MiG 25RB Foxbat X YF 14A Tomcat II in The Yom Kippur War ( 1973) - Chapter 2

[maurobaggio]

"War is the essence of stratagem. So even if you are able, show incapability. When determined to employ his forces, pretending disability. When your goal is near, how does it look distant; when distant, creates the illusion that is near."

General Sun Tzu
The Art of War

There were some undeniable evidences that the offensive of Egypt and Syria in 1973 against Israel could had been planned for some years before with purpose to elude the U.S.( United States) and Israel. Below are some facts and their interpretations about this possibility


The highly publicized expulsion from Soviet military contingent of 20,000 "advisors" in July 1972 from Egypt could be an action designed to convince the U.S. that Egypt had been moving away from the Soviet Union support;

Despite the removal of military personnel from Soviet Union most of the equipment and weapons operated by those had remained in Egypt, since these were the purpose of Soviet military contingent were training the Egyptian military.

The reason given for the expulsion of the Soviets in 1972 was the denial of authorization by Soviet Union to sale MiG 25RB to Egypt. This notice has had a high impact on estimates of Western intelligence agencies that MiG 25RB Foxbat were designed to attack missions too, besides the primary capability of the reconnaissance missions, which due its supposed capability the MiG 25RB were able to penetrate the defenses of Israel in strike missions against strategic targets if necessary with tactical nuclear warheads.

With the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from Egypt the U.S. had interpreted this as an emphatic gesture for rapprochement with the West and U.S. from Egypt diplomacy.

By analyzing the militaries forces of Egypt by Israel and the U.S. there would be little chance for Egypt that had been moving away from the Soviet Union could start a conflict with Israel.

There were several reports from West intelligence agencies and even Israel intelligence agency that Egypt had shortage of the several military supplies or spare parts from soviet weaponry. The lacking of the training among several military units after the soviet person had been expelled from Egypt in 1972, especially between the SAM units. Those information’s about the Egypt military forces probably in most cases were false, certainly it had been “leaking” as counter information to be intercepted by intelligences agencies from Israel and another’s countries with the purpose to elude these about the preparations for the war in 1973.

Despite Syria was continuing this close relation with Soviet Union, Syria alone against Israel had no military strength or political influence as Egypt to attack Israel and get support from other countries in the region from Middle East. In this case the continuous support of the Soviet Union would not be a high threat to Israel, since the armed forces from Syria were not as powerful as those of Egypt and its training until 1972 was not as advanced as that of Egypt.

As Israel had nuclear warheads and TBM (tactical ballistic missiles) of short range, and Egypt had no nuclear capability and had moved away from the Soviet Union, Israel was confident that Egypt would not go into a new conflict with Israel because the last one had nuclear warheads;

The confidence placed from Israel on its nuclear program seemed very optimistic in 1972 by Israel. Once Israel had been assumed that it was extremely successful strategy since its greatest enemy that was Egypt had no nuclear capability had moved away from the Soviet Union, so this would not receive assistance in this warheads could be deployed if necessary against Egyptian troops in case of war between both countries in the desert places of the Sinai without high risk of the radioactive fallout for the population from Israel, since there would be no risk of nuclear strikes hitting Soviet units in Egypt and the Soviet Union would not retaliate with nuclear warheads against Israel.

By investing heavily in its nuclear program, Israel certainly had invested less in its conventional military forces, which in fact more weakened the Israel military capability for the War of 1973, since the nuclear arsenal was useless against Egypt and Syria with support from Soviet Union.

After Egypt kick out the Soviet military that event had no significant impact on its military capability from Egypt anyway, since most of these soviet persons had a mission to conduct the training of the Egyptians and even before the full scale war that soviet contingent should be removed from Egypt. However to show for the another countries of the Middle East that Egypt could be able to defend itself against Israel, and that Egypt was not a satellite country of the Soviet Union, with the purpose to increase the leadership and influence of Egypt among others countries from region. After this event in expelling the Soviet Union from Egypt this last one had become much higher status about its influence in other countries that opposed to Israel, specially among countries much more close from West and USA.

The alleged withdrawal of the MiG 25R/RB from Egypt in 1972 also had suspended any action of Israel in its urgency to improve the air defense against this threat. Israel and USA were both surprised by the inability of F 4E Phantom II equipped with the AIM 7E Sparrow missiles or even the SAM MIM 15 Hawk to intercept the MiG 25RB Foxbat.

After the withdrawal of the MiG 25R/RB from Egypt it event should be freezing the talking about the sale of the new fighter F 14A Tomcat armed with AIM 54 Phoenix missile to Isarel, or as emergency alternative the improved version of F 4E Phantom II with the capability to launch the AIM 54A Phoenix with long range assistance of the CGI ( Command Ground Interception) .

The missions of the MiG 25RB from Soviet Union had been realized most than 20 reconnaissance missions over the Sinai and collected huge data from Israel defenses in the Sinai. The military person from Soviet Union were expelled from Egypt in 1972 and a new war against Israel would be quite difficult without a strong support from Soviet Union, the missing of the reconnaissance missions from MiG 25R/RB would become less important once the Israel certainly shouldn’t improve the defenses in the Sinai in the short time, once the war in 1973 began almost 1 year after the military person from Soviet Union had left Egypt. In the case of an attack in a short period, from Egypt and Syria, as a year would be more advantageous to suspend the reconnaissance missions from Soviet MiG 25R/RB in order to deceive Israel there would not be an attack against it.

[maurobaggio]

"So if there is a villain assassin hiding in the forest, even a thousand men pursue, everyone around you will look like owls and observe how wolves. Why? Fear from violence that break out and hurt himself. Thus, a blind man to life and death can hag a thousand."

General Wu Ch’i
The Art of War

Tu 16K-16 Badger G from Egypt armed with 02 AS 5B Kelt anti radiantion missiles

http://www.aerospaceweb.org/aircraft...16/tu16_18.jpg

The large-scale military exercises in Egypt in March and August 1973 were interpreted only as a show of force in order to pressure Israel in secret negotiations promoted by the U.S. with goal to return of Sinai to Egypt, as well as statements by the President Sadat from Egypt on this a possible war against Israel. For U.S. and Israel analysis after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in Egypt this last one has not the resources needed for a military offensive against Israel and that is why he used these demonstrations of force as the only resource they had to pressure Israel.


The plan of Egypt and Syria to defeat Israel in 1973 as it was later had demonstrated with purpose by these actions not based on a short time operation as several times interpreted with the invasion of Israel, but in an attrition war with goal that Israel's military losses became unsustainable over time, and after its losses could be accepted a ceasefire on terms favorable to Egypt and Syria, through the return of occupied territories in the War of 1967.


For an attrition war against Israel could be effective, Israel should be isolated from supplies military sources as well new weapons and equipment to compensate the losses of the fighting. But a long war with Israel in conditions that could be supplied by U.S., the war could become extremely disadvantageous to Egypt and Syria, since the military capability of Israel in causing losses to Egypt during the War of Attrition in 1970 was very unfavorable to Egypt.

The Soviet Union through experience in the Vietnam War had knowledge about the high impact caused by the use of PGMs( Precision Guided Missiles) as the smart bombs had been used by the U.S. against North Vietnam and its armed forces operating in South Vietnam. in the case of Israel, which already had a high advanced Air Force and too well trained, the widespread use of these new weapons should has a devastating effect about the infrastructure of Egypt and Syria in a prolonged war.

The strategy to defeat Israel should be based on the fact that this would be blocked from sources as U.S. with new equipment or ammunition during the conflict, so that Israel would be forced to maintain a defensive strategy, in reason of the need to save your military resources in case of the prolonged conflit without assistance, and with this situation Israel would keep its military operations almost in defensive actions or limited attacks.

While Syria and Egypt should be receive new equipment and ammunition throughout the conflict from Soviet Union, as well as new air and ground units would join those from other countries of the region in order to maintain pressure on Israel and overcome this in matter of time, or in the must possible possibility til the superpowers as U.S. and URSS would pressure Israel to accept a ceasefire in terms favorable to Egypt and Syria.

Tu 16 Badger from Egypt Air Force


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tu-16_Egyptian.jpg

Since it were not possible to obtain air superiority by Egypt and Syria against Israel Air Force, with mission to interdict air space from Israel or its airports, the tactics to be used should be the threat to use the MiG 25RB against airports and bases from Israel, so that possibility the U.S. would not send their transport aircraft as C 141 Starlifter and C 5A Galaxy with necessary supplies to Israel, because of concerns that it would be damaged or even destroyed, that could expose a vulnerability of the U.S. in its strategy to send troops and supplies by air transport in case of war against the Soviet Union, especially in the case to support for NATO against the Warsaw Pact.

This could be achieved with the use of a small number of fighter as MiG 25RB once these should be kept secret in Cairo West Air Base had located in the Egypt. In the moment when hostilities would be initiated those MiG 25RB could be placed in flying conditions quickly to strike the bases and airports from Israel in the attempted to seize the Israel for the air transport bridge from United States.

With the possibility of a long war with Egypt and Syria in which Israel would be unable to receive supplies from air transport of the U.S. due to threat of MiG 25RB fighters, the option would be the use of sea transport. Due to this the dangerous Israeli navy would not risk in attack missions in order to preserve itself to protect merchant vessels with the necessary supplies to Israel from U.S..

The remain option to send supplies should be the sea transport between U.S. and Israel, but this option could take weeks and this were also more vulnerable to being hit by naval and air operations of the Egypt and Syria, since when sea transport could be near Israel border its air force should be already severely weakened by the losses from land campaign.

In that case the dangerous Israel Navy with fast missile boats equipped with missiles anti-ship Gabriel would be overwhelmed by air and naval actions of Egypt and Syria, once the Israel Air Force could be at this moment of the war severely weakened to withstand all missions on three different fronts (Sinai, Golan Heights and the Mediterranean Sea).

Tu 16K-16 Badger G from Egypt Air Force armed with 02 AS 5B Kelt anti radiantion missiles

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...rivate-archive

Egypt and Syria had a considerable number of fast missile boats equipped with anti ship missiles SS 2 N Styx, which would be a serious threat to ships with military supplies to Israel. However the Israel Navy would not be able to protect merchant ships from air strikes in particular by Tu 16K-16 Badger G from Egypt equipped with long-range anti ship missiles as AS 5 Kelt with range of the 100 NMI or 180Km.

Against this threat as much as the Israel Navy could do were attempted to jamming by electronic emissions against the radar missiles from AS 5 Kelt as the SS 2 N Styx, once the vessels from Israel Navy didn’t had SAM ( surface air missiles) with long range to threat the Tu 16K, and because this would demand a high number of missions from Israel Air Force only to keep the Tu 16K with AS 5 Kelt out of range of the merchant ships with supplies.

