MiG 25RB Foxbat X YF 14A Tomcat II in The Yom Kippur War ( 1973) - Chapter 2

[maurobaggio]

SR 71 AGAINST MOSCOW - JUDGED BY THE MURPHY LAW

https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xmoscow/home

Chapter 1 - The Soviet Planning To Defeat The SR 71 Program :https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm...oviet-planning
Key Publishing Forum: http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?t=115044

Chapter 2 - MiG 25 RB X YF 14 Tomcat II Over Sinai in 1973 :https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm...over-the-sinai
Key Publishing Forum: http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?t=115178

Chapter 3 - MiG 25P to MiG 31A , From SHADOW to DARKNESS :https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm...ow-to-darkness
Key Publishing Forum: http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?t=115390

Chapter 4 - SR 71 Blackbird, The Legacy of Murphy's Law : https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm...phy-law-legacy
Key Publishing Forum: http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?t=119286

Chapter 5 - MiG 31 Foxhound Vs. SR 71 Blackbird , 007 At Service of the Soviet Union: NEXT
Key Publishing Forum : NEXT




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De SR 71 MiG 25 MiG 31 gif

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Chapter 2 - MiG 25 RB Foxbat X F 14A Tomcat II in
The Yom Kippur War

To see the complete files will be necessary to link:https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm...over-the-sinai

In those hypothetical scenarios of battles had been described in the chapter 1, which are no longer hypothetical when the opponent leaves the theory to practice, using large-scale version of the MiG 25RB by allies of the USSR in the first half of the 70 would at least have a political impact despite anything. Despite the objetive these paper would not be to describe the operations of MiG 25RB, however it is important to mention that before the Yom Kippur War in 1973 the presence of MiG 25RB from Soviet Union in Egypt with the official mission in recconaissance, but with the secret most important mission to demonstrate the performance of the MiG 25 RB to the West analystes to impresse these about the suppose performance of the interceptor MiG 25P, with the goal to avoid the reconaissance missions of the SR 71 Blackbird over the Soviet Union.

Under the full command of the Soviets the missions of the MiG 25 RB caused great concern among U.S. and Israel, once that the main interceptor of Israel and US the fighter F 4E Phantom II had been equipped with medium range missiles AIM 7E Sparrow were not effective to intercept the MiG 25RB from Soviet Union. Despite the Soviet squad had left Egypt long before the outbreak of hostilities, since they were expelled by the President of Egypt once had demanded that the Soviet Union should sold the MiG 25RB to Egypt and if the Soviet Union refused then would be necessary to send back the aircraft for the Soviet Union from Egypt .The Soviets did not authorize the sale of MiG 25RB to Egypt or any other nation until that time, so in retaliation of Egypt was necessary to remove the MiG 25RB from there.

Once the War had begun between Egypt and Syria against Israel, the Israel Air Force failed to stop the divisions formed by tanks (T 54, T 55 and T 62) and infantry assault vehicles (BMP 1) of the armies of Egypt and Syria, as these were protected by a strong and well assembly air defense system consists of: SA 2 Guideline, SA 3 Goa, SA 6 Gainfull , SA 7 Grail, SA 9 Gaskin and ZSU 23-4.Among all these systems the most advanced and lethal to the Israel Air Force was the SA 6 Gainfull that in addition to be mobile and armored, able to follow the divisions of assault, was also able to reach the fighters from Israel for more than 30 km ( 17 NMI) from distance and 10 km ( 32 208 ft) altitude.

After heavy losses of the Israel Air Force, in most cases by ground air defense, the high command of Israel decided attacking enemy armored forces with their powerful and well-trained force of tanks (Centurion, M 48, M 60) .This force of tanks had a history of getting great wins even when outnumbered by opponents, and the types of tanks available from Egypt and Syria were already known to Israel. Unfortunately what these crews of tanks of Israel had ignored his lethal enemies this time would not be the tanks of their opponents, but the new missile antitank AT 3 Sagger, distributed in large numbers of infantry between Egypt and Syria.

The Israeli attack against enemies ground forces were neutralized due in very large-scale employment of AT 3 missile that was simple and portable, which due to its simplicity was considered by many before the conflict began as rudimentary. The losses of tanks in this phase of the war were higher among Israeli forces than the forces of Egypt and Syria in their advance. This time in battle with Israeli forces were often under attack by the air forces of various nations of the Middle East and North Africa to North Korea sent a few squads to help Egypt, which in any case had a superiority in numbers of almost 2.5 : 1 over the Israel Air Force.

The situation of Israel had become more worst because its army (ground forces) had not mobile air defense systems for long range and altitude as had Egypt and Syria with their SA 6 Gainfull and supported by: ZSU 23 4 , SA 7 Grail and SA 9 Gaskin for protection in lower levels. Since the Egyptian Air Force had the Tu 16 Badger bombers as the fighter bombers could attack too in high or medium altitude the military ground forces of the Israel.Thus the strength of Israel Air Force now had to divide their limited fighters between to attack the ground forces of the enemy on two fronts totally different in geographical aspect and also protect their ground forces on both fronts of air attacks from enemies.

