as Baz noted 340mph determined in the flight test program, it turns out that the Battle I Pilot's Notes advised the same maximum diving speed: 340mph and with conditions imposed relevant to engine and flying controls, as follows:

      Pilot's Notes Battle I Aeroplane Merlin I Engine AP1527A Jul 1939
      From the Introduction, amended to AL 6:

      Trimming tabs para 6 to 8
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      Fuel systems para 21 (all in CAPS!)
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      Lastly, Handling and Flying Notes for Pilot amended to AL 6: Diving para 21
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      That about covers the Battle's dive limitations, incl the caution about prolonged dives. Does the Intro para 21 note imply applying further nose down, once already established in the dive?

      The Handling notes, on recovery per elevator and engine limits, are of considerable interest especially in view of Baz's admirable caution. It's also worth remembering that Pilot's Notes were for the guidance of all Pilots, from the simply Average to the rarely accorded Exceptional (and what a range those terse assessments covered!).

      Engine limits for Merlin I II, III follow in a separate post below.
      Last edited by DonClark; 18th February 2018, 19:35. Reason: Addnl! punct sp revise for engine limits
      Don Clark
      www.211squadron.org

      Comment

      • DonClark
        Toujours propos

        #23
        On further reading of Pilot's Notes Battle I Aeroplane Merlin I Engine AP1527A Jul 1939, noted that Amendment List 4 and 6 had been taken in throughout (with AL 7 also made by hand). As the usual AL update table is omitted from my copy, the date of effect is not shown. But as a result, Battle I/Merlin I of the title pages regardless, the Notes cover Merlin Mark I, Mark II and Mark III.
        For completeness then:

        Engine limits
        Issued with AL No 6 (as last pages of the Notes)
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        So engine limitations in the dive are the same for Marks I, II and III: 20 seconds limit, +6lb boost, 3600pm.

        Dive bombing
        The Pilot's Notes added, with AL6, a table of Bomb Clearance Angles as para 37:
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        Lastly, for bombing, the wing cell bomb-carriers could be hydraulically lowered clear of the wing surface, before release up to the max dive-bombing angle of 80 degrees. The Pilot had three hydraulics selector levers, marked Chassis (ie undercarriage), Flaps, and Bombs (the latter both opening the cell doors and lowering the carriers).



        Source as noted. Printed facsimiles and PDF copies can be found on line through the usual sources.
        Last edited by DonClark; 18th February 2018, 22:15.
        Don Clark
        www.211squadron.org

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        • bazv
          olde rigger

          #24
          Excellent stuff Don

          Glad the VNE turned out to be over 300mph as I found some dive bombing trials figures for the battle and one of the noted pull out speeds was 338mph

          Comment

          • otis
            Rank 5 Registered User

            #25
            Was not aware that the Battle was considered as a dive-bomber. In this role was the aiming done by the pilot, as in the Ju87? This would make one of the crew members and several other aircraft features redundant.

            Comment

            • PhantomII
              Phantoms Phorever

              #26
              So I finished the book, and I have to say that I now have a very different perspective on the Battle and its legacy. Suffice to say I've always view its crews and those who worked on it with a great deal of respect, but I now have a better understanding of the aircraft itself. Turns out it wasn't such a bad design. The basic aircraft itself would appear to have been an excellent design that was never used or modified to reach its full potential. I hope others will pick up this fascinating read as I bet you will learn a great deal that you didn't already know. Top notch book!

              Title: The Fairey Battle: A Reassessment of its RAF Career
              Author: Greg Baughen
              Year: 2017

              The only downside I would give this particular book is that it doesn't cover the aircraft's life as a trainer, target tug, engine testbed, etc. Granted, I don't think that was the focus of this particular work, but some words on the lesser known stories of an under-reported (& widely misunderstood) aircraft would have been nice.

              otis,

              To answer your question about the Battle's dive bomber capabilities, apparently it was able to perform as a dive bomber and although never intended strictly as such (no dive brakes for starters), the aircraft was imminently more capable than some of its contemporaries (Blenheim, Maryland, etc.) in this role although it was never utilized in that mission to a large extent.)
              Fox-4!