AS 5B Kelt anti radiation missile

http://en.valka.cz/viewtopic.php/t/10768

However this tactics could cause major losses to Israel Navy since the Tu 16K-16 Badger G from Egypt were also equipped with anti radiation missiles AS 5B Kelt with same long range of the anti ship missile AS 5A Kelt, which in this case would be guided to the source of the jamming emission, which would result in the destruction the boat that was interfering with radars of anti ship missiles SS 2 N Styx or AS 5A Kelt in the attempted to protect the ships with supplies.

The sea transport of the emergency supplies to Israel could be a disaster for Israel, since even long time for these to arrive, also would create a third front to the Israel Air Force which would weaken further two others fronts against Egypt and Syria, which would employ those air forces more intense in attacks missions against the ground forces from Israel , that could be collapsing these even before the new supplies reaching them.

Tu 16 Badger from Egypt Air Force in an area protected dug deep into the ground, apparently out of service for a long time

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia...503640_JPG.jpg

[Sens]

Guessing can be intresting but the reality is otherwise.
Neither Egypt nor Syria planned to conquer Israel in 1973 whatever some people from all sides claimed about that. Sadat and Assad were looking for a temporary tactical win and to secure and exploit it in the political arena to a strategic win afterwards. [Something Sadat reached!] The Israeli military saw that to some degree but underestimated the political will in the Arab countries to start a conflict with the risc to loose it within few days. The Israeli military were looking for Arab military tools to prevent the Israeli reserves to reach the future battle fields at the Suez and the Golan. Nothing serious at hand in their minds to delay that really. [Neither a limited number of Tu-16s nor MiG-25RBs had changed that!] A) They were still convinced to have the 48-72 hours MOB-time from the own intelligence services. B)
By that logic the Arabs would not start a serious attack without A and B as given.
The Arab/Russian planners had realized to have a window of opportunity of 48 hours at least to reach their limited military targets by the more important B alone. Every military conflict is a time versus force race at first and lost time could be regained by "blood" or losses only.
When the Israelis underestimated the Arab will of fighting with the weaponary at hand from the own experiences of 1967 the Arabs overestimated the Israeli capabilities too. Their minimum target was to restore the military pride lost by the humilating defeat of 1967. (That was achieved by all Arab participants) Neither Egypt nor Syria learned the scope of their tactical surprise from B in time to make some military use of that. Both kept to their cautios planning. Some military mistakes led to further delays when some unexpected gains could not be exploited in time for the luck of the surprised Israelis. The fame of the IDF-AF and the Israeli tank forces were critical in the first days as well. Sadat restricted his forces to military targets within the Sinai far from the Israeli borders his political main target in mind. That was not kept to the same degree by Assad's forces and led to some limited political gains for the Golan only. (Peak of Mt Hermon and town of Kuneitra in the DMZ observed by the http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/undof/

Just when we have the idea about the political aims of the October War 1973 we can do some guessing about the weaponary at hand and their limited part to achieve that. Neither the Tu-16 nor the MiG-25RB had or would have changed something about the well known outcome of that conflict.

[Sens]

In October 73 just 25 AS-5 Kelt were fired from the EAF Tu-16 Badger Gs in the opening nights against targets in the Sinai. The most eastern one was El Arish and 5 from 25 ASMs = 20% hit their target.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/54830209/A...v-Tu-16-Badger
pp 120-124

[maurobaggio]

Wrong question by ignoring the political situation in October 1973. The Israelis used their El Al airliners from the first days to airlift resupplies to Israel! It took some time for the US-administration {U.S. military involvement in Vietnam ended on 15 August 1973 as a result of the Case–Church Amendment passed by the U.S. Congress.} and some others as well that the October War of 1973 would last longer than one week and none was intrested in. The involved Soviets had started resupplies by ships from Black Sea ports from the first days to arrive within a few days at Syrian and Egyptian ports to make up losses suffered during fighting. When the Syrians depleted their stocks of SAMs within days and lost the battle for the Golan the Antonovs were just 5 hours flight-time away to bring in that resupplies to bolster the Syrians. That was the political signal for the USA to respond in a similar way in support of its client. Both sides suffered from low stock of ammunition at first, which were depleted in an alarming rate. A nasty surprise for the NATO and WP too.

As I had mentioned in the previous posts( 1.3 Battle Plan and 2.3 Battle Plan) the high risk to be taken to Israel would be a war of attrition, but that in the plan should be opposite of the War of Attrition with Egypt in 1970, since in this time Israel would have to fight on two fronts as supposedly drafted in the plan.

Israel would be unable to receive supplies from the U.S. by air by the threat of MiG 25RB fighters secretly held in Cairo West Air Base, and by sea once the threat of Tu 16 -16K Badger G equipped with AS 5 Kelt anti radiations missiles, since efficient and dangerous Israel Navy would e unable to intercept its threat and protect merchant ships with supplies without the engagement of the Israel Air Force.

Which after several weeks of war and without new supplies received would seriously weakened to accomplish all missions on three fronts that this supposed phase of war as : Golan Heights, Sinai and Mediterranean Sea or even Red Sea .

I agree with the SENS when it says no weapons would win the war for Egypt and Syria, as the Tu 16 Badger G and MiG 25RB Foxbat, but the lack of weapons and ammunition especially for the Israel Forces indeed could defeat this, which anyway would be depleted without new supplies that would be prevented by the action of MiG 25RB and Tu 16 Badger G.

Soon, if I'm not definitely impeded, I will put the last part of the Battle Plan, which is the 3.3 .

[MadRat]

Fear what? ...of MiG 25RB taking pictures of air transports?

[Sens]

When all went to plan Sadat and Assad had demanded a ceasefire from the UN-security council within the first week of fighting already. The Syrian failure at the Golan followed by an Israeli push into the dircetion of Damascus did prevent that. Sadat had to stay longer in that war than planned. After the first week all parties were in need of replenishment for some vital supplies to stay active. The Russians had set some resupplies in motion after the first day. They were informed about the Arab limited attacks much better than the USA and Israel were. The Russian supply routes by ship and air were much shorter. All parties were surprised by the demand of resupplies from the constant use of fire-power and losses from that. In short the Israelis never attacked the Russian resupplies as did the Arabs about the later US one. It was a limited war of clients about limited political gains from that. Neither the SU nor the USA went behind political support or to become a fighting party in that conflict. The US-airlift allowed Israel to go active on the Egyptian front again. The USA had the commitment to replace all Israeli losses after an Arab attack. That was the main part from the US-sponsored ceasefire agreement in August 1970. After the first week of fightning the Israelis demanded the resupplies in a more urgent manner. The USA had exspected something like short clash in favor of Israel like 1967 and the dlivery of resupplies afterwards and the SU something in their favor too. An Israeli air-attack in the morning of October 6th with questionable gains could have freed the USA from its commitment of free resupplies.

[maurobaggio]

Fear what? ...of MiG 25RB taking pictures of air transports?

MiG 25RB armed with 08 free fall bombs FAB-500M-62T with 500Kg each

http://www.testpilot.ru/russia/mikoy.../mig25rb_e.htm

It may be a new possibility thanks at the MadRat commentary that the U.S. sent the F 14A Tomcat II in secret for Israel to avoid the MiG 25 RB overfly these airports that had been receiving the transport aircraft to take pictures of it and for some part of its MiG 25 RB loose itself,especially those "red things" hanging above the wings and the belly of the MiG 25 RB , and hit some transport aircraft in the ground by accident, after the safety of Soviet aircrafts by the West analysts has always been questionable.

I still can not find the windows to take pictures on the MiG 25 RB?

MiG 25RB armed with 02 Kh 58U anti radar missiles and 04 free fall bombs FAB-500M-62T

http://airbase.ru/sb/russia/mikoyan/...m/indexe-t.htm

[Sens]

No need for that, because both Super-Powers were not intrested to become an active party in that limited conflict. Similar situation to that of Vietnam. Where the airbases in the North were off-limit for US-attackers f.e.. The similar reason why the MiG-25RBs were not handed to the Egyptians in 1972. Second reason was the Russian airlift had started days before the American one and was much more vulnerable about that if one side did not keep the silent agreement about that. Third reason was the limited accuracy of such MiG bombing in the densely populated area around the primary civil airport of Lod. The MiG-25RB was not at hand till the first cease-fire to support the Egyptians with recce-flights during the fighting at all.

[maurobaggio]

Any direct involvement of the two superpowers in a conflict would inevitably lead to World War III, and it was one of the hard lessons had learned in Cuba Missile Crisis in the 60'.

However both superpowers had much interest in their respective allies to overmatch the oponent side, and because of this would make all that could be possible to secure the victory, which were confirmed by massive aid in weapons and equipment sent by the superpowers during the conflict.

I do not know anything about the agreements of silence, once if this probably existed who organized those attacks listed below did not get the memo about the agreements, or maybe had not heard due to the sounds of battle.

On 14 October Israel had launched a major air attack against air bases of Tanta-el and el-Mansourah which resulted in one of larger air combat of the entire war, only Egypt has employed more than 50 MiG 21M/MF this battle to protection of the bases, and there was speculations about Soviet aircraft transport unloading in these bases, however this attack the bases were not severely affected by what were known and no Soviet aircraft was hit or damaged.

On 18 October the base of el-Arish in the Sinai had been occupied by Israel since 1967 was attacked by eight Mirages 5DE from Egypt. This base was hit with 400kg bombs as SAMP 400 while transport aircraft from U.S.A and Israel unloaded supplies. There were no reports of aircraft hit or damaged from the U.S.A and Israel in this attacks.


Indeed I have found out clever, although this does not mean anythin, in the commentary from MadRat about the MiG 25RB , since in general a reconnaissance aircraft like the U-2 and SR 71 from U.S. did not carried with weapons, as well as the MiG 25R that were to a previous generation than MiG 25RB . However the MiG 25RB aircraft were a multirole fighter that could do reconnaissance as an attack missions at high altitude and not only with free-fall bombs, but that's another story ... may be in the 3.3 Battle Plan.

[MadRat]

The pilot of the MiG-25RB flies using his instruments because the visibility out of the cockpit is too limited to be of any tactical value. And it lacks sensors that would detect bogies around it. It doesn't have the analog datalink of the bomber destroyers and couldn't be passively vectored to a target, a target they wouldn't probably see. And reconn in those days took hours or days to disseminate to the leadership. The film wasn't digital and processing happened on the ground.