The aim of this brief comment is also shown that technological superiority is not to be confused with superior capabilities. The introduction of two new devices such as the surface-air-missile SA 6 Gainfull and anti-tank-missile AT 3 Sagger in wide-scale allowed the other equipment considered technologically inferior to Israel or the U.S. were employed in other missions, changing the whole configuration of the forces of Egypt and Syria and the alleged balance means that before the conflict was considered to be favorable to Israel.

The Soviet Union possibly had no interest in destroying the state of Israel, since it was his determination that would have provided more other advanced weapons systems to Egypt and Syria. While the Soviet Union had been equipped with the MiG-23 Flogger, MiG 25 P / RB Foxbat, Su 22 Fitter fighter bombers and Tu 22 Blinder supersonic bomber. Despite with this new and more capable weapons systems the Soviet Union continued to provide Syria and Egypt with the MiG 21 figther, the fighter bombers Su 7 Fitter fighter bombers and the Tu 16 Badger subsonic bombers .Even Su 15 Flagon with medium-range missiles AA 3 Anab, those had been replaced in production lines by MiG 25 P and AA 6 Acrid, it weren't delivered to any costumer of the Soviet Union. In the field of the land battles the Soviet Union had placed in service more advanced types of tanks as the T 64, while the forces of Egypt and Syria had received only small amounts of T 62 that was a little more advanced than the T 54 and T 55, and these were what constituted the majority of the force of tanks available to Egypt and Syria.

The most effective air-air missile of the conflict of 1973 were not the medium-range missiles AIM 7E Sparrow used by Israel in F 4E Phantom II, but the missiles as the short range or close combat as Sidewinder AIM 9J from U.S. and Shafrir that had been manufacturing in Israel which resulted in huge losses to the enemy forces despite those missiles had not all aspect cabability to engage their targets in the forward aspect. The USSR did not provide the Egyptians and the Syrians with short-range missiles as AA 2 Atoll with passive seeker SARH ( Semi Active Radar Homing)but only the passive infrared seeker as AA 2 Atoll IR to equip their MiG 21s.

In the doctrine of the Warsaw Pact these missiles had been operated by MiG 21 with IR and SARH versions of the short-range missile AA 2 Atoll, that enabling the MiG 21 to perform in all aspect interceptions against the enemies fighters, since the AA 2 Atoll IR were extremely limited to get the IR from tail or nozzles of the enemies fighter, in this engagements even under these conditions were considered to be equivalent to only the first generation of AIM 9B Sidewinder, which this time could already be considered as obsolete by the U.S. and Israel. The short-range missiles with seeker by SARH were only abandoned when the Soviet Union AA 8M Aspid with IR seeker with capability to hit targets in all aspect of engagement had emerged, and according with speculations it were possible that some versions of the AA 2 Atoll SARH were attracted by the irradions of the enemies radar fighters such as anti radiation missiles.

The relationship between Israel and the U.S. was very close, since the U.S. began to supply Israel with its more advanced types that made up their forces as e.g. the fighter bombers F 4E Phantom II and tanks M 60. The Soviet Union had exploited the resentment of the nations of North Africa and Middle East with the closeness between the U.S. and Israel, so in the geopolitical point of view was much more interesting to the Soviet Union to keep the existence of the state of Israel than its destruction. The recovery of the Egyptian and Syrian territories occupied by Israel in the Six Day War in 1967 would be a great victory for the Soviet Union, one that would defeat the major weapons systems the U.S. without to use all its most advanced systems, with some exceptions among which the SA 6 Gainfull , SA 7 Grail , SA 9 Gaskin , ZSU 23 4 and AT 3 Sagger .

In the case of the use of nuclear weapons by Israel, this situation would lead to direct involvement of U.S. and Soviet Union in the conflict. In this context the Soviet Union would present itself as the only power to protect the nations of North Africa and the Middle East in this threat of nuclear attack by Israel. The U.S. would be accused of having provided at least the nuclear technology to Israel and that nations like Saudi Arabia and even Iran could break up the alliance with the U.S., most likely turning the Soviet Union arm. If the Yom Kippur War in 1973 triggered the first oil crisis, when Saudi Arabia halted oil exports to Western nations, what would happen if Israel to prevent even its annihilation use nuclear weapons against the forces of Egypt and Syria?

In the first three days of the Yom Kippur's War the Israel Air Force had obtained a rate of victories of 2 : 1 favorable to Israel while it fought against an opposing enemies with a superiority of 2.5 : 1 against Israel, which was remarkable to Israel but would be enouch . If the losses of Israel had maintained in the same rates of the first three days all long of the war the losses of Israel aircrafts would have reached for 280 aircrafts after 12200 accomplished missions what could happen around the day 24, while the losses of the enemies of Israel could have reached the 500 aircrafts after the same 12200 accomplished missions from the Egypt( Lybia, Iraq, Argely and Marroco sent fighter squads to Egypt) and Syria until the day 24 . In this way the Israel Air Force that was in the beginning of the conflit had faced a superiority of almost 2.5 : 1 against Israel would be on the i.e day 24 to face a superiority of 3.5 : 1 against Israel, and in these circumstances it could be affirmed the rate of victories would which was favourable to Isarel as 2 : 1 in the first day of battles could be decreased to around 1:1 once the Israel would be faced against figthers superiority of 3.5 : 1 from their enemies. Then the war would be almost lost for Israel once the losses in the ground of tanks and armored vehicles were worst than the losses of aircrafts. The Iraq, Lybia, Argely and Marroco that already had sent several fighter squads to war against Israel could replaced hundreds of aircrafts and pilots lost for Egypt and Syria what indeed would become the Israel situation in the i.e. day 24 much more critical .