              Comment

              • otis
                Rank 5 Registered User

                #27
                I’m curious as to what could have been done more for the Battle. In daylight it was too big, too slow and vulnerable. For ground attack you need either a dedicated dive-bomber or a cannon-armed fighter-bomber. Night bombers need to carry a worthwhile bombload over reasonable range. That the Battle showed no prospect of being easily improved showed it to be a rather poor design?

                Comment

                • PhantomII
                  Phantoms Phorever

                  #28
                  Well you have to start off by viewing the aircraft from a different perspective in terms of what roles it might be suited for. It's obvious that the idea of a single-engined bomber in the conventional sense was an anachronism from the 1920s and early 30s. The aircraft was designed to replace designs from that era (Hawker Hart, etc.) and in that regard it was excellent. It's performance far exceeded the design specifications it was intended for, and the general design was actually quite good in terms of handling, agility, and other features (it used an excellent albeit not perfect engine for example).

                  The problem that the Battle faced was that around the time it came about some other designs came along (Blenheim, Wellington, Hampden, etc.) that the Air Ministry became more focused on and this was because they viewed these designs as one step closer to the ultimate arrival of the four (& one twin) engine heavies they so badly wanted (Striling, Halifax, & Manchester....later redesigned into the Lancaster) Long-range strategic bombing was still very much on the minds of those in the upper ecehelons of the RAF and so they immediately viewed the Battle as obsolete even though in reality in terms of its design it wasn't. From the very beginning, they should have discarded any notion of using it in a strategic context. I can't think of many other single-engine designs that were intended to be used this way and even worse, the crew training was based on this idea which meant that when the Battle found itself in tactical situations such as in France, the crews didn't have the training they should have to make the most of their aircraft. This isn't to say the aircraft didn't have its limitations, but the simple solution was to re-role the aircraft into a tactical bomber in the same vein as the Ju-87 & Il-2. Granted the Il-2 came about just a bit later and the Ju-87 was a dedicated dive bomber, but the comparisons are still valid. Broadly similar dimensions, weights, & warloads in their initial incarnations mean that the Battle could have been developed to be much more had the necessary emphasis been placed on solving its weaknesses which were as follows:

                  Only a single forward firing rifle caliber gun (which was used quite often)...This should have been supplemented with further machine guns or perhaps cannon. The aircraft and wing could have dealt with this design change and you would have had an aircraft that would have been far more effective in a tactical battlefield role.

                  Self-sealing tanks...these were actually designed and delivered but apparently never really fitted (certainly not prior to combat in France) and this is largely to do with the lack of focus on the aircraft as it was viewed already as a waste of resources.

                  Increased range...this could have been provided by additional fuel tankage and some weight savings could have been gained by removing the bomb aimer and his equipment as for the battlefield role, this would have been unnecessary. (See the Ju-87 & two-seat variants of the Il-2...)

                  More engine power...several additional powerplants were looked at to replace the early Merlin and although some tests were successful, it was not proceeded with as pretty much by the time the aircraft entered service the powers that be had moved on.

                  The point I'm trying to make is that the aircraft had a good sound design and a variety of improvements would have helped turn it into a likely fairly successful attack aircraft that could have helped hold the line until dedicated fighter-bomber types such as the Typhoon & Tempest came along. You say that for ground attack you require a cannon-armed fighter-bomber and it must be realized that this concept didn't really come into play until a bit later in the war although the Stuka & Il-2 certainly showed that dedicated attack types had their place. (Yes, they were both vulnerable to fighters, but there were few bombers of any type during WWII that weren't. I think that properly equipped Battles with crews trained to perform the battlefield mission could have done their bit through the first few years of the war until the advent of newer fighter-bomber types.

                  The post is getting long so if you want to talk about specific aspects individually that might be easier. The author covered a lot of ground in the book, and I think he made some incredibly valid points. I don't know what your particular perspective or experiences are as they pertain to the Battle, but based on your response I tend to think your are viewing the Battle in the "traditional" way that indeed I used to. Thus, I do not think it was a poor design, but one that wasn't developed to its full potential.
                  Fox-4!

