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Thread: TPY-2 can be radar OTH ?

  1. #31
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    It is amusing, because of course the more one pumps up the capabilities of TPY-2, the more it becomes clear that the deployment of such a system so close to China represents a repeat of the Cuban Missile Crisis, to be approached in the same manner, i.e. by threatening to erase the southern aspect of the Korean peninsula from the map. China's mistake here has been in speaking too softly and not wielding a big enough stick.
    Last edited by Rii; 6th May 2017 at 13:54.

  2. #32
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    It is amusing, because of course the more one pumps up the capabilities of TPY-2, the more it becomes clear that the deployment of such a system so close to China represents a repeat of the Cuban Missile Crisis, to be approached in the same manner, i.e. by threatening to erase the southern aspect of the Korean peninsula from the map. China's mistake here has been in speaking too softly and not wielding a big enough stick.
    You mean this?

    http://www.defencetalk.com/pentagon-...-review-69923/

    In reality, it has been an ongoing review since way back with Obama Admin, and the missile shield in East Europe..

    Which is subsequently the one reason Russia is going ahead with the R-500 missile(New Iskander), which is outside the INF agreement, but then again so is the US missile shield.
    Officialy Iskander is labled at est. 415km range, but not really. Its far longer.
    Last edited by haavarla; 6th May 2017 at 14:05.
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  3. #33
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    ...and again, separating targets from decoys is thaad's purpose as well, hence the big, high frequency, high directivity radar with the ability to discern decoys from the missile. thaad interceptors are IR based I believe so ECM is of no use (a tiny missile jammer is not going to have any impact on a huge TPY-2 AESA). It comes down to maneuvering, and thaad kill vehicles are small, agile and use ACMs to maneuver.

    As for US, it certainly seems their plan is so hit the S-400 head on with F-35s loaded up with mid-range standoff weapons and decoys containing jammers.

  4. #34
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    So your dispute is that the radar can't be used to detect atmospheric targets or just doesn't have the ability to discriminate a fighter or cruise missile target from a ballistic missile?
    I don't dispute either of that. THAAD is designed to engage targets flying between 50-150km in altitude (rough estimate of the lower altitude limit but it is generally believed to be 50km). What is common knowledge that the radar is a BMD sensor designed to detect, discriminate and target the ballistic missile threat. The MDA classifies it sensors as BMD, AMD or IAMD and the TPY-2 is a BMD sensor.

    Thaad testing alone has been performed on low endo-atmospheric targets since as early as 2007. I provided an example of a test involving a slower flying cruise missile which you're implying had nothing to do with the radar during the test (its on you to provide evidence that tpy had no involvement in detecting or tracking the cruise missile as it's your claim is didn't).
    THAAD is an endoatmospheric capable BMD intercept system so no I never ever disputed this. What you have shown is an integrated exercise involving AEGIS Baseline 9 IAMD assets, THAAD BMD assets to neutralize a multi pronged threat directed towards AEGIS. No where does it mention anything that the THAAD is currently incapable off vis-a-vis its BMD mission. As the official TPY-2 description from the MDA describes it is designed specifically for BM Defense. Neither of tests that involved THAAD have provided documented evidence of THAAD tracking, classifying or eliminating any non ballistic missile threat, something it is not designed or required to do given that it is purely a BMD sensor.

    So we have numerous tests where Thaad has been proven against low atmospheric, high speed srbm targets including ftt-14 which involved very high lead angle in a "very high dynamic pressure" environment... ie low level, side on shot. A test involving a cruise missile being defeated by AEGIS in conjunction with thaad. It seems that low altitude and possibly low speed is not a problem for the radar.
    THAAD radar is a BMD sensor. Most that know the system, or have studied it know this. SRBM is a ballistic missile and as long as it is gets high enough to cover the interceptors lower altitude it will be be engaged. This speaks nothing of the sensor being used or even being capable of an IAMD mission.

    As I have said repeatedly, the BMD vs IAMD distinction is well understood an documented. You can reach out to Raytheon, MDA or someone that is a BMD expert to confirm that the TPY-2 is a BMD and not an IAMD sensor when operating either in TBM or FBM.

    Just like THAAD is integrated into the Navy's IAMD architecture, it will, over the next few years be integrated with IBCS and the Army's command and control that also handles the Patriot system. This will allow THAAD to provide extended coverage to the Patriot system through IBCS and once the interceptors are upgraded with a dual band data links (C/X) it will even allow THAAD radar to cue a PAC-3. That will not make the TPY-2 an air defense sensor since it will remain a BMD sensor (unless additional requirements are invested in) supporting the Patriot IAMD in its BMD portion of the mission much the same way it supports the Navy.