[Sens]

All the Russian resupply flights went to civil airports in some distance to the frontline. When not used by fighters that were off-limit to Israeli attacks.

The infamous October 14 air-battle was never mentioned in a serious publication.
See AIR Enthusiast International May 1974 Vol 6 No 5
THE HOLY DAY AIR WAR by David Nicolle about that. The Egyptians had never missed to claim such a success during or after that war.
Similar thing with PHOENIX OVER THE NILE from Lon Nordeen and David Nicolle from 1996 with participants and their reports from the Ramadan War (1973) just that written sources at hand.

For the intrested ones the reported scenario was that of Operation Tagar = Challenge from Sunday October 7 (second day "The IAF Strikes Back, 7 October")
when really 100+ F-4E/A-4N/H-mod flew ABA missions to seven EAF main ABs at ~7 a.m.. Just the first surpression wave took place when the operation was terminated by the crisis on the Golan.

At October 18 the Mirage 5s from Tanta were on the way to El Arish and had bad luck by running into a flight of Nesher from 113 sqdn from Hatzor AB. That flight on the way to the Canal and was alerted by GCI about the Egyptian low level intruder just in time. Caught by surprise the Egyptians dropped their ordenance and tried to disengage. One crashed into the Sea and two further ones felt to Shafrir 2 AAMs. The other were safed by better luck from alerted Israeli F-4s. That were entering the scene too and bounced the Mirages below to learn in the last moment about Israeli ones too.

[maurobaggio]

MiG 25 BM capable to attack air defense system ( SEAD) in the ground, and especially aircraft's as the AWACS E 3 Sentry from NATO during the 80's

http://toad-design.com/migalley/inde...g25/?nggpage=2

The first MiG 25R were converted to the standard MiG 25RB since 1972, and production and modernization of the MiG 25RB and MiG 25BM this last one for SEAD mission had been continued until 1986.

The MiG-25RB had the system inertial navigation system ( INS) Peleng D that could be updated by LORAN signals from ground stations, which had been increased the precision both in attack and reconnaissance missions.

Another novelty introduced in the MiG 25 RB , at least in soviet fighters by end of the 60', were an electronic counter measuring (ECM) that had been combined with its max speed from 2,500 to 3,000 km / h (1,562 to 1,875 mph) within the combat radius of 920km ( 575 miles) and maximum altitude of 26,000 to 27,000 m (85,301 -88,582 ft), those MiG 25RB became almost immune to being intercepted at least in the early '70s.

The number from attack versions of the MiG 25 Foxbat were quite extensive as:MiG 25RB / RBT / RBS / RBK / RBN / RBV / RBSH / RBF / BM.

In the early '70s the quantity and variety of reconnaissance equipment's were already impressive as: SAR radars, ELINT sensors and photographic cameras. In fact the equipment's could be exchanged in its own bases since those were mounted on pallets, allowing the change of sensors according to the missions.

The performance had been estimated for the MiG 25RB in 1973 by the intelligence services from West nations that assumed a much better performance than were the reality of the MiG 25 Foxbat. However this were only known after the analysis of MiG 25P had seized in 1976 in the Japan.

Because of this lack of correct information about the MiG 25 in 1973 it had been estimated that the MiG 25RB could be armed with 5,000 kg free-fall bombs or 10 FAB 500 62T on each attack mission with a combat radius of 900km at a speed of Mach 2.8 and an altitude of 22,000 m. Each TBM( Tactical Ballistic Missile) as SS 1 Scud could carried a 500 kg warhead with HE or fragmentacion to a target at distance of 500 km as comparative analisys.

The TBM SS 1 Scud in preparation for launch.

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...-scotland1.jpg

Thus each MiG 25RB could launch over the target as equivalent to 10 TBM SS 1 Scud missiles per mission in a much greater range than would be obtained with those TBM but with the equal or better precision.

Therefore in case that the 04 MiG 25RB could be used in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 since those aircraft could had been performing a mission per day for 15 days, and with this could released over the targets with a destructive power equivalent to 600 SS 1 Scud missiles!

Throughout the war between Iran / Iraq that endured eight years in total were released almost 500 SS 1 Scud missiles. In the first Gulf War Iraq had launched less than 100 SS 1 Scud missiles against targets in the Gulf countries and Israel.

As the transport aircraft in the Operation Nickel Glass had loaded with ammunition would be exposed in the loading and unloading terminal from airports at the MiG 25RB that in each mission of the 04 MiG 25RB according to these estimates could launch the equivalent of 40 SS 1 Scud missiles in each attack!

Since each transport aircraft could be loaded with dozens of tons of explosives and fuel, that one was hit would be enough to cause major damage at the airport and hundreds of casualties on the ground staff, interrupting the Operation Nickel Glass for several days. The worst possibily was that the attacks could continue thereafter as the MiG 25RB were immune at air defenses from Israel with F 4E Phantom II and SAM Hawk.

About the "infamous" air battle of October 14, even neither serious publication would have not mentioned this, its appear that all seem to know about the same, including the authors of serious publications.

On the October 18 I had mentioned the first wave of attack from Mirage 5DE, whereas SENS described what happened with the second wave of attack against the el-Arish Air Base from Israel.

[Sens]

If we assume a limited number of MiG-25RBs in Egypt during the Ramadan/Yom Kippur war in Egypt the possible damage from that was very limited. We have to assume also that none was aware of their base and non of their flights high up was tracked. An impossible task under the conditions there. After the first "surprise" strike the MiG-25RBs and their Egyptian base had become a prime target of the IDF-AF within hours. A MiG-25RB was as vulnerable during take-of and landing as every other fighter and the Russians were well aware about that.
A bomb-loaden MiG-25RB had no longer the superior speed and height capability to outperform alerted Israeli F-4Es or USN F-4S.

Your source maybe:

http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_353.shtml

"When you claimed 8 bombing Mirage 5" from that report. Eight 400 kg bombs from 4 Mirage 5 may have inflicted a limited damage to El Arish airfield and the Egyptians were aware about that. See the 8 further Mirage 5 from that ABA mission intercepted in time from the Israelis. The Israelis used C-130s/Noratlas a.s.o to shuttle supplies from Lod IAP (C-5A/C-141A) to Sinai bases like El Arish and Faid in Egypt. The ex USAF C-130Es may have had still temporary Israeli markings only when rushed into service after arrival. Maybe that even some US-crews operated some of that after the arrival to ease the shortage of Israeli crews to operate all of that in short notice.

[maurobaggio]

F 14A Tomcat from Iran Air Force carrying with 04 AIM 54A Phoenix under the belly, and 02 AIM 7E Sparrow and 02 AIM 9P Sidewinder under the wings.

http://otpisani.niceboard.com/t985-grumman-f-14-tomcat

If anyone read this and think that would be having a déjà vu , this probably is not, because I believe that I've written this before.

The F 4E Phantom II of Israel in 1973 were equipped with the air-air medium range missiles as AIM 7E Sparrow with SARH ( Semi Active Radar Head) seeker, those were also the standard used by the U.S. in the Vietnam War. Both radar AWG 10 and missiles AIM 7E were already well known to the Soviet Union because of the Vietnam War, which had facilitated the USSR for the development of ECM System SPS 141 "Siren" for the MiG 25RB Foxbat to jamming both the AWG 10 radar as the AIM 7E Sparrow missiles from F 4E Phantom II.

Due to increased threats and the poor performance in the Vietnam War of the U.S. AIM 7E, the AIM 7F were developed and it were almost a new missile under the skin when compared with AIM 7E since it was introduced in the AIM 7F a new seeker with semiconductor circuits much more resistant to jamming by ECM, indeed a technological revolution at the time, and a new rocked motor with dual stage which also led to the AIM 7F obtain a range more than twice once compared to the AIM 7E.

F 4E Phantom II from Israel Air Force carrying 04 AIM 7E Sparrow under the belly and 02 IR Shafrir or Sidewinder under the wings.

http://www.patricksaviation.com/photos/Csipesz/28328/

However the AIM 7F began to be produced after 1976 and that it was used against Syria in the 1981 in the Lebanon War, and the F 15A/B/C/D Eagle had fired these missiles and achieved several victories including some MiG 25 RB's from Syria.

The AIM 7E had been used by Israel in the F 4E Phantom II against MiG 25R/RB between 1971 and 1972, or by F 4D / E Phantom II from Iran until 1978 did not shot down any of MiG 25 R/RB that invaded the air space from Iran, despite several attempts with AIM 7E fired from F 4D/E Phantom by Iran and Israel .

In the Iran / Iraq War during the 80's that lasted almost nine years, despite all the controversy about the loss of MiG 25P/RB from Iraq and even MiG 25BM from Soviet Union, Iran just had announced that victories were obtained with the air-air long range AIM 54A Phoenix missiles only, with were used by F 14A Tomcat from Iran Air Force, and none of the MiG 25RB in attack missions were shot down or damaged by AIM 7E Sparrow used by all F 4D / E Phantom II and even the F 14A Tomcat. Because of the revolution in Iran in 1978 that did not received the AIM 7F had been ordered from U.S. before the revolution in 1979.

F 14A Tomcat from Iran Air Force firing AIM 54A Phoenix

http://www.sampadia.com/forum/index.php?topic=15795.0

Iran announced in 1975 that had damaged one MiG 25R from Soviet Union that could be hit by the AIM 7E's fired from F 4E Phantom II, but the MiG 25R managed to escape and crossed the border with the Soviet Union.

However Iran had admitted that against the MiG 25RB , which were a more advanced version than MiG 25R, the F 4E Phantom II with AIM 7E missiles were unable to stop the invasions of MiG 25RB since it were equipped with a powerful and advanced ECM system.

In fact the invasions of MiG 25RB were contained only with the arrival of the F 14A Tomcat equipped with AIM 54A Phoenix, which beyond the sophisticated of the AIM 54A Phoenix , the AWG 9 from F 14A Tomcat were not affected by the ECM from MiG 25 RB.

How the F 4E Phantom II were the most numerous interceptor from Iran Air Force, between F 4D/E maybe more than 220 were delivered before the revolution in 1979, and those were the most used during the war with Iraq.

It would be logical that MiG 25RB in several attack missions that had done during the war would have been slaughtered by F 4E Phantom II equipped with AIM 7E Sparrow missiles if those missiles could be effective against the MiG 25RB.

In the War of 1973 the F 4E Phantom II from Israel might had to face the MiG 25RB aircraft, equipped with ECM, under extremely disadvantageous conditions because of the limitations of AIM 7E Sparrow against a target so hard.