                  Comment

                  • Malcolm McKay
                    Rank 5 Registered User

                    #29
                    Well there is always the problem that at the time the Battle proved hopelessly inadequate which was the Battle of France, the British retreated to Britain and for the foreseeable future there was no need for a short range ground attack aircraft. Especially one as anachronistic as the Battle. The necessity for such an aircraft first arose after the BoB in the Nth. African campaigns and there it was fighters which did that particular task and did it well. In the west these would continue that role. I'm afraid I can't see much of a parallel between the Battle and the Il 2 and the Stuka. Both of those types suffered very heavy losses but on the other hand were capable of delivering a far greater punch than the Battle and had better crew protection. A Battle bought up to their standard would have been a totally different aircraft, but still would have suffered high losses. This becomes an exercise in finding a WW2 version of an A10 - and the A10 is not designed for operation in an interceptor rich environment.

                    Comment

                    • otis
                      Rank 5 Registered User

                      #30
                      The Battle being marginally better than the biplanes in preceded is not really proof of excellence. By the time it was being designed it was clear that fighter improvements were removing the speed edge of the Battle. I suppose the original spec was at fault and that it should only have been used as a stepping stone to the next light bomber, rather than being produced en mass. Sent to the backwaters like the Vickers Wellesley?
                      Re-purposing the Battle as a ground attack aircraft just throws it into the daylight role in which it was literally cannon-fodder. Adding self sealing tanks, extra fuel, armour and guns just adds extra weight and removes a great deal of speed, and it’s speed was it’s only original virtue. A divebomber has no need for a dedicated bomb-aimer, and neither does a cannon-armed tank buster.
                      At the same time it’s production was being cancelled, the Hurribomber was about to arrive. Although it lacked the range of the Battle, it could carry the equivalent bombload and packed the punch in guns that the Battle lacked. It also had the prospect of being able to fight/flee afterwards with risk to only one airman per plane.

                      Comment

                      • Graham Boak
                        Rank 5 Registered User

                        #31
                        "By the time it was being designed it was clear that fighter improvements were removing the speed edge of the Battle." Is this not a little premature?
                        "At the same time it’s production was being cancelled, the Hurribomber was about to arrive." Very premature - there were two years between the decision to cancel further production of the Battle (1939) and the arrival of the Hurribomber (1941). Which incidentally had only half the payload (500lb) of the Battle. The Battle was retained longer in production but as a trainer.
                        Both these statements have a strong air of hindsight, not available to the planners at the time.

                        Adding weight to an aircraft doesn't make an immense difference to its top speed, although it will significantly reduce other performance factors such as ceiling, acceleration, climb rate, and most significantly here payload/range. Removing the bomb aimer and his equipment would compensate for much of the added weight suggested. This is however attempting to make a ground-attack aircraft from an existing conventional bomber, which is not a particularly good idea, although in all fairness the USAAF did do a fairly good job of this in the Pacific. Had the RAF been seriously interested in ground attack in the first place, the specification could have called for something other than a Battle. That takes us back to a main argument in Baughen's books, that the RAF avoided serious thought on close air support for as long as possible, until it was forced on them by war experience. What might have been considered, without too much wishful thinking, could have been much like a P4/34, which became the Fulmar, which with added bombracks isn't so far from a Hurribomber, which may suggest that there was nothing too far wrong with Fairey's approach and the original design configuration - it was just a little oversized.

                        It is difficult to see how the Ju 87 was significantly superior to the Battle in terms of better crew protection, nor did it carry (at least in 1939) a greater payload. Arguably of course one big bomb is more effective than more smaller ones - though this does depend upon the target. It also suffered heavily when operating in the face of enemy fighters and heavy flak - but then so did the armoured Il 2.

                        It is worth adding (just about) that the Battle did have a respectable war service as a light bomber in East Africa.

                        Comment

                        • otis
                          Rank 5 Registered User

                          #32
                          Premature? I read that the Hurricane prototype flew months before the Battle prototype. Across the world high speed fighters were being proposed. How could it not be realised that the Battle was soon going to lose the speed advantage?
                          Re the Hurribomber, please consider the context I was using it. I am not suggesting it as a replacement for the existent Battle bomber. One therefore needs to compare your 1941 introduction date to a hypothetical date when the redesigned Battle/Sturmovik arrives.

                          Comment

                          • alertken
                            Rank 5 Registered User

                            #33
                            You have to fight with what you've got DC #10/13.

                            R&D Budget was given in parallel, 1933, to Battle Light and to Hampden/Wellington/Heyford Medium/Night Bombers. The public mood of the time was to Ban the Bomber. Not until PM Baldwin had safely seen off UK Bolshies/Fascists in 14/11/35's General Election could he re-arm to the extent of converting civil/export engineering resources. Heavies were promptly funded, and WW1 shadow scheme revived to convert auto et al industries to Munitions. Mussolini/Hitler/ Japan's territiorial encroachments, 1935/37, were seen by politicians as calling for UK Naval and Air response, as Deterrents to protect territory of UK National Interest - so keep Italy away from Iraq, Japan from Malaya: strengthen RAF/Middle and Far East, provide garrison, small Regular Army with RAF Co-operation for pacification of unruly proxy tribes. Battle, Blenheim, Lysander would do that, well, plus multi-role types on Illustrious-class.

                            As 1937 became 1938 we saw we might need to deal again with Germany in Europe (not however with a large conscript Expeditionary Force, not funded until 4/39). Naval blockade, again, plus Air interdiction of internal supply/distribution. France behind the Maginot would hold the line, while Paralysers vaulted it: so, the 3 Heavies that were actually deployed, plus R&D for more (e.g Warwick, Supermarine T.317), with 1941 seen as likely brief campaign, as Germany had no means of sustaining a long one.

                            The death traps funded in 1938 (endless: Battle, Blenheim, Botha, Hampden, Whitley, our scarce $ spent on paper kites) were intended as Interims - in scaling up production in the ex-auto plants, unskilled/female labour, and generating ground/aircrew to be ready for proper types in 1941. Defence/Foreign Policy went by the title cunctation, in a sense of gently catchee monkey.

                            France was doing much the same. Hitler saw a chance for early-1940 to clear his rear before turning East, that would be eroded as the Allies brought this new kit into service in 1941. He was so nearly right. Air Staff, 5/1940, must send in the Forlorn Hope, Alamo-style: to buy time till the big guns could be brought up.

                            Comment

                            • Graham Boak
                              Rank 5 Registered User

                              #34
                              There was never any suggestion that the Battle would be faster than opposing fighters of the same generation, which has always been a chimera since the Fox, just faster than then-current light bombers. The Hurricane and the Spitfire initial studies were funded on the grounds of high speed research, although fighters were clearly in mind. Whereas there's legitimate doubt as to whether Fairey would have any insight into the advanced thinking of competitor project offices, his own was more than competent enough to realise that a smaller aircraft powered by the same Merlin would be faster than a Battle! As they say, that's not rocket science.

                              It is too harsh to consider the Battle, Blenheim, Hampden and Whitley as deathtraps per se. (I reserve judgement on the later Botha, which appears to have had distinct shortcomings separate from the arguments in this thread.) These types were advanced for their time, as good their contemporary equivalents (A-17, SB, Do.17 etc), and up to anything they were likely to face in the second half of the 30s. As said elsewhere in this thread, no day bombers can operate in the face of enemy air superiority; though had more emphasis been placed by the RAF on escorting their bombers we'd not have seen the loss rates of mid-1940. Even the much-acclaimed Mosquito had loss rates in its initial period of day bomber operations higher than that of the preceding much-criticised Blenheim. (Though the Blenheim carried out fewer of the deep-penetration raids, thus being more exposed to enemy fighters, the Mosquito didn't attempt anti-shipping operations thus faced less fierce flak.)

                              PS I entirely agree that you have to fight with what equipment you've got. The interesting questions become whether you actually made the best possible use of that equipment, whether they could have been better prepared in terms of standards of fit, and whether your operating planning was up to the job. Avoiding hindsight makes this difficult. In the case of the Battle, armour was fitted to some extent, self-sealing tanks were planned (which becomes a question of production capabilities and restrictions of the time), doing without a bombaimer was considered (and even applied sometimes?), but planning to use them on deep penetration missions in daylight has to be considered lunacy! Whereas additional forward firing armament perhaps requiring (my pet suggestion) external bomb racks would need a change in operational intentions that could only have come from a considerable shift in RAF planning (see post 33). Which benefits from considerable hindsight and leads us into the separate argument of excessive focus on the strategic bombing campaign to the neglect of more urgent priorities.
                              Last edited by Graham Boak; 9th March 2018, 12:01.

                              Comment

                              • PhantomII
                                Phantoms Phorever

                                #35
                                Malcolm,

                                You are correct. The war went into a phase where short-range ground attack aircraft weren't necessary on the Channel front, but perhaps they could've been used elsewhere until the fighter-bomber concept was truly workable with adequate types. I'm not trying to argue that the Battle was as successful as the Ju 87 or Il-2, but rather that properly equipped with appropriately trained crews they could have provided similar results in certain mission sets to the other two types. As others have mentioned there was not one attack or bomber type that wasn't vulnerable during the war when not provided with adequate fighter protection.

                                otis,

                                I can already see that we won't ever begin to agree on this topic as I know from what perspective you are viewing the aircraft with, but I'll attempt to explain my thinking regardless. First off saying that it was marginally better than the aircraft it replaced is disingenuous to say the least. Of course the notion of a single-engine bomber was soon obsolete, thus the aircraft was, through not fault of its own, left without a true mission. The RAF's continued insistence on strategic bombing meant that the aircraft would never be truly re-roled into a battlefield attack type although the premise of the basic design meant it could have. Your comments regarding performance imply that no new engine was to be fitted. Had the aircraft been truly equipped with the necessary equipment for a battlefield attack role, then we can surmise it would have gotten a much larger engine (either a later Merlin or another type...many different engines were tested on the Battle to varying degrees of success. As mentioned the bomb aimer comes out of the aircraft with the new mission set so no weight penalty there. As someone else mentioned, there was a fair amount of time between the end of Battle production and the Hurricane being truly thrust into the fighter-bomber role. The last point regarding its lack of ability to escape also applies to all other bomber, attack types of the war.

                                I think some of you guys are still missing the point. I'm not claiming that the Battle was a war-winning design nor am I saying it could have served the RAF throughout the entirety of the war in any frontline role. My point is that it is an example of an aircraft that could have been more than it was, and the sound basic design would have permitted that. High level thinking in the RAF being what it was however this was not to be the case. The common (i.e. coffee table history book description) perception of the aircraft was that of an obsolete design that was nothing more than a failure. I disagree with that assessment and place more of the blame for the aircraft's ultimate fate on a lack of innovation among the Air Staff. Hindsight is always 20/20, but the aircraft could have been turned into a useful design. The author does an excellent job of explaining this from a wide variety of different angles and perspectives. We shall agree to disagree.
                                Fox-4!

                                Comment

                                • otis
                                  Rank 5 Registered User

                                  #36
                                  As someone else mentioned, there was a fair amount of time between the end of Battle production and the Hurricane being truly thrust into the fighter-bomber role.
                                  I think there’s been some confusion around wording here. I said "At the same time it’s production was being cancelled, the Hurribomber was about to arrive." I believe Graham picked up on that, as the decision to cancel was made sometime in 1939? (I’ve not read the book). Actual Battle production continued through until late 1940. So the Hurricane models with cannons and the bomb-carrying variant did arrive with squadrons within only a few months of Battle production ending.

                                  You would therefore need to show it was worthwhile altering the overburdened Battle design for the ground attack role when that work had already been completed for the Hurricane.

                                  I don't think it's fair to say we are missing the point because we don't agree with you. It is just very unclear exactly what form this new Battle takes, when does it arrive, how much extra weight of weapons/armour and what engine? It just seems a vague set of various wish-lists at the moment.

                                  Comment

                                  • Malcolm McKay
                                    Rank 5 Registered User

                                    #37
                                    I suspect, and I may be wrong, that much of the problems associated with the poor daylight record of aircraft like the Battle, Blenheim and others was the nature of RAF aerial gunnery training prewar. From most accounts that I have read live ammunition practice was minimal, restricted to annual attacks on drogues, while exercises pitting bombers against defensive fighters seemed rather like a game.

                                    A flight of slow bombers with poor maneuverability would fly along in a V formation while the "enemy" fighters flew around them at a slightly faster speed. The fighters would make passes and the pilot would make takatakatakataka noises to signify he'd fired and hit the bomber. While on the bomber a rather exposed AC or LAC quickly drafted for some air time would stand in a "turret" and point his single gun at the fighter and make corresponding takatakatakataka noises.

                                    At the end the bombers would fly serenely on to the target, drop their bags of flour, then fly away. The umpires would adjudicate and generally reach the conclusion that on the basis of the bombers having more people making takatakatakataka noises that the bombers had successfully breached the defense and then every one, except the ACs and the LACs, went off to the mess for a drink. That seems to have been the situation up until the fast 8 gun fighters arrived and even then their pilots had little live firing practice. If my summation is correct then it's no wonder that Battles and Blenheims proved to be death traps on real operations - years of poorly designed training had given them a tragically false perception.

                                    It compounded rather than challenged Baldwin's maxim that the bomber will always get through. WW2 came as a rude awakening for bomber crews everywhere. It was good thing for Britain that Dowding's development of Fighter Command's layered defensive system with its combination of detection and defensive action was in place. Even then the fighter pilots were hamstrung initially by hangovers from the gentlemanly prewar exercises like the V formation.

                                    Comment

                                    • K225
                                      Rank 5 Registered User

                                      #38
                                      Canadian Battle R7439 was the sole aircraft to be equipped with the Wright R1820 Cyclone radial engine powerplant as a study of potential alternative engines in the event of supply interruptions of the Merlin. This engine did develop up to 1350 hp in later versions but not sure what version was actually used for this test, would be interesting to know how it performed. Since this was the only one converted I suspect the results were not very encouraging.
                                      Attached Files
                                      "I always wanted to procrastinate, but I just never got around to it."

                                      Comment

                                      • Graham Boak
                                        Rank 5 Registered User

                                        #39
                                        Battle production only continued late into 1940 because of Beaverbrook's limiting priority to a handful of types, one of which was the Battle , which was seen as useful as an advanced and operational trainer. Not because the AM was seriously considering it for any other role except in desperation driven by circumstances. (As indeed were Tiger Moths.) Combat units with Battles continued to fly them until enough Blenheims were available as replacements.

                                        As for the Hurribomber, in concept this seems to have fallen almost directly into the role of a Hart replacement, but lacking the range of the Battle (or a Hart!). The RAF in the UK appears to have had no intention of using it in the close support role - even after allowing for the fact that there was no clash of armies in the theatre. Otherwise it would have been issued to Air Co-operation squadrons. It's difficult to determine just how it fitted into Air Staff thinking at all - except that it allowed bombs to be carried and dropped over the other side of the Channel with hopefully less losses than real bombers. All good for the Continuous Offensive of Trenchardian thinking, if totally ineffectual in actually winning the war. At least the later use in Channel Stop operations made more sense. The RAF in the UK appears to have had no intention of using it in the close support role - even after allowing for the fact that there was no clash of armies in the theatre. Otherwise it would have been issued to Air Co-operation squadrons. Thankfully it was a good idea really, which was used in the Desert War to develop tactics of genuine value. Which really is nothing to do with the Battle as intended by Air Staff doctrine and hence unsuitable for the real war, but the Hurribomber would have been seen as a direct replacement if the Battle had been conceived/designed/used as perhaps it should. In the end, it took the Hurribomber a couple of years to get the weapons and armour it needed for the role - and a more powerful engine to get the result off the ground!
                                        Last edited by Graham Boak; 10th March 2018, 15:37.

                                        Comment

                                        • otis
                                          Rank 5 Registered User

                                          #40
                                          Graham, thanks for clearing up the confusion caused earlier. Now that we have shown that the arrival of cannon and bomber versions of the Hurricane did arrive only a few months after Battle production ended, we need to establish whether it is worthwhile modifying the Battle at all, given the time difficulties you suggest?

                                          Was there ever any suggestion from Hurricane pilots that what they really needed was a larger/heavier plane with poorer performance?

                                          Comment

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