    This is talked about in both the roles of the sensors but also test objective and execution summary provided by the MDA. If you take the 2015 test you likely referenced (since you did not provide a link) it involved 2 distinct TPY-2's, and an AEGIS vessel. One TPY-2 was operating in TBM and detected, acquired and destroyed a short ranged TBM. The second TPY-2 was operating in FBM and exchanged data with the command and control and provided enough data for the AEGIS Destroyer (Paul Jones) to launch an SM3 against an MRBM. The SM3 developed an anomaly after which the first THAAD TPY-2 guided a THAAD interceptor to destroy the target. There was a cruise missile launched during this test event, and MDA specifically mentions that it was detected and tracked by the AEGIS destroyer. There is no mention whatsoever of the TPY-2 being involved with anything having to do with a non BMD target. This would be obvious to most that know a thing or two about it since its purely a BMD system.

    It is amusing, because of course the more one pumps up the capabilities of TPY-2, the more it becomes clear that the deployment of such a system so close to China represents a repeat of the Cuban Missile Crisis, to be approached in the same manner, i.e. by threatening to erase the southern aspect of the Korean peninsula from the map. China's mistake here has been in speaking too softly and not wielding a big enough stick.
    China's concern aren't technical but more about policy shift and the linking of South Korea into the US BMD architecture. The only likely technical argument in this context against the TPY-2 is its FBM capability which requires radar shut down and hardware changes and cannot operate concurrently with the TBM capability which it is designed to do in that region to provide BMD protection. If there were two radars on South Korea it would have made more of a case since it could be argued that one could always be operated in FBM all the time while the other provides BMD. This is not the case with the TPY-2 and not how it operates.
    Last edited by bring_it_on; 6th May 2017 at 16:05.
    Old radar types never die; they just phased array

  5. #35
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    As for US, it certainly seems their plan is so hit the S-400 head on with F-35s loaded up with mid-range standoff weapons and decoys containing jammers.
    More vaporware..
    That only works until the first wave of jets take loses.. its a DYNAMICAL ASPECT in such high tier conflict, so such baseless claim belong for the usual basement dwellers.

    Whatever sugar coating news that comes out from Nellis/Red Flag with F-35 is quite sanitized in terms of what will go down in real conflict. You simply don't know until you are in the middle of it.
    First off, you have to located the damn S-400 regiment, and then fight off multi layer of different systems, and that include EW and decoy SAM elements.
    Last edited by haavarla; 6th May 2017 at 14:17.
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  6. #36
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    China, Russia will deploy the SS-26 and DH-10 to limit the capabilities of THAAD, if war occurs, THAAD is designed to detect North Korea's ICBM and MRBM targets rather than LACM's. Russia and China

  7. #37
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    Quote Originally Posted by blackadam
    what about this picture ? It shows that TPY-2 is completely capable of scanning surface targets in China. South Korea has a lot of high mountains that can do it
    China, Russia will deploy the SS-26 and DH-10 to limit the capabilities of THAAD, if war occurs, THAAD is designed to detect North Korea's ICBM and MRBM targets rather than LACM's. Russia and China
    The red cone doesn't touch the ground, and TPY-2 is not a ground to ground radar, it is an anti ICBM radar, so velocity rejection threshold is very high to reduce clutter.
    SS-26, DH-10 , practically all ballistic missiles are what TPY-2 designed to defense against
    Last edited by garryA; 6th May 2017 at 14:35.

  8. #38
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    Quote Originally Posted by haavarla
    Voronezh radar are highly prefabricated radars needing fewer personnel and using less energy than previous generations. The ones being built in Mishelevka are Voronezh-M, also described as Voronezh-VP, a VHF radar with a stated range of 4,200 kilometres (2,610*mi). The VP stands for high potential and may reflect that it has six segments, rather than the three of other Voronezh VHF radars.
    Voronezh is an over horizon early warning radar , so its role is closer to AN/FPS-118 or ROTHR rather than TPY-2, with frequency around X band, the beamwidth of TPY-2 should be more than enough for tracking and targeting

    Quote Originally Posted by PeeD
    The Iskander is a maneuvering target, it has a kinematic advantage to pull G's, plus decoys, plus ECM, different trajectories.
    TBH I don't think Iskander is an agile target, eventhough, according to some internet sources said that it can pull 20-30G. The reason is, the missiles moving at Mach 6 so the turn rate isn't actually very high. Moreover, i highly doubt that the tiny fin can provide enough aerodynamic lift for the ballistic missiles to turn at the edge of space (mid phase). Furthermore, Iskander is a solid-propellant single-stage rocket, so it won't have constant thrust in cruising phase like a ramjet or a turbo jet, which mean every hard maneuver will reduce speed of the missiles dramatically. Rather counter productive for ballistic missiles.
    Last edited by garryA; 6th May 2017 at 14:52.

  9. #39
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    Voronezh is an over horizon early warning radar , so its role is closer to AN/FPS-118 or ROTHR rather than TPY-2
    Yes, but you would think Russia is currently working on a high terminal X-band system to go with future Voronezh-VP.
    In other words not only rely on S-400 system for targeting solution..

    Edit:
    From the beginning its been clear that any large early warning radar station will be a high target value asset.
    In Russia there will be S-300/S-350/S-400 systems close by such facilities.
    So why not throw in some more layer of protection like powerfull X-band targeting segments..
    Last edited by haavarla; 6th May 2017 at 14:48.
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  10. #40
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    Those are different systems supporting different needs. The TPY-2 is first and foremost a targeting radar for the THAAD system. It provides excellent discrimination against debris and decoys since its engagement altitude is high enough where it cannot rely solely on the atmosphere taking care of a lot of that (as a Patriot would for example). As a second role, the TPY-2 when operated in FBM supports Early Warning and aids the naval and Homeland defense assets in discriminating longer ranged ballistic missiles before they enter these system's organic sensor coverage. As longer ranged variants of the SM3 mature (such as the IIA) the interceptors coverage extends beyond that of the radar and the TPY-2 allows the missile to be launched on remote using its cues and updated later once the ballistic missile enters the envelope of the SPY-1 or in the future SPY-6 where it will be less of a challenge given the considerable increase in range.

    A pure Early Warning, or OTH radar serves a different purpose and will get you excellent range given the use of more effecient lower frequency components, but it will offer poorer discrimination and will be impractical for interception duties against a credible threat. There is a reason there is mad rush within eh MDA to replace or supplement UHF band EW radars currently supporting the homeland defense mission via GMD with S-Band LRDR and it is precisely because of the discrimination challenge.

    Finally, the most challenging bit for the TPY-2 is its requirement to be transportable and be required to be set up quickly (relative to size and mission of course) thereby limiting its effectiveness as a purely fixed early warning radar (dedicated EW sensor in the BMD context). It does great given theater coverage requirement but it isn't an LRDR substitute, in fact not even the SBX can fulfill that role without significant growth. If it were to be a purely fixed X-Band discrimination/Early Warning sensor it would have looked like a permanent SBX fixture.

    Last edited by bring_it_on; 6th May 2017 at 14:46.
    Old radar types never die; they just phased array

  11. #41
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    Quote Originally Posted by haavarla
    Which is subsequently the one reason Russia is going ahead with the R-500 missile(New Iskander),
    TBH, i find that calling R-500 the new Iskander is rather misleading, original Iskander is more or less a ballistic missiles similar to SCUD. On the other hand, R-500 is a cruise missiles similar to tomahawk. Different design for roles, IMHO


    Quote Originally Posted by haavarla
    Yes, but you would think Russia is currently working on a high terminal X-band system to go with future Voronezh-VP.
    In other words not only rely on S-400 system for targeting solution..
    That plausible, but what iam saying is that the role of TPY-2 and Voronezh-VP are very different.
    One mobiles with narrow beamwidth for targeting, while the others stationary, has wide beamwidth but can see over the horizon for early warning.
    Last edited by garryA; 6th May 2017 at 14:49.

  12. #42
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    Flirting with the INF via Ballistic and perhaps cruise missiles (wink wink magical 499 km range performance ) is already eliciting a counter response so someday cooler heads will prevail and they will sit down, talk about it and either walk away from INF or limit these systems. LRPF hit its Milestone A just recently and it has range requirements closely mimicking those of the Iskander Ballistic Missile with a 499 km objective (again it doesn't fall to the ground at 499 km so it is essentially a potentially INF violating or INF flirting weapon). At the moment there are no plans to bring back the ground launch cruise missile capability but that could be exercised as a means to kicks start negotiations again. The missiles and boosters already exist, all they really need to do is certify a launcher.
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    Last edited by bring_it_on; 6th May 2017 at 14:56.
    Old radar types never die; they just phased array

  13. #43
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    R-500 is an overall term of a new missile platform, while Iskander is part of a system(TEL) included.
    Don't think you should get too hung up on this part..

    And there are 2500km figures floating around the R-500 missile.
    Last edited by haavarla; 6th May 2017 at 14:59.
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  14. #44
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    Yes I am aware of that hence the distinction to refer to only the BM portion of the Iskander system. The cruise missile portion is tricky since you can play it a number of ways. A ground Launch Tomahawk can be claimed to be a 500 km missile on account of software limitations or playing around with the design and limiting performance for example or by being liberal with trajectory while calculating range. However no matter what you claim it will be hard selling it as a 500 km missile much the same way its hard to sell these long range fires (essentially short range INF flirting ballistic missiles) as being sub 500 when they are designed to operate right at the edge of that range. From a policy perspective the US has decided to counter just the Ballistic Missile piece with the LRPF also sporting similar range figures but one could argue that doing the same with a TLAM or LRSO (conventional) based ground launched weapon would be easier but quite a bit more escalatory so it remains to be seen if that is the response.

    Last edited by bring_it_on; 6th May 2017 at 15:43.
    Old radar types never die; they just phased array

  15. #45
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    It would be interesting to know what the Russian State pays for Iskander with new missile..
    Perhaps not cheap.. but a Su-34, PakFa or large Bomber is far from cheap.

    About R-500. How ridicules would it be if it could do a supersonic start and mid flight, then trottle down and deploy cruisemissile fins for the end flight..?
    Last edited by haavarla; 6th May 2017 at 16:01.
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  16. #46
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    It wouldn't be ridiculous at all, if it flirts with or violates INF it will illicit a proportional response and they will get back to the negotiating table to deescalate.
    Old radar types never die; they just phased array

  17. #47
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    Quote Originally Posted by bring_it_on View Post
    It wouldn't be ridiculous at all, if it flirts with or violates INF it will illicit a proportional response and they will get back to the negotiating table to deescalate.
    And when would this happen? How far would it go..
    most of US Elite would rather have a weapons race just to see Russia burn down.. Russia has tried to protest against US missile sheild in East Europa for a good decade. I would very much like to know who is the Cooler heads here
    Last edited by haavarla; 6th May 2017 at 18:49.

  18. #48
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    And b.t.w the quote function works on my Smartphone.. 🙃 but not on my PC. Is there a setting on this forum to choose which type of user platform?
    Thanks

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    PAC-3 is struggling enough with Tochka and Scud in Saudi use, would be "interesting" to see it go up against a vastly more potent round like Iskander.

    BTW, what is curious about the current INF treaty is the US has claimed the supposed violator is not Rubezh or R-500. So either the US is completely full of it, has mistaken intelligence, or Russia actually is planning to field something entirely new that doesn't just skirt INF, but completely violates it. Which would indicate they intend to leave the treaty wholesale.
    Also one does have to add related Russian concerns about American land based VLS systems, missile targets, which do nothing to strengthen the likeliness that both sides can maintain trust.

    Also, lol @ AJ chestbeating about a radar system while being wrong on its actual specifics.

    http://nevskii-bastion.ru/demonstrator/

    Some photos of a rough Russian equivalent (really a "civilian" demonstrator, but the only open thing we have to go off), though what is actually undergoing MOD testing, and what will enter service with S-500 (for its more dedicated ABM role) we will only see around ~2020.
    Last edited by TR1; 6th May 2017 at 20:52.
    http://img818.imageshack.us/img818/9098/rsz11rsz3807.jpg

  20. #50
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    The Voronezh is a high power system like the TPY-2, as far as I remember it has VHF- and UHF-band variants and no OTH capability. Hence its primary a BMD sensor, the new Russian system with OTH capability is the "Container".

    @garryA

    TBH I don't think Iskander is an agile target, eventhough, according to some internet sources said that it can pull 20-30G. The reason is, the missiles moving at Mach 6 so the turn rate isn't actually very high. Moreover, i highly doubt that the tiny fin can provide enough aerodynamic lift for the ballistic missiles to turn at the edge of space (mid phase). Furthermore, Iskander is a solid-propellant single-stage rocket, so it won't have constant thrust in cruising phase like a ramjet or a turbo jet, which mean every hard maneuver will reduce speed of the missiles dramatically. Rather counter productive for ballistic missiles.
    It can pull those G values in terminal phase due to the integrated gas system (apart from the solid fuel booster). The whole exo- and endo atmospheric maneuvering capability (without the use of fins at all if needed) is what makes it a anti-ABM asset.
    The game that this capability creates is a bad one for a ABM asset. The Iskander regains its speed even with shut boosters when maneuvering due to its potential energy. I talked with you about the same case in the last SAM discussion: The Iskander can either dissipate its potential energy by heating up its heatshield via friction (SCUD), or maneuver away from its initial position, forcing the THAAD interceptor to change accordingly. Difference is that the Iskander won't loose much of its kinematic parameters, while THAAD will lose it's most important one in this climb game: it's speed.

    The turnrate at mach 6 is another point: a 30 G turn at mach 6 might cause a small turn but due to the speed the change of position is very much, the THAAD must catch up to that position change.

    The (sometimes lofted) ballistic trajectory and the speed it produced at terminal phase and the sophisticated exo- and endo-atmospheric gas steering system is that makes the difference and why the name Iskander is around in BMD discussions.

  21. #51
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    Quote Originally Posted by TR1 View Post
    PAC-3 is struggling enough with Tochka and Scud in Saudi use, would be "interesting" to see it go up against a vastly more potent round like Iskander.

    BTW, what is curious about the current INF treaty is the US has claimed the supposed violator is not Rubezh or R-500. So either the US is completely full of it, has mistaken intelligence, or Russia actually is planning to field something entirely new that doesn't just skirt INF, but completely violates it. Which would indicate they intend to leave the treaty wholesale.
    Also one does have to add related Russian concerns about American land based VLS systems, missile targets, which do nothing to strengthen the likeliness that both sides can maintain trust.

    Also, lol @ AJ chestbeating about a radar system while being wrong on its actual specifics.

    http://nevskii-bastion.ru/demonstrator/

    Some photos of a rough Russian equivalent, though what is actually undergoing MOD testing, and what will enter service with S-500 (for its more dedicated ABM role) we will only see around ~2020.
    Which missile are we then talking about if not R-500?

  22. #52
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    They have not said AFAIK.

    https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/270603.pdf

    "The violating GLCM is distinct from the R-500/SSC-7 GLCM or the RS-26 ICBM"

    That doesn't make it sound like the issue is a missile that can skirt the prohibited range through modification, but who knows.

    Also they claim this:

    "Information pertaining to the missile and the launcher, including Russia’s
    internal designator for the mobile launcher chassis and the names of the
    companies involved in developing and producing the missile and launcher"

    But since none of this has been brought into open...
    http://img818.imageshack.us/img818/9098/rsz11rsz3807.jpg

  23. #53
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    PAC-3 is struggling enough with Tochka and Scud in Saudi use, would be "interesting" to see it go up against a vastly more potent round like Iskander.
    PAC-2 not PAC-3 or PAC-3 MSE since the DOD awarded the PAC-3 export contract (of which SA was one of the customers) only around the Christmas of 2015 with work continuing through 2019 is deployed with the Saudi Patriot systems. As far how it is performing, there is no reliable data beyond claims from both sides (Saudi and Raytheon vs rebels) that are often unsubstantiated by actual facts. Regardless the current baseline of the Patriot is Configuration 3+ with MSE with the sensor and C2 bump contributing as much to actual intercept as the interceptor itself going forward. While it has received sensor upgrades and the new MSE missile is operational with the US, the sensor and Command and Control bump is a bit away. A year or two for the C2, and 4-6 years for the radar (export).
    Last edited by bring_it_on; 6th May 2017 at 22:31.
    Old radar types never die; they just phased array

  24. #54
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    Quote Originally Posted by PeeD
    It can pull those G values in terminal phase due to the integrated gas system apart from the solid fuel booster
    The whole exo- and endo atmospheric maneuvering
    9K720 Iskander-M 's mass is around 4,615 kg , assuming the mass without fuel is 1/2 of that, it is still around 2307 kg ( likely even heavier with all these alleged ECM, decoys and gas system on it). As a result a 30g turn required the force at least 2307*30 =69,225 kg or more than 69 tons.What sort of mini gas system giving that amount of thrust ? and for how long ? For reference purpose the first stage of LGM-30 Minuteman produce 91,170 kg of thrust or 91 tons
    https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/icbm/lgm-30_3.htm
    I don't know about you but i don't buy that a secondary gas system on the tiny Iskander can produce thrust more than half of Minuteman's first stage
    Moreover, how does the missiles even know when to perform the high G maneuver to dodge the interceptor?, also after the maneuver does it turn back to attack the intended target or just fly randomly in a completely new direction ?
    Furthermore,in exo-atmospheric condition, a gas system perpendicular to the body will change nose pointing but not the direction of travel, unless the main rear motor still operating ( see the different between how a space shuttle pointing its nose and an aircraft turning).

    Quote Originally Posted by PeeD
    The Iskander regains its speed even with shut boosters when maneuvering due to its potential energy.The Iskander can either dissipate its potential energy by heating up its heatshield via friction (SCUD), or maneuver away from its initial position, forcing the THAAD interceptor to change accordingly. Difference is that the Iskander won't loose much of its kinematic parameters
    All missiles launched in ballistic arcs can take advantage of potential energy, Iskander is no different. It basically trade potential energy for kinetic energy after mid phase, if you wasted this precious kinematic energy, it will not have enough to potential energy to compensate. Every maneuver turnning missiles relative to the air stream will waste kinematic energy due to higher drag. Furthermore, regain speed in the atmosphere would take much longer time consider the fact that the air density is much higher and it keeps getting denser and denser the longer the missiles fell back into the earth.

    Quote Originally Posted by PeeD
    I talked with you about the same case in the last SAM discussion
    Yes,we did and i just couldn't be bothered to reply in the end because the discussion keeping going in circle
    Last edited by garryA; 7th May 2017 at 00:07.

  25. #55
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    The Voronezh is a high power system like the TPY-2, as far as I remember it has VHF- and UHF-band variants and no OTH capability. Hence its primary a BMD sensor, the new Russian system with OTH capability is the "Container".
    Power does not have to do anything here since many applications can share comparable or high levels of power but still be different. The role or design and technical aim is what matters. The TPY-2 a high power high frequency radar designed primarily for terminal intercept and discrimination and can also double up and operate independently in FBM where it provides high quality early warning and discrimination data for launch on remote and situational awareness duties. High power early warning radars are tasked for such a role and the design choice there is lower frequency. A comparable long range Early Warning US System would be the AN/FPS-132 which incidentally was tied to the Qatar THAAD deal and will be operated alongside the THAAD providing SSA and EW to that nation's BMD program.

    Those radars (AN/FPS-132 operates in the UHF band) however do not aid much when it comes to discrimination even though they are great for early warning and cover a very large area. Hence the US has globally deployed X-Band TPY-2s, the AEGIS network, SBX, and has just recently broken ground on the construction of the S-Band GaN Long Range Discrimination Radar one of the largest S band AESA radar anywhere in the world. LRDR overlaps the AN/FPS-132's mission and co-exists with it, essentially covering similar areas but it provides a giant leap in discrimination which is critical when you are intercepting ICBMs in their mid course using interceptors from CONUS.

    The Role of long range Ballistic Missile EW has now grown to cover mid course defense which is a lot different from the decades past where they were there to provide Situational Awareness so that a retaliatory strike could be launched. The new role influences design trades as no longer would a low frequency, high efficiency radar be a reasonable trade even though it provides excellent coverage. The discrimination challenge and advances in high frequency AESA has allowed for higher frequency trades to be made at a reasonable cost.

    Comparable (mission) US Early Warning Radars (programs) -

    AN/FPS-132 (UHF)

    LRDR - S-Band AESA (GaN)
    Last edited by bring_it_on; 6th May 2017 at 23:33.
    Old radar types never die; they just phased array

  26. #56
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    BringItOn: The Saudi's don't have PAC-3s operational? TIL, thanks.

    And yes it is always difficult to draw results that are free from user-error, particular chain of events, or just (mis)fortune, really the only point I was making is in real life scenarios systems often struggle with something that "should" be an easy feat.

    There are videos of the Saudis essentially rippled firing interceptors (like a few dozen at one time!!!) at a single target, hard to tell what was going on in the operations post at that point.
    http://img818.imageshack.us/img818/9098/rsz11rsz3807.jpg

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    BringItOn: The Saudi's don't have PAC-3s operational? TIL, thanks.
    As I had mentioned the US Government only awarded the contract to Lockheed to begin executing the Saudi order only in late December of 2015 so they are likely to begin getting deliveries this year and receive all missiles and launcher modifications by 2019. With US FMS sales it is easy to follow FMS notification date, or even vendor_customer contract finalization dates but what is the only 'real' completion metric to look at is the actual DOD contract award. For now their upgraded PAC-2s are the best they have and I don't think they have configuration 3+ either. UAE has the most advanced system in the region. Saudi's are likely to announce or finalize their THAAD and perhaps an IBCS order during Trump's visit there if everything could move along in the Congress. Informal, and back channel requests for IBCS and THAAD has been pending for a number of years as part of a broader GCC missile shield but much like Qatar's and UAE's request the previous administration sat on it longer than usual.

    https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=...BD1Cx-MjVJ3tcA

    There are videos of the Saudis essentially rippled firing interceptors (like a few dozen at one time!!!) at a single target, hard to tell what was going on in the operations post at that point.
    While it is easier to see missiles being fired, it is harder to deduce shot doctrine or tell how many targets they are actually attempting to defeat unless one has such a clear view that one can see tens of km in altitude, and downrange to deduce warheads, decoys or missile fragments.

    Few dozen interceptors at a time? A PAC-2 launcher can only carry 4 missiles so I'd love to see videos of them emptying 3-6 launchers in one go (Typically the Saudi's should be using 4-6 launchers per radar). 2 PAC-2's per Ballistic Missile target should be a good shot doctrine, but you could even allow 3 per target if you are protecting a very high value asset given the nature of this particular conflict (Saudi's have vastly more resources and are at home). Even PAC-3 shot doctrine calls for mostly a twin launch per TBM target. 3 Incoming Ballistic Missiles could warrant 6-8 PAC-2 interceptors depending upon the area they are protecting but unless there is a massive raid of say 6-10 incoming missiles you wouldn't need to launch 12, 24 or 36 interceptor missiles at them even if it were physically possible given the PAC-2 and its size.

    These are the raid sizes the PAC-3 with its 16 missile/launcher configuration is designed to tackle. PAC-2 not so much even if one gets past the fact that the PAC-3 exists primarily because there was a need for a considerably better TBM interceptor than the PAC-2 (even though the PAC-2 has been subsequently upgraded and improved).
    Last edited by bring_it_on; 6th May 2017 at 23:48.
    Old radar types never die; they just phased array

  28. #58
    Join Date
    May 2013
    Posts
    215
    Where China plans to deploy anti-THAAD cruise missiles
    March 28, 2017 Vasily Kashin, special to RBTH
    In January 2017 the Xinhua news agency reported that China and Russia agreed on certain joint military measures in response to the expected deployment of the American THAAD missile system on the Korean Peninsula. Now that this deployment has already begun, the question arises as to what these measures will look like.

    First of all, one should note that the deployment of THAAD in South Korea has different implications for the security of Russia and China. The impact is minimal in Russia’s case, because THAAD is designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles. Russia does not have such missiles, since in 1987 the Soviet Union and the United States signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

    Even if we assume that the THAAD system is upgraded with more powerful missiles, it would still not pose any threat to Russian strategic nuclear forces. Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear missile submarines are far away from the Korean Peninsula and the flight path of Russian missiles flying to targets in the United States pass through the North Pole.

    Members of the Russian and Chinese teams at the closing ceremony of the Masters of Reconnaissance competition as part of the International Army Games held in the training compound of the Novosibirsk Military Command College. Source: Alexandr Kryazhev/RIA Novosti
    Russia and China vow action against U.S. ABM plans on Korean Peninsula



    Thus, the Russian opposition to the deployment of THAAD is caused not so much by threats to security but by fundamental strategic considerations. Russia opposes placing elements of the U.S. missile defense system near its borders in principle. If THAAD complexes in South Korea were managed by the Korean military, not the U.S., there would most likely be no objection to the deployment of the complex. China’s position on the matter is much softer.
    Why the U.S. might need THAAD in South Korea

    The U.S. has already signed contracts for the delivery of THAAD to the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The fact that this was not done in the case of South Korea indicates that the true motives of deployment on the Korean Peninsula are far from declared.



    Apparently, the U.S. wants to have extra capacity for radar monitoring of airspace over the Northeastern China, where China’s bases containing ballistic missiles, including medium-range, are stationed. In addition, there comes possible trajectory of Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles being launched in the direction of the United States.

    Accordingly, it is possible to assume that it will be China, and not Russia, which offers the most serious response to the deployment of THAAD from the military-technical point of view.

    Russia will limit its actions to some acceleration of previously planned measures related to the modernization of the armed forces in the Russian Far East.
    China's response

    The most likely response to the deployment of THAAD would be the creation of specialized groupings intended for the destruction of the missile defense system on the Korean Peninsula.

    A Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor is launched during a intercept test, in this undated handout photo provided by the U.S. Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency. Source: Reuters
    Why Moscow and Beijing are really afraid of the U.S. THAAD in South Korea

    The likely tool for this kind of preliminary strike would be cruise missiles: THAAD is not able to intercept them, especially in the case of a massive strike at known coordinates.

    The obvious option for China may be deploying DF-10 missiles on the Shandong Peninsula. In addition, China can use technical means to strengthen its intelligence about the place of deployment of the THAAD.
    Syria-tested Club missiles

    Russia, unlike China, is not able to openly deploy ground-based medium-ranged cruise missiles, although the U.S. has been accusing Russia of doing so.

    But the new Russian warships, as a rule, are equipped with Club (Kalibr) cruise missiles with a range over 2000 km. These complexes have been successfully tested in the course of the war in Syria. The construction of such ships for the Russian Pacific fleet was planned long before the plans to deploy THAAD in Korea.

    In January 2016, Russia revealed plans to construct six project 636.3 diesel-electric submarines to be based in Vladivostok. These boats are able to carry Club missiles as well and were also tested during the Syria campaign.

    A People's Liberation Army soldier jumps over a burning obstacle during a training session on a snowfield, in Heihe, Heilongjiang province. Source: Reuters
    Will Trump push China to form a military alliance with Russia?

    The fleet is expected to adopt other ships able to carry Clubs including the Karakurt-class corvette, the construction of which has already begun.

    Perhaps this will be the Russian answer to THAAD, although all of these measures would have been undertaken anyway.

    Apart from told above, Russia and China will also carry out additional joint exercises and, possibly, coordinate in the field of technical intelligence to more effectively track the current location and mode of operation of the THAAD complex.

    Vasily Kashin is a senior research fellow in the Moscow Based Institute for Far Eastern Studies and in the Higher School of Economics. Views expressed are personal.

    https://rbth.com/opinion/2017/03/28/...issiles-729028

  29. #59
    Join Date
    Oct 2010
    Posts
    8,986
    Man, finding the video again was a PIA:



    What I was talking about re. ripple firing. That's a lot of rounds, and from what we know, the Houthis have hit quite a few Saudi installations that should have had defenses...
    http://img818.imageshack.us/img818/9098/rsz11rsz3807.jpg

  30. #60
    Join Date
    Dec 2003
    Posts
    98
    @garryA

    9K720 Iskander-M 's mass is around 4,615 kg , assuming the mass without fuel is 1/2 of that, it is still around 2307 kg ( likely even heavier with all these alleged ECM, decoys and gas system on it). As a result a 30g turn required the force at least 2307*30 =69,225 kg or more than 69 tons.What sort of mini gas system giving that amount of thrust ? and for how long ? For reference purpose the first stage of LGM-30 Minuteman produce 91,170 kg of thrust or 91 tons
    https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/icbm/lgm-30_3.htm
    I don't know about you but i don't buy that a secondary gas system on the tiny Iskander can produce thrust more than half of Minuteman's first stage
    You are mistakenly simplifying the case. Soviet engineers should have known what they are doing with the gas system of the Iskander. You don't take into consideration the offset of the gas system to the CoG.

    Moreover, how does the missiles even know when to perform the high G maneuver to dodge the interceptor?, also after the maneuver does it turn back to attack the intended target or just fly randomly in a completely new direction ?
    Furthermore,in exo-atmospheric condition, a gas system perpendicular to the body will change nose pointing but not the direction of travel, unless the main rear motor still operating ( see the different between how a space shuttle pointing its nose and an aircraft turning).
    The gas system of the Iskander is at a strong offset to the CoG. As for the maneuvering: it may travel at a wrong ballistic course and all the maneuvering during terminal phase will the result in the right target location, hence all the random maneuvering are course corrections. It would likely fly as far away from its initial position to deplete the kinetic energy of the interceptor within denser atmosphere.

    It basically trade potential energy for kinetic energy after mid phase, if you wasted this precious kinematic energy, it will not have enough to potential energy to compensate.
    No precious kinetic energy is wasted. Under exo-atmospheric conditions there is no loss at all because of maneuvering as it causes no friction. In endo-atmospheric conditions speed is decreased due to maneuvering, however as the missile has to slow down anyway, the maneuvering does to some extend that what friction would have done. So you do a controlled amount of maneuvering to decease your speed to a level in which the energy is not wasted due to heatshield heat up. We have 3 parameters: Speed, heatshield temperature and gain of kinetic energy due to transformation of potential energy.
    Speed must be in a efficient relation to heatshield temperature (you don't want a heaver heatshield to do all de-acceleration) --> the result is added to the maneuvering capability.
    Speed must be in a constant relation to gain of kinetic energy (you don't want to increase your already high speed when entering dense atmosphere layer) --> the result is added to the maneuvering capability

    Furthermore, regain speed in the atmosphere would take much longer time consider the fact that the air density is much higher and it keeps getting denser and denser the longer the missiles fell back into the earth.
    Yes to an extend where no regain of speed is possible at all. You have to manage the 3 parameters above in a fashion that adds up to your maneuvering capability.

    @bring_it_on

    Power does not have to do anything here since many applications can share comparable or high levels of power but still be different. The role or design and technical aim is what matters. The TPY-2 a high power high frequency radar designed primarily for terminal intercept and discrimination and can also double up and operate independently in FBM where it provides high quality early warning and discrimination data for launch on remote and situational awareness duties.
    I didn't say anything about BMD capabilities of Voronezh vs. TPY-2, just said that Voronezh is not a OTH radar but high power BMD sensor like the TPY-2. The TPY-2 has much better resolution for discrimination, that's right. However decimetric band might be sufficient for discrimination of decoys. X-band has more power per array area --> more compact.

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