Even if the F 4E Phantom II with AIM 7E still had a chance, it would be inevitable that the Israel Air Force should required to maintain almost all its force of the F 4E in CAP( Combat Air Patrol) missions along the possible routes from targets of the MiG 25RB, which could lead to collapse of the front lines with Egypt and Syria, since without the F 4E Phantom, the Egypt and Syria Air Forces would be establish superiority over the battle fields, and the Israel Army would suffer devastating attacks by the Egypt and Syria Air Forces.

F 4E Phantom from U.S. Navy firing AIM 7E Sparrow

http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices.../d4c-35816.htm

[Sens]

...

Even if the F 4E Phantom II with AIM 7E still had a chance, it would be inevitable that the Israel Air Force should required to maintain almost all its force of the F 4E in CAP( Combat Air Patrol) missions along the possible routes from targets of the MiG 25RB, which could lead to collapse of the front lines with Egypt and Syria, since without the F 4E Phantom, the Egypt and Syria Air Forces would be establish superiority over the battle fields, and the Israel Army would suffer devastating attacks by the Egypt and Syria Air Forces.
..

There was no need for that. Even in a mental exercise of some MiG-25RBs in Egyt outside the control of the SU and allowed to fly an attack mission against the international airport Lod well inside Israel it had not given the desired result. On the ground, during climb out and landing back the MiG-25RBs were very vulnerable to every F-4. To make some use of its speed the MiG-25RBs had to stay high and be a prominent target for every EW radar and give away the home-base of that in short notice. Even worse the SU airlift under the way some days before Nickle Grass became a prime target for the Israeli strikers in retaliation. Whatever is claimed about the resupply flights from every side it has to serve political claims and had nothing to do with the real military situation in that time limited conflict. Israel was never in a mortal danger in that conflict and the time after October 8th was more about to restore some deterence capability lost from October 6th.

For the intrested ones it was impossible to operate own fighters over the own SAM protected zone in general. (See "Defender of the Sky", military history of the GDR, 2009) The WP-country learned that during exercises (1969-1975) when the Arabs learned that the hard way in 1973, when the own SAMs downed more own than Israeli fighters in the last weeks of that war.

[maurobaggio]

There was no need for that. Even in a mental exercise of some MiG-25RBs in Egyt outside the control of the SU and allowed to fly an attack mission against the international airport Lod well inside Israel it had not given the desired result. On the ground, during climb out and landing back the MiG-25RBs were very vulnerable to every F-4. .

You've been correct about mentions the fact that the MiG 25RB would be vulnerable, while in the ground, taking off, landing or climbing, at the F 4E Phantom II, as well as too: Mirage III, IAI Nesher and even the A 4 Skyhawk from Israel Air Force.

However there was one small detail that could prevent this to happen as you said, it was the fact that in 1973 the Israel Air Force had failed to establish air supremacy, just remember the "infamous air battle" in October 14, and not even at the end of the war. Without air supremacy would not be possible keeping the CAP( Combat Air Patrols) over air bases in Egypt, or even in Cairo West Air Base, to destroy the MiG 25RB when it come out of their underground shelter to strike the Operation Nickel Glass.

At the end of World War II, the Germany after had been introduced the new jet fighter as Me 262 in combat received as responses from Allied patrols by allied fighters ( CAP), over the air bases from Germany. Due to the fact that at this stage of the war the Allies had established the air supremacy over Germany .

This tactic from Allies had been keeping CAP's over German air bases were partially effective, however the tactic which reached better result were due the lack of fuel for the Me 262 accomplish its missions to intercept allied bombers. Once the Allies had concentrated heavy air attacks against facilities that produced synthetic fuel destined for the Me 262.

The Replicate Me 262 Flies Alongside the Preserved B 24 Liberator

http://www.camaro5.com/forums/showthread.php?p=5568922

[Sens]

"the "infamous air battle" in October 14" never happened that way. It was a fiction in honor of the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and EAF commander during the war. Most of the details about the Israeli side were from the events of October 7. Even the Egyptians did claim that battle before 1996.
During that war Israel had the capability and had shown it to close an Egyptian or Syrian AB whenever the need should arise. Cairo-West was well known and not a difficult target in 1973.

[maurobaggio]

“Those who excel at defense bury themselves beyond the lowest depths of the earth. Those who excel in attack move above the highest heights of the sky.”

General Sun Tzu -
The Art of War

As the U.S. was leaving the Vietnam War in 1973 certainly would be much resistance from the U.S. government to engage directly in war against the Egypt if any aircraft transports as C 5A Galaxy or C 141 Starlifter engaged in the effort to supply Israel with weapons and munitions were attacked in the Israel territory by MiG 25RB had been based in Cairo West Air Base from Egypt, once those MiG 25RB for all circumstances would be about Egypt command .

Thus it was presumed that the U.S. had been faced by its restriction to support Israel caused by the MiG 25RB in Egypt would press Israel to accept a ceasefire in terms favorable to Egypt and Syria, and most probably those favorable terms should be the Sinai territory and the Golan heights to return from Egypt and Syria respectively.


Anyway the high effort in preparing the offensive in 1973 did by Egypt and Syria without the secret services of Israel and the U.S. were able to alert were a remarkable achievement, even more because these extensive preparations had involved two countries at the same time, and the Soviet Union as the main support its, and in the case of the Egypt did its despite the high celebrate departure of the Soviet personnel in 1972 from Egypt .


The governments of the U.S. and even Israel were so convinced that Egypt was not in condition to enter in a new war against the Israel, and that all military demonstrations from Egypt were a smokescreen to cover up the negotiations with the U.S. and Israel from the hard line of Egypt Armed Forces , that even when Bulgaria sent the SS 1 SCUD to Egypt in August 1973, this was interpreted as just another demonstration for the hard lines.

Heavy Cargo Helicopter Mil Mi 6 "Hook" Loading Into Cargo Bay SS 1 SCUD Missile

http://www.aviastar.org/helicopters_eng/mi-6.php

With the detachment between Egypt and the Soviet Union in 1972, Egypt became a threat of lower intensity as compared to the period that its was near at the Soviet Union, and Syria alone had not been considered a potential threat to Israel as Egypt.

However other problem that could be important about the decreased the perception from secret services of Israel and the U.S. about Egypt and Syria had been preparing for war against Israel with high support from Soviet Union before 1973 were that Israel and U.S considered as the greatest threat could came from terrorist groups as far as Israel and U.S. interests in the Middle East, especially after the murder of the Israeli athletes in 1972 Olympic games in Munich, West Germany.

The Bulgaria and other countries under the influence of the Soviet Union were used to deliver equipment and weapons to Egypt in order to maintain the illusion that Egypt and the Soviet Union were apart. The case of SS 1 SCUD were perhaps the most interesting, since Bulgaria could not supply the SS 1 SCUD without the approval from Moscow, or in that case under orders from Moscow. However this delivery for the SS 1 SCUD were seen only as a gesture from Moscow to pleasure the Egypt, so that could help to reverse the Egypt decision to move away from the Soviet Union influence.

However what was really the highest secret and therefore the most unpleasant surprise were the concealment of the MiG 25RB in Cairo West Air Base between 1972 and 1973. An aircraft like the MiG 25RB had demand many high specialized technicians in maintenance to keep those aircraft in fly conditions, mainly due to high volume and complexity from electronic equipment of those aircraft in addition to all other systems to keep its operating, it must should be inspected and tested continuously even to avoid the corrosion from air and moisture content about its sensitive parts of the MiG 25RB .

The probable reason that the MiG 25RB could be kept secret in Egypt for years could be the storage process in which it were placed in the underground shelters of Cairo West Air Base. The Soviet Union at that time had been developing ICBM (Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles) since the 60’ that would be stored inside the chamber or cylinders with inert gas atmosphere, so that it just did not cause corrosion in the component from all systems of the missile .

http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/89_icbms.jpg

And other utility had been pumped through the cylinder with the cold ejection, so the high pressure and heat from gases generated by the rocket engines after the cold ejection while the missile were out of the silo should not damage the parts of the missile, in special the nozzles devices as well the others parts as the guidance system and even the airframe.

SS 18 Satan ICBM into Launch Canister

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/icbm/r-36m.htm

In the case of ICBM as the SS 18 Satan were extremely difficult to determine in which these silos ,during the Cold War, where it were stored those missiles, since after the installation thereof, it were not inspected for more than ten years, what could appears that silos were empty specially when were observed from reconnaissance satellites in low orbits.

After SS 18 ICBM had surpassed its useful life from 10 year more than 150%, all launching of the SS 18 during tests were flawless, which proves that the inert atmosphere from cylinders were able to protect the components of the missile for long time.

Currently this method has become well known and used since by Soviet SAM as: SA 10 Grumble and SA 12 Gladiator / Giant during the 80’s. With this method with missiles inside of the cylinder or chamber could be keep almost 10 years without the need to pass through maintenance, and this cylinder with missiles inside usually were laid down at the outdoors, even in ditches under mud, snow or water.

SA-10 GRUMBLE Launching Missile

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia...f/s-300pmu.htm

9A85 GLADIATOR Launcher/Loader Vehicle (LLV) From SA 12 With All Missile Canisters

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/airdef/s-300v.htm

[maurobaggio]

“So of all the activities of the Three Armies, no relationship is more than close one has to spies; no reward is more generous than that given to spies, no business is more secret than those that pertain to spies.”

General Sun Tzu

The Art of War

ADCOM Grumman F-14 Tomcat proposed interceptor for USAF

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:US...tor_-_1972.jpg

When storing the MiG 25RB in chambers with inert gas atmosphere on the underground of the Cairo West Air Base, these MiG 25RB were protected from any effects of corrosion mainly in its electronic systems and had not demanded the action from support staff to keep them in fly conditions, which drastically reduced the Soviet personnel in the Cairo West Air Base to just keep it.


For that reason could be one explanation about the secret services from Israel and the U.S. did not detect the presence of MIG 25RB before the conflict started. As the MiG 25 RB had no refueling probe, and besides that the confidentiality and secrecy around these aircraft did not allow these were displaced by its own means in areas not covered by the Soviet system to control those aircraft in order to prevent any possibility that any MiG 25 would fall into the wrong hands.



So the only way to bring the MiG 25RB to Egypt would be by air transport inside the An 22 Antey during the war , and in these it would come apart, which would require considerable time to reassemble it and test all systems prior the mission . As the Soviets as well the MiG 25RB were supposed expelled from Egypt in 1972 , there would be little chance to keep the MiG 25RB in Egypt with all personnel without the secrets services from Israel and U.S. discovery its.


But with the chambers of inert gas to storage the MiG 25RB the high number and specialized personnel would no required to maintain the MiG 25RB , but only a small contingent of Soviet "civilian" contractors to maintain the facilities Soviet Cairo West Air Base that certainly would not seen suspicious.
The purpose for the MiG 25RB in the Yom Kippur War should be to keep as threat to the U.S. and its powerful air transport fleet with large cargo of new advanced weapons away from Israel until it was weakened by the losses as well as the depleted stocks of ammunition.

Bulgaria's MiG-25RB. The only country of the Warsaw Pact, except the Soviet Union to receive the MiG 25 RB.

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...Airforce/page2

Despite all in the end Israel would be convinced by the U.S. to accept a ceasefire on terms favorable to Egypt and Syria. Once that Israel would use its nuclear arsenal, Egypt and Syria would receive nuclear weapons, such as the SS 1 SCUD from Soviet Union and would strike back against Israel.
For the Soviet Union this would be a great the political triumph to provide the means for Egypt and Syria to retake its occupied territories .

The MiG 25RB should remain secret in Egypt until the end of war if were not required for missions against Israel since the transport aircraft from U.S would not landed in Israel. So that would keep the fact that the victory from Egypt and Syria were obtained with the export standard of military equipment from Soviet Union.


The threat of MiG 25RB in Egypt in 1973 to prevent reinforcements in new weapons from U.S. through Operation Nickel Glass to Israel could bring another advantage for the Soviet Union, once this should be making the U.S. and NATO destined a major effort to expand its air defenses to protect the air bases and airports from UK against the supposed threat from MiG 25RB , that in case the war against de Warsaw Pact would receive the supplies and troops sent from the U.S. to reinforce the NATO.

Bulgaria's MiG-25RB.The purpose of this was to replace the loss by the withdrawal of MiG 25RB from Cairo West Air Base that were expelled from Egypt in 1974.

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...Airforce/page2

However a problem arose in preparation for the offensive against Israel, since it was originally scheduled to begin in 1974, since many of the equipment provided for Egypt and Syria, in particular batteries of SAM, were still in training process with crews of these both countries .

F 14 Assembly

http://www.grummanpark.org/content/f-14-assembly

But the offensive were anticipated for 1973 due to the fact that the Soviet secret service had been obtained information that the F 14A Tomcat could become operational in 1974.

Despite all the problems that have arisen in the program of the F 14A, which almost resulted in the cancellation of this, the Soviet Union did not expect these to become operational before 1975 or even 1976, due to problems with the development of radar AWG 9 and AIM 54 Phoenix missiles when under jamming by ECM.

Flight Test of the F 14A Tomcat

http://www.grummanpark.org/content/t...-3-buno-157982

Because of the MiG 25RB missions in Egypt between 1971 and 1972, the U.S. was able to accelerate the development of the F 14A Tomcat, especially the AWG 9 radar and AIM 54A Phoenix missiles, which despite had been working in its development from 1966 to TFX, the items were still critical of the F 14A Tomcat.

What the Soviet Union could not figure out was that in 1973 both the AWG 9 radar as the AAM 54A Phoenix missiles were already for its production with all of its development problems had been solved, even at work with prototypes and pre-production fighters.

F-14A Tomcat number 9 at Pt. Mugu. ramp. Photo US Navy.

http://www.tomcat-sunset.org/test2/gallery.htm

The U.S. maintained a high degree of misinformation about the program YF 14A Tomcat, with the intent that if the Soviet Union again would the MiG 25RB to invade the air space of U.S. allied nations, as it did between 1971 and 1972 against Israel, the idea was to surprise the MiG 25RB in this invasions missions, presenting them to the F 14A Tomcat, before it officially becomes operational.

In the times of the Cold War to declare as operational some new military equipment were more a matter of formality than reality, and this most often occurred after the other side has to make sure that the new equipment was ready for use.

The biggest threat of MiG 25RB in attack missions would not be the free-fall bombs, these were what the Soviet Union had been leaked to classify the MiG 25RB also with the purpose of attack besides the reconnaissance, however it would only be of secondary weapon system, since the main weapon of MiG 25RB would not be free fall bombs, but ...

AIM-54 missile launch by a VF-111 F-14 Tomcat. Photo US Navy.

http://www.tomcat-sunset.org/test2/gallery.htm

Development and Testing Program of the F 14A Tomcat in Video
http://tomcatsforever.com/?p=350
http://tomcatsforever.com/

[Sens]

Tu 16 Badger from Egypt Air Force in an area protected dug deep into the ground, apparently out of service for a long time

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia...503640_JPG.jpg

Not dug deep into the ground. That was done by several sandstorms rising dunes at Cairo-West every year. The Egyptians were just busy to keep the taxiway to the former hardstand free and rise the walls of that.

[Sens]

“So of all the activities of the Three Armies, no relationship is more than close one has to spies; no reward is more generous than that given to spies, no business is more secret than those that pertain to spies.”

General Sun Tzu

The Art of War

ADCOM Grumman F-14 Tomcat proposed interceptor for USAF

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:US...tor_-_1972.jpg

When storing the MiG 25RB in chambers with inert gas atmosphere on the underground of the Cairo West Air Base, these MiG 25RB were protected from any effects of corrosion mainly in its electronic systems and had not demanded the action from support staff to keep them in fly conditions, which drastically reduced the Soviet personnel in the Cairo West Air Base to just keep it.


For that reason could be one explanation about the secret services from Israel and the U.S. did not detect the presence of MIG 25RB before the conflict started. As the MiG 25 RB had no refueling probe, and besides that the confidentiality and secrecy around these aircraft did not allow these were displaced by its own means in areas not covered by the Soviet system to control those aircraft in order to prevent any possibility that any MiG 25 would fall into the wrong hands.



So the only way to bring the MiG 25RB to Egypt would be by air transport inside the An 22 Antey during the war , and in these it would come apart, which would require considerable time to reassemble it and test all systems prior the mission . As the Soviets as well the MiG 25RB were supposed expelled from Egypt in 1972 , there would be little chance to keep the MiG 25RB in Egypt with all personnel without the secrets services from Israel and U.S. discovery its.


But with the chambers of inert gas to storage the MiG 25RB the high number and specialized personnel would no required to maintain the MiG 25RB , but only a small contingent of Soviet "civilian" contractors to maintain the facilities Soviet Cairo West Air Base that certainly would not seen suspicious.
The purpose for the MiG 25RB in the Yom Kippur War should be to keep as threat to the U.S. and its powerful air transport fleet with large cargo of new advanced weapons away from Israel until it was weakened by the losses as well as the depleted stocks of ammunition.

Bulgaria's MiG-25RB. The only country of the Warsaw Pact, except the Soviet Union to receive the MiG 25 RB.

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...Airforce/page2

Despite all in the end Israel would be convinced by the U.S. to accept a ceasefire on terms favorable to Egypt and Syria. Once that Israel would use its nuclear arsenal, Egypt and Syria would receive nuclear weapons, such as the SS 1 SCUD from Soviet Union and would strike back against Israel.
For the Soviet Union this would be a great the political triumph to provide the means for Egypt and Syria to retake its occupied territories .

The MiG 25RB should remain secret in Egypt until the end of war if were not required for missions against Israel since the transport aircraft from U.S would not landed in Israel. So that would keep the fact that the victory from Egypt and Syria were obtained with the export standard of military equipment from Soviet Union.


The threat of MiG 25RB in Egypt in 1973 to prevent reinforcements in new weapons from U.S. through Operation Nickel Glass to Israel could bring another advantage for the Soviet Union, once this should be making the U.S. and NATO destined a major effort to expand its air defenses to protect the air bases and airports from UK against the supposed threat from MiG 25RB , that in case the war against de Warsaw Pact would receive the supplies and troops sent from the U.S. to reinforce the NATO.

Bulgaria's MiG-25RB.The purpose of this was to replace the loss by the withdrawal of MiG 25RB from Cairo West Air Base that were expelled from Egypt in 1974.

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...Airforce/page2

However a problem arose in preparation for the offensive against Israel, since it was originally scheduled to begin in 1974, since many of the equipment provided for Egypt and Syria, in particular batteries of SAM, were still in training process with crews of these both countries .

F 14 Assembly

http://www.grummanpark.org/content/f-14-assembly

But the offensive were anticipated for 1973 due to the fact that the Soviet secret service had been obtained information that the F 14A Tomcat could become operational in 1974.

Despite all the problems that have arisen in the program of the F 14A, which almost resulted in the cancellation of this, the Soviet Union did not expect these to become operational before 1975 or even 1976, due to problems with the development of radar AWG 9 and AIM 54 Phoenix missiles when under jamming by ECM.

Flight Test of the F 14A Tomcat

http://www.grummanpark.org/content/t...-3-buno-157982

Because of the MiG 25RB missions in Egypt between 1971 and 1972, the U.S. was able to accelerate the development of the F 14A Tomcat, especially the AWG 9 radar and AIM 54A Phoenix missiles, which despite had been working in its development from 1966 to TFX, the items were still critical of the F 14A Tomcat.

What the Soviet Union could not figure out was that in 1973 both the AWG 9 radar as the AAM 54A Phoenix missiles were already for its production with all of its development problems had been solved, even at work with prototypes and pre-production fighters.

F-14A Tomcat number 9 at Pt. Mugu. ramp. Photo US Navy.

http://www.tomcat-sunset.org/test2/gallery.htm

The U.S. maintained a high degree of misinformation about the program YF 14A Tomcat, with the intent that if the Soviet Union again would the MiG 25RB to invade the air space of U.S. allied nations, as it did between 1971 and 1972 against Israel, the idea was to surprise the MiG 25RB in this invasions missions, presenting them to the F 14A Tomcat, before it officially becomes operational.

In the times of the Cold War to declare as operational some new military equipment were more a matter of formality than reality, and this most often occurred after the other side has to make sure that the new equipment was ready for use.

The biggest threat of MiG 25RB in attack missions would not be the free-fall bombs, these were what the Soviet Union had been leaked to classify the MiG 25RB also with the purpose of attack besides the reconnaissance, however it would only be of secondary weapon system, since the main weapon of MiG 25RB would not be free fall bombs, but ...

AIM-54 missile launch by a VF-111 F-14 Tomcat. Photo US Navy.

http://www.tomcat-sunset.org/test2/gallery.htm

Development and Testing Program of the F 14A Tomcat in Video
http://tomcatsforever.com/?p=350
http://tomcatsforever.com/

The claims become more and more strange to save a fiction.
"When storing the MiG 25RB in chambers with inert gas atmosphere on the underground of the Cairo West Air Base, these MiG 25RB were protected from any effects of corrosion mainly in its electronic systems and had not demanded the action from support staff to keep them in fly conditions, which drastically reduced the Soviet personnel in the Cairo West Air Base to just keep it."
Corrosion is no issue in Egypt. [The recce-regiments in the SU equipped with MiG-25RBs stored theirs in the open!] The high sun-radiation and sandstorms are the main threats in Egypt.
Egypt and Syria had just limited military targets in October 1973 and no party suspected an airlift from the USA. Egypt and Syria were stunned by the tactical surprise they achieved October 6th and unable to change planes to exploit that during that window of opportunity. None did anticipate a fight lasting for more than a week till forced to a ceasefire from the UN. To the surprise of the Russians its Arab clients have depleted a lot of its stock of ammunition within the first days and something similar happened to the Israeli for their limited stock MBT ammunition f.e. The starting Russian resupply of Arab ammunition could not be touched by the Israelis militarily for political reasons. Doing so they would make the SU an official war-party. Similar thing the other way around for the Arabs, when the Israelis demanded a similar support in supplies by the USA to balance that. Sadat never allowed Egyptian attacks behind the occupied Sinai. Clausewitz in mind: "Never start a war without the political end in mind." = Camp David and the USA as broker.
The claims about fictional roles of the F-14A neither ready nor deployed in Israel and the MiG-25RBs not in Egypt before October 1973 had changed nothing. The few Russian MiG-25RBs were just tasked to monitior the coming cease-fire to support the SU foreign affeirs in support of their Egyptian client.
In that days the frontline did change every hour by the advancing Israelis and the first radar monitored recce flights of the Russian MiG-25RBs were along the Suez for that purpose similar the US recce-flights there.

[maurobaggio]

Tu 16 Badger from Egypt Air Force in an area protected dug deep into the ground, apparently out of service for a long time

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia...503640_JPG.jpg

Not dug deep into the ground. That was done by several sandstorms rising dunes at Cairo-West every year. The Egyptians were just busy to keep the taxiway to the former hardstand free and rise the walls of that.

1) I'm not a Engineer of the Constructions, but I imagine that the inclined wall was constructed to contain the hill, as the hill is higher than the wall, I can´t imagine that a dune would remain that way.

2) And even I'm not a Geologist and because this I do not imagine that's has been show in the picture is formed around the wall only by sand from a dune, and as you said dune constantly change place, so how would it be possible to imagine the same place in 1970?

By topography in the picture I can not imagine that this was Tu 16 Badger in Cairo West Air Base because the terrain of this base is very flat, this photo is probably from some other Air Base from Egypt.

After the Six Day War in 1967 when the Israeli air force had been destroyed in one day being the 5th June more than 400 aircraft of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq, and almost all in the ground. After this had happened a deep change in the concept of the air bases, with the construction of high armored shelters( HAS) and scattered places in order to avoid what happened in 1967.

Only Egypt lost on June 5 and about 289 aircraft: 30 Tu -16, 27 IL-28, 12 Su-7, 80 MiG-15/17, 20 MiG-19, 90 MiG-21 and e.g.

Tu 16 Badger from Egypt destroyed in Cairo West Air Base during the War in 1967.

http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-...s-spy-1.345614

Israel's attack in 1967 dramatically changed the doctrine of air power, since even NATO and the Warsaw Pact had been increased greatly the defenses from air bases , especially with the construction of HAS and dispersal places for the aircraft's on the ground.

The shadow of an Israeli Mirage III EA passes over some destroyed MiG 21's on the ground during a reconnaissance mission .

http://the-aiw-reader.blogspot.com.b...-1967-six.html

Thus Cairo West Air Base where the Soviet Union had built also underground shelters and reinforced armored in order to protect its MiG-25 R/RB in Egypt since due to all hostility between Egypt and Israel during the early 70 would be an invitation for an attack, so to keep fighters high expensive as the MiG 25 R/RB vulnerable to the open sky would be almost insanity, and sure enough when has been speaking of Israel Air Force there are two certainties:
1) This will always on the offensive in any conditions and against any adversary if necessary;
2) And this offensive will stop only when they win or when none one remain alive to fight;

Posted by SENS: "Bort number 57 of 154th ORA before its Egyptian hangar. There were no underground hangars at Cairo West AB. Reduced scan from Flieger Revue Extra issue 30 p 84."

http://forum.keypublishing.com/attac...6&d=1338411593

By the way it is very good the picture of Cairo West Air Base with the MiG 25RB MiG in front of the hangar.

How about the fact that Cairo West Air Base had received underground shelters that was described by Mr. Yefim Gordon in his book MiG 25 & MiG 31, but at this time I don't know if another source to confirm this and even to be able to deny it.

[maurobaggio]

Tu 16 Badger from Egypt Air Force in an area protected dug deep into the ground, apparently out of service for a long time

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia...503640_JPG.jpg

Not dug deep into the ground. That was done by several sandstorms rising dunes at Cairo-West every year. The Egyptians were just busy to keep the taxiway to the former hardstand free and rise the walls of that.

1) I'm not a Engineer of the Constructions, but I imagine that the inclined wall was constructed to contain the hill, as the hill is higher than the wall, I can´t imagine that a dune would remain that way.

2) And even I'm not a Geologist and because this I do not imagine that's has been show in the picture is formed around the wall only by sand from a dune, and as you said dune constantly change place, so how would it be possible to imagine the same place in 1970?

By topography in the picture I can not imagine that this was Tu 16 Badger in Cairo West Air Base because the terrain of this base is very flat, this photo is probably from some other Air Base from Egypt.

After the Six Day War in 1967 when the Israeli air force had been destroyed in one day being the 5th June more than 400 aircraft of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq, and almost all in the ground. After this had happened a deep change in the concept of the air bases, with the construction of high armored shelters( HAS) and scattered places in order to avoid what happened in 1967.

Only Egypt lost on June 5 and about 289 aircraft: 30 Tu -16, 27 IL-28, 12 Su-7, 80 MiG-15/17, 20 MiG-19, 90 MiG-21 and e.g.

Tu 16 Badger from Egypt destroyed in Cairo West Air Base during the War in 1967.

http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-...s-spy-1.345614

Israel's attack in 1967 dramatically changed the doctrine of air power, since even NATO and the Warsaw Pact had been increased greatly the defenses from air bases , especially with the construction of HAS and dispersal places for the aircraft's on the ground.

The shadow of an Israeli Mirage III EA passes over some destroyed MiG 21's on the ground during a reconnaissance mission .

http://the-aiw-reader.blogspot.com.b...-1967-six.html

Thus Cairo West Air Base where the Soviet Union had built also underground shelters and reinforced armored in order to protect its MiG-25 R/RB in Egypt since due to all hostility between Egypt and Israel during the early 70 would be an invitation for an attack, so to keep fighters high expensive as the MiG 25 R/RB vulnerable to the open sky would be almost insanity, and sure enough when has been speaking of Israel Air Force there are two certainties:
1) This will always on the offensive in any conditions and against any adversary if necessary;
2) And this offensive will stop only when they win or when none one remain alive to fight;

Posted by SENS: "Bort number 57 of 154th ORA before its Egyptian hangar. There were no underground hangars at Cairo West AB. Reduced scan from Flieger Revue Extra issue 30 p 84."

http://forum.keypublishing.com/attac...6&d=1338411593

By the way it is very good the picture of Cairo West Air Base with the MiG 25RB MiG in front of the hangar.

How about the fact that Cairo West Air Base had received underground shelters that was described by Mr. Yefim Gordon in his book MiG 25 & MiG 31, but at this time I don't know if another source to confirm this and even to be able to deny it.

[TEEJ]

[CENTER][SIZE="2"][B][SIZE="3"]
By topography in the picture I can not imagine that this was Tu 16 Badger in Cairo West Air Base because the terrain of this base is very flat, this photo is probably from some other Air Base from Egypt.

Cairo West. Note revetment with damaged lip?

http://goo.gl/maps/KyEjW

Look at the area in Google Earth and rotate to match the original picture.

[maurobaggio]

Cairo West AB and H 3 AB - Part I

Image edited from Google Maps:http://goo.gl/maps/DFc3C

The H3 Main Air Base from Iraq, one of from three bases in the extreme West from Iraq. This base had been using by Soviet Union MiG 25 PD/RB during the 80’s and wer considered strategic for the Iraq High Command even far way from the battles zones during the War Iran-Iraq.


The Cairo West Air Base from Egypt and H 3 Air Base from Iraq had much in common despite those airfields belong at different countries, since both bases had operated in different times the MiG 25 Foxbat RB from Soviet Union. Another fact in common about those bases were that actively participated in conflicts and thus both were priority targets for the opponents, in the case of Cairo West would be the Israel Air Force and H 3 by Iran Air Force during the almost eight years of war between Iran and Iraq.


The importance to comment about the of Underground Shelter for aircrafts in Cairo West were not due only to the protection of aircraft would be based on this air base, but the importance of this would keep in secret the aircraft types that were inside those bunkers as well the number of units of those aircrafts in the base, since in underground shelters air reconnaissance or even by images taken from spy satellites in low orbits could not determine easily.
However to better analyze Cairo West would be interesting to analyze first other air base as H 3 in the far west of Iraq, belonging to it, that during the 80’ at least had been used by the Soviet Union primarily as a base for MiG 25RB/PD Foxbat.


In fact the operations of the MiG 25RB/PD from Soviet Union in Iraq were initiated around 1980 in Shoaibah Air Base in southern Iraq, near the Persian Gulf, however with the of the outbreak from Iran-Iraq War, this Air Base was the first target had been attacked by F 4E Phantom II from Iran almost two hours after the offensive initiated from Iraq in September 22, 1980.
Because of this attack and the damages had been suffered in Shoaibah Air Base , the Soviet Union shifted its contingent, comprising of : 16 MiG-21MF, 20 MiG-23ML and 24 MiG 25RB/PD at H 3 Air Base in far western from Iraq, near the border with Syria and Turkey.


The H 3 Air Base was not only an airfield, but a cluster consisting of three airfields, two of which were considered satellites of the main, but all those airfields had been provided with HAS ( Hardened Aircraft Shelter) , but the H 3 Main were equipped with more HAS and another facilities. The others two satellites airfields were labeled as H 3 Northwest and H 3 Southwest, and near of this airfields could be possible use long strips of the Highway Amman-Baghdad as alternatives runways.


Another particularity of H 3 were that location away from urban centers or villages , since this Air Base was situated in a desert place, which provided the highest degree of secrecy about the operations had been carried out from this base.

Image edited from Google Maps::http://goo.gl/maps/DFc3C

Surface HAS( Hardened Aircraft Shelter) partially covered by sand: The image were edited to show the approach dimensions of this construction as well the aircraft probably a MiG 23/27 Flogger . its possible to see a few MiG 23/27 abandoned in the GoogleMaps images taken in 2013 around the base, in the time when this base were active the MiG 23 Flogger certainly had belong to this base and most of the time should be keep inside this HAS.

Image edited from Google Maps::http://goo.gl/maps/DFc3C

Surface HAS in H 3. Those Surface HAS near of the runways should be used by interceptor fighters as MiG 21MF, MiG 23MF or MiG 25PD. Those fighters had the primary mission to defend this base against any threat.


As H 3 was relatively far away from the border with Iran, and consequently the battle zones, so far that could diminished the risk of attack by Iran or even interceptions by this, especially in the case by the F 14A Tomcat equipped with long range air-air missiles as AIM 54A Phoenix against the MiG 25RB Foxbat when it had been approaching or taking off its base for reconnaissance missions.

The location of H3 would allow the MiG 25RB to accomplish reconnaissance missions of the border of Turkey's as well as NATO facilities in this country, and even the Mediterranean Sea through Syria with it was allied with Soviet Union, besides Iran with benefit to access this country from east border, along the north border already covered because this border it was with Soviet Union.

Anyway the MiG 25RB based in H 3 could perform missions in the Gulf Persian by simply using some base in southern from Iraq to refuel, but the main problem for the MiG 25RB in reconnaissance missions in the Gulf still would remain as the threat of the F 14A Tomcat from Iran during the war Iran/Iraq.

Image edited from Google Maps::http://goo.gl/maps/DFc3C

This part of H 3 has widely paved area however for only four HAS. Those type of HAS in Iraq airfields has been described by some sources as “ Drive Thru” HAS, since it has an inlet and outlet for the aircraft which would decrease the time required to maneuver the aircraft to access the HAS. However the large paved area as taxiway appears to be out of proportion in size to only 04 HAS, and these distribution almost equidistant resembles an Air Carrier with their lifters to transport the aircraft's to the below decks.

Image edited from Google Maps::http://goo.gl/maps/DFc3C

1.HAS: The dimensions are lower compared to the previous Surface HAS had been described, but if this structure its only destined to cover the lifter for the Underground facilities indeed that would be advantage since that should present a less detectable target;
2.MiG 23/27 Flogger: Those dimensions are only to give the scale when close of the HAS, and when compared with the previous Surface HAS its clear that HAS in the image above is smaller than the previous HAS and would be too restrictive for ground crew working on aircraft;
3. Access Ramp: It’s not clear what the purpose of this to the HAS, but if this ramp gives access at the underground levels, indeed to the Underground Shelter that would be a reason for this since could be used even by vehicles;
4. HAS Access: In all HAS of this dimensions appear that one of those entrances has less restriction than the other due to the presence of a small wall, so if this HAS would be a “Drive Thru” HAS there wasn’t reason for this asymmetry;
5. HAS Exit: Its possible see in the image a shadow had been created by a small wall, what certainly would create some problems to maneuver an aircraft at the HAS, but if this small wall were only a deflector jet for the aircraft inside the HAS when this get out from the same to avoid the exhaust of the jet engine create a cloud of dust and withdraws the aircraft for an enemy during attack against the airfield, once the aircraft could be maneuvered in the underground level to leave where it enters in the HAS.


Thanks at the Iran Air Force the US Navy Fleet didn’t receive many visits of the MiG 25 RB from Soviet Union in the Gulf, once the MiG 25RB from Iraq Air Bases should cross along the coast of the Iran and very close of the Iran Airfields ,in missions over the Persian Gulf.

The reason should be that the first part of the reconnaissance mission from MiG 25RB would be easy in the Gulf , without problems with Iran Air Force, but in the regress part of the mission, that would be funny part, when CAP of the F 14A Tomcat from Iran Air Force would be positioned over the Persian Gulf between the MiG 25 RB and its base to cut off his return to Iraq.

However among others possible reasons that the Soviet Union did relocate its staff to H 3 was surely the fact that Air Base had underground HAS , since it was away from the border of Iran, also meant that this was close to Israel, and how Israel and Iraq had a history of conflict, the presence of well protected underground HAS was very convenient to the Soviet Union.

The complex H 3 with its three bases were impressively by its scale as the complexity, besides those three bases H 3 ( Main, Southwest and Northwest) near of H 3 Main as large set of bunkers, which later in 1991 during the First Gulf War were extensively attacked in reason that facilities were identified by U.S. Intelligence as storage sites for Chemical Weapons.

Image edited from Google Maps::http://goo.gl/maps/DFc3C

Surface HAS: The dimensions of this type of surface HAS are larger than the supposed Underground HAS, since the visible part in the surface would only lift access to underground levels, whereas Surface HAS in the image above e should have dimensions suitable to allow the ground crews to work in the maintenance of the aircraft.



The H 3 Main should be two types of HAS, one its the surface type and the underground type. In Surface HAS that were build near of the runway would be intended to interceptor fighters that could defend the base, once alerted should take off quickly. While in Underground HAS would be crowded with aircraft for others missions such as reconnaissance and attack, or even interceptors as backup. The reason to keep the attack or reconnaissance aircraft in the Underground HAS instead of the Surface HAS could be described by the fact the attack or reconnaissance missions could be planned in in advance of hours or even days, since the interception missions in most cases its reaction from a threat that still hard even today to anticipate.


In the case of attack against base with these HAS, those fighters with interception mission take off to protect the base, leaving the Surface HAS empty , which even if those HAS were hit would not result in the destruction of aircraft since the same HAS were empty. While others aircraft would be in Underground HAS that would provide greater protection for the aircraft's inside even if the base is heavily attacked.

Although Underground HAS and even Surface HAS are complex and extremely expensive to build, it would has had the purpose to avoid the installation of several systems of the SAM ( Surface Air Missiles) and AAA (Anti Air Artillery) to protect the airfield, once the SAM and AAA also are even expensive and vulnerable specially by attack aircrafts with mission to destroy or even jamming the air defense radars as SEAD (Suppression Enemy Air Defenses), since systems SAM and AAA could be more efficient when it would be moved to other locations and thereby obtain the element of surprise against an attack aircraft's, instead of being kept in one location known as an airfields.

There are several sources that claim as many of the HAS were built by companies of the former Yugoslavia during the 80's, and were basically of two types, surface and one underground type.

Surface HAS: Although the images has been taken by satellites at disposal not permit a correct measuring from the height of the HAS in H 3 , it only could be estimated that at least the dimensions of Surface HAS had a larger height as its width and length than compared to the suppose Underground HAS.

Underground HAS: When compared with the type of surface would be possible to estimate that the inner space of these types of HAS, would in fact too restrictive for ground crews, at least for the dimensions of the aircraft as MiG 25 Foxbat, but still the MiG 25 could use this to get to the underground once this restrictive HAS could be the elevator, where would be made all phases of operation and maintenance since this underground levels could be capacity to receive several fighters at the same time.


However the origin of the complex H 3 bases are older, since during the 70s these bases had been extensively enlarged and modernized, and received in this period its HAS well as other bases in Iraq.

The interesting fact about this period of the 70's were that H 3 bases became known as Koreans Camps, since Koreans labors had been working in the construction of the Highway between Baghdad and Amman were housed near of these bases.

If those Koreans labors belong to the North Korea that could explained who and when de Underground HAS were built in H 3, because the North Korea has a long tradition of building underground facilities, especially underground HAS in its airfields, would be a very likely hypothesis that the H 3 underground facilities were built during the 70s by the North Koreans who were also building the highway which serve to hide the construction on H 3, and most likely under the guidance of the Soviet Union.

An overview of Hwangju AB from North Korea is provided in the image below, with significant facilities or features annotated:

There is an interesting article on the Air Bases from North Korea that has underground shelters for aircrafts, in this case the link is: http://geimint.blogspot.com.br/2010/...elds-dprk.html



With the presence of the Soviet Union in H 3, particularly the MiG 25 RB conducting reconnaissance missions over Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and those missions of the MiG 25RB were a serious threat from Iran, since the details had been collected by all sensors that could be equipped in the MiG 25 RB certainly given to Iraq high advantage to conduct the war against the Iran. Probably because this reason H 3 were attacked in 1981 by Iran Air Force, on a daring mission performed by F 4E Phantom II.

Image edited from Google Maps:http://goo.gl/maps/DFc3C

Underground HAS: This part of H 3 also has four HAS has been distributed almost in a circle over a wide area of taxiway. However the dimensions are different between this HAS , which would indicate that at least one of these has been built to allow access to larger aircraft with less restriction. There are several sources that say the underground HAS in Iraq would be able to receive 04-12 aircraft at same time.

Image edited from Google Maps:http://goo.gl/maps/DFc3C

Underground HAS: Put 12 aircraft in the ‘basement’ that only could use a single elevator should be a problem due to the long time to return those aircraft at the surface, or even in case of the elevator broken or had been disabling after an attack against the base. So these underground HAS would be more logical that could has more of an elevator by Underground HAS , and the image above there are apparently two HAS side by side, as twined, and probably that could be two elevators for the underground facilities.

Image edited from Google Maps:[/COLOR]http://goo.gl/maps/DFc3C

Underground HAS: Put two HAS together , or twin, it would not be interesting since the rule should be put those HAS so dispersed in order to make them less obvious as target. However if these are indeed twinned elevators to the ‘basement’ so that if one of these were damaged or even broken, the other could continue remain active and bring back at the surface the aircraft's that were on the underground, even if only for 04 aircraft the capacity of this facility in the image above. As a say left 04 MiG 25 in the basement during the battle because the single elevator would be out of service certainly should be not desirable



The introduction of the MiG 25PD/RB in Iraq Air Force had been gradually occurring in 1981 since the MiG 25PD/RB demanded high training of the pilots to those fighters, despite this fact the MiG 25RB were very active in reconnaissance missions during 1981, which would indicate that those MiG 25 RB were in fact from Soviet Union, and from the H 3 Air Base.

Thus it would be possible that Iran High Command had planed this attack against H 3 with intention to obtain the same result when in 1980 after the attack of several F 4E Phantom II from Iran against Shoiabah Air Base, the Soviets withdrew from this base, and so by attacking H 3 in 1981 the Soviets could withdraw the MiG 25RB from Iraq once for all.

Placing together two HAS would not be a very logical choice, since this would allow the enemy more easily discern this target due to its dimensions, both in terms of visual contact or infrared imaging, as well as for detection by ground mapping radar from attack aircraft( F 111E/F, Tornado GR 1, B 1B Lancer ). However if this facility could access to lifts to an underground HAS, putting both so close could be due to limited space in underground which anyway would not possible disperse the surface structures.

As some of HAS twinned has different dimensions, which also would not be very logical if the goal is to reduce the visibility of it, since this way the logical thing would disperse them. One possibility is that these structures did not had internal wall to separate both, which would allow large fighters like the MiG 25 would be maneuvered more easily to the elevators.



However in H 3 with facilities as Underground HAS that were immune to Iran's weapons at its disposal, once the Iran Air Force were equipped with precision weapons, as :GBU 10 Paveway II LGB ( Laser Guided Bomb) ,GBU 8 HOBOS and AGM 65A Maverick, that could be used by F 4E Phantom II against the Surface HAS , but against the Underground HAS those weapons would be useless. The Soviet Union remained in this base even after this attack of 1981, and had been continued even after the end of the war between Iran and Iraq.

The effectiveness of Underground HAS in H 3 to face an attack with high intensity, most likely based in the project of the Cairo West in Egypt , maybe had convinced the Iraq High Command to invest large sum of resources to build a large number of Surface and Underground HAS around others bases during the war between Iran and Iraq in the 80’s.

Even in the case of the Surface HAS built by the former Yugoslavs companies, known as trapezoidal form, most likely this could be resist all precision weapons from Iran Air Force, and the aircraft's inside this could be protected against any surprise attack.

But certainly the Underground HAS would resist against those precision weapons and most of the others, even against a blast from nuclear warhead if it wasn't a direct impact, because against a direct impact probably would be impossible for any bunker to resist. Maybe this last feature were required to face the nuclear capability from Israel or even about the probably advances in Iran nuclear program during the 80's.

LGB Paveway III under the wing of the Tornado GR 1

Image from:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Paveway_ILA06.JPG

During the First Gulf War in order to destroy the hardened targets of the Iraq, the Tornados GR 1 armed with LGB Paveway III had launched its weapons from an altitude of 7.140m, which due to sophisticated ground mapping radar that could detect the HAS in any condition atmospheric at long range and altitude. With this target on the ground mapping radar and its inertial navigation system allowed the f computer from Tornados GR 1 to calculate the launch point from LGB Paveway III in order to put this weapons in a ballistic trajectory allowing turning the altitude and initial velocity input by the Tornado in high final velocity when the LGB reached the target. By increasing the velocity at impact by 25% would increase the Kinetic Energy of the LGB Paveway by almost 60%, which would penetrate deeper into the target before detonation, which would increase the damage caused by it LGB .




In the first Gulf War in 1991, those trapezoidal HAS built by former Yugoslav companies during the 80s were destroyed only after several attacks by several types of aircrafts as: F 111F, Tornado GR1 and F 15E that were armed with LGB Paveway III as BSU 109 with 2000 lb. / 907 kg .

Since after the first impact with this LGB, a second LGB were aimed to the same point left by the impact for the previous attack, and because the accuracy of Paveway III much better than the Paveway II which had Iran during the war against Iraq during the 80s, its second Paveway III had been practically impacting on the already point damaged and weakened of the structure of concrete from HAS, thereby allowing the second impact penetrate and destroy the HAS, as well as any aircraft that were within them.

The Coalition led by USA in the first Gulf War had conducted more than 3,000 missions against Air Bases from Iraq, which had resulted in the destruction of 375 HAS of the approximately 594 HAS that Iraq had at the beginning of the First Gulf War. To ensure that the HAS were destroyed, several mission were demanded with this purpose, which had demonstrated the strength thereof of those HAS and its bases.

If the purpose of the use of penetrating LGB before detonation, the best way of achieving this would hit the target perpendicular at the surface , which considerably decrease the thickness of the protection from the target, beyond which an impact at a smaller angle than 90 ° would cause a deviation in the trajectory LGB at impact, which could reduces greatly the capability to penetrate inside the target causing more superficial damages, which could mean that HAS were able to operate and maintain the aircraft protected inside. The LGB Paveway III had besides the laser head seeker another guidance system as inertial navigation kit that allowed the LGB to remain in the designated trajectory even hasn’t located the marked target with the laser emission. This feature allows the LGB Paveway III to control its dive angle toward the target, which could increase their effectiveness in penetrating a target, as in the case of BSU 109.

MiG 25PD Foxbat from Iraq destroyed during the Desert Storm Campaing within a Surface HAS after the same had been penetrated probably by a Paveway LGB.

Image from::http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/3/35/Defense.gov_News_Photo_990528-O-9999M-011.jpg/782px-Defense.gov_News_Photo_990528-O-9999M-011.jpg

Despite of the capabilities had been demonstrate by Tornado GR 1 about locating the targets and attack them from high altitudes due to the sophistication of its ground mapping radars and inertial navigation systems, they were not capable of illuminating targets with laser beam to designate those for LGB Paveway during the Desert Storm in 1991 , since in most missions the targets were covered by layers of clouds at low altitudes or even by smoke due to fires even from oil wells. The aircraft that would designate targets for LGB had been launched altitude by Tornados GR 1 were the Blackburn Buccaneers which already flying close the target at a low altitude to locate and designate the targets below the layer of clouds and smoke in cases where the target had previously been attacked or even by the Buccaneer, thus allowing a second LGB hit the target area where were already damaged to increase the penetration of the LGB.

Formation composed during Desert Storm Campaign by a Spectat Jaguar in the foreground and in the sequence a Tornado IDF GR 1, a Buccaneer and a Tornado ADF

Image from:http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafi...C1FF0DBF2C.jpg

Thus the Buccaneers equipped with AN/AVQ-23E “Pave Spike” flying at low altitudes were responsible for designating targets, which had exposed the Buccaneers at AAA and short range SAM during the day, once the AVQ 23E pod hasn’t night capability , making the task much more dangerous than those held by the Tornados IDS at medium altitude.

F-15E leading formation with F-15E and F 16A at his left side, and with F 15C and F 16A at his right side Flying over oil wells on fire during Operation Desert Storm.

Image from::http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:USAF_F-16A_F-15C_F-15E_Desert_Storm_edit2.jpg

The USAF had sophisticated pods as AVQ 26 Pave Tack and LANTIRN with Thermal imaging capability that allowed operate day and night in the: F 111F (AVQ 26), F 15E (LANTIRN) and F 16D( LANTIRN) to designate targets for LGB Paveways, what gave the Coalition the capability to operate around o’clock against all targets and even Iraq Air Bases. Yet many important targets as Iraq Air Bases had been entrusted by the High Command of the Coalition (USA Command) at the Buccaneer and Tornados GR 1 due to efficiency tactic adopted by them, releasing part of the fleet of: F 111F , F 15E and F 16D in the missions to hunt down the mobile launchers of SS 1 Scud tactical ballistic missiles using the Thermal Imaging Pods to detect those evasive targets.


However with respect to the destruction from Iraq HAS in the first Gulf War could be detected that has discrepancy about details and information, since while Surface HAS there are many images and information about the operations of destruction of the HAS, however regarding Underground HAS the availability from information’s and images apparently it were trapped in the underground.

Since the unpleasant surprise about the MiG 25 RB in West Cairo Air Base during the War of 1973,what led the F 14A Tomcat to Israel in secret to protect the air bridge (Operation Nickel Glass) between U.S. and Israel, the United States had begun to invest a lot of effort and resources to obtain the capabilities to nullify the benefits from constructing underground facilities as a means to protect the military assets from Warsaw Pact and even China.

So in 1990 the underground facilities as well as Air Bases from Iraq should not be an obstacle to liberation of Kuwait by U.S. and Coalition formed for this purpose, however in 1990 it became again!

[sheytanelkebir]

just a few corrections.

1- iraqi Mig25s were not based out of H3 "al waleed" but from Tammuz AB ("al taqaddum" in western parlance).

2- Iraqis did not have underground HAS. the only facilities underground were the Air Defence Operations Command HQ and Sector Operations Command HQs. There were some "semi buried" ammunition storage areas.

3-H3 did not have dozens of fighters and bombers etc... it was a combat training base for the air force in the 1980s. the associated small bases around it were all simple dispersal fields. sometimes 2 interceptors would be based out of there for QRA covering ingress from israel/syria. but that was about the extent of combat aircraft based there during the intensive combat period of the iran war. Chinese F7s as well as some twin seater MiG21UM were based there, all used for combat training. Jordanian Instructor pilots were based there as well as some Jordanian I-HAWK unit and they did lots of joint training with Jordanian F5s flying out of H4 Jordan.

do note that the above info refers to the period 1980-1988... at other periods different types operated out of H3.. but it was not a main operating base and did not have a "permanent" combat squadrons flying out of it.

[maurobaggio]

About the description of the Underground HAS(Hardened Aircraft Shelters) in Iraq Air Bases there are a diversity of information sources asserting about its existence.

Among several articles at disposal this would be quite interesting from author Mr. Christopher M. Centner because of that summarize the challenge posed by Iraq Air Bases with underground Hardened Aircraft Shelters to the Coalition lead by U.S., and the site is: http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr...92/centner.htm

The writer and journalist Mr. Tom Cooper also describes the Underground HAS in Iraq Air Bases and the article could be to find out in:
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_377.shtml

[Sens]

About the description of the Underground HAS(Hardened Aircraft Shelters) in Iraq Air Bases there are a diversity of information sources asserting about its existence.

Among several articles at disposal this would be quite interesting from author Mr. Christopher M. Centner because of that summarize the challenge posed by Iraq Air Bases with underground Hardened Aircraft Shelters to the Coalition lead by U.S., and the site is: http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchr...92/centner.htm

The writer and journalist Mr. Tom Cooper also describes the Underground HAS in Iraq Air Bases and the article could be to find out in:
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_377.shtml

In 2003 all Iraqi ABs were in US hands and none claimed that "Underground HAS". Maybe you can give a present US source to bolster your claim. The US will not have missed the opportunity to show something like that to press.
At your first link of airpower .. 1992 you can find the original comment of "Lt Col Sergey Bezlyudnyy" and how it was reused at acig.org a decade later without mention the origin of that.
"9 The aerodynamic-looking HABs at the airfields were "superhardened,".. was missing for example. Not a single word about the claimed Underground HAS from Bezlyudnyy like in the text above at ACIG.

[Sens]

Maybe the ACIG people missed that new built "Super Base 202E or Tallil AB" they were reporting was conquered by the 82nd Airborne Division in 1991 during Desert Storm already where they had look about that. U.S. Combat Engineers then destroyed whatever serviceable aircraft and ordnance was missed during the earlier air campaign.