THE CHART OF THE AIRCRAFT'S LOST IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

After beginning Yom Kippur War against Israel in 1973 the situation has become critical of it, since Israel was facing two powerful enemies on two fronts at the same time and this time it was Israel who was on the defensive and losing the war .Faced with projections that the enemies would be not stop without nuclear weapons, Israel was vulnerable to a large-scale invasion. Then U.S. had decided to move to Israel nearly its entire new arsenal of so-called smart weapons from battle in land and air. Due to the urgency of shipments of these new weapons was necessary to use the transport aircraft C 5A Galaxy and C 141 Starfighter with addition for civil aircrafts as Israel Boeing B 707 and B 747, and this operation was coded as Nickel Glass. In these operations the United States sent 20,000 tons ( 44.092.000 lb)of equipment through the use of their air transport fleet and Israel airlifted 5,000 tons ( 11.023.000 lb) using their fleet of civil and military air transport.

Those equipments and weapons had been delivered from USA since day 09 of October in 1973 to Israel were in great part responsible to change the balance of the war in favour to Israel once the losses rates decreased in the air and the ground battles, and until the end of the war the aircrafts losses account 121 aircrafts than 283 had been estimated in the begnning of the war. These new weapons could be classified as sophisticated and powerful, even in the year of 2012 there are less than a dozen of countries that could display such systems in its military forces. The short list of equipments and weapons delivered could be described as: laser guided bombs as Paveway, TV contrast guided bomb as HOBOS, TV imaging contrast guided missiles as AGM 65A Maverick, TV data link guided bombs as Walleye, anti radar missiles as AGM 45 Shike, anti radar missiles as AGM 78 Standard, ECM( Electronic Counter Measures) pods to jamm the enemy radars, reconnaissance drones with data link to transmit TV images in real time , anti tank missiles for infantry as TOW, tanks M 60 with laser telemeter and ballistic computer , e.g. The most part of these equipments and weapons in that time still in acceptance phase in the USA military forces and some in development phase when were delivered at Israel as emergency measure to avoid the worst for Israel once most of those weapons had been classified as secret and the exposition of those in real conflict could put these new technological achievements in jeopardize in some hipotectical war with USSR.

A U.S. military intelligence predicted a great threat in this large operation that due to urgency in moving the equipment in a few days would be necessary to maintain exposed to attack at airports in Israel a lot of transport aircrafts. They were unloading weapons and live ammunition, in the case of one of these aircraft was hit in the ground, probably others that were close were also destroyed due to the type of cargo they were carrying. To face the enemy fighter bombers and their escorts fighters, the Israel Air Force had been prepared to repel any attack attempt, but if the MIG 25RB were used in an attack at high altitude and supersonic speed, since when they were based in Egypt, one its fled with the colors and markings of the Egypt Air Force , there could inflicted several losses at those transport aircrafts , equipment and ground personnel.

Thus even though the U.S. strongly denied that this had happened, they secretly sent prototypes of the YF 14A Tomcat II armed with the new missiles as AIM 54 Phoenix to protect the Nickel Glass operation, and that fighters were placed in Israel bases in case of a possible attack by MiG 25RB supposedly from Egypt. For the U.S. the potential threat of the MiG 25RB was real and that did the same sending prototypes still undergoing tests to protect the operation, as if there were attacks on the MiG 25 RB in these airports and without the protection of YF 14, the operation Nickel Glass should be renamed to Nickel Graveyard.

Due to possibility that the Soviet Union had maintained in secret the MiG 25RB in undergrounds hardened shelters in the same air base of Egypt that were operated the MiG 25RB before the Yom Kippur War. The USA had requested the prototypes of the YF 14A Tomcat II for protection of the air bridge between the USA and Israel called as Nickel Glass Operation. The rumors had indicated the possibility that MiG 25RB were kept in these underground shelters in sealed compartment under an inert atmosphere to prevent damages due to oxidation of the fighter as well its delicated electronic systems.Once the Soviet personnel came back to Egypt these fighters suppose stored in Egypt could be placed in operation in matters of hours instead of days in case the same fighters were brought dismounted by the transports Antonov An 22 Antei.

The MiG 25 RB could carry 5.0 tons ( 11023 lb) of free fall bombs had been maintaining a maximum speed of Mach 2.8 at 20 000 m ( 65 617 ft) of altitude. Its navigations equipