He says some other interesting things that are generally ignored:
1. Training and tactics are critical. He actually stated that in realistic USAF/USN tactics exercises had to be changed daily in order to avoid devastating losses.
2. Sortie generation are going down due to declines in aircraft numbers (no it didn't start in 1991 or at start of GFC). Current fleet sizes are fine for blowing up defenceless third worlders, but insufficient for high intensity conflict.
3. Emphasis on:
- Attaining surprise - key component of warfare since humans first started beating each other up with sticks. Today it relates very much to modern fighter design (i.e. stealth)
- Outnumbering the enemy - key component of warfare since humans first started beating each other up with sticks.
- Outmaneouvring and outlasting the enemy
- Achieving reliable kills - the age old question of BVR v WVR comes into this.
4. Aircraft to emphasise passive over active sensors - in 2013 networked data links, IRST etc kind of come into this.
I think his analysis raises some good issues and highlights the key problems aircraft designers and tacticians need to solve to win A2A combat.
I don't necessarily agree with his conclusion of "small = best." The combat record of US/Israeli F-15 and to a lesser degree Iranian F-14s and Ethiopian Su-27s would appear to counter that theory.
I'll add one of my own comments as it kind of thing to think about the future of air combat:
"The last A2A combat between jet fighters occured in September 2001 between 2 IDF/AF F-15s and 2 SyAF MiG-29s. Contrary to popular thought it was a WVR combat involving some classy maneouvring by the F-15s and not a BVR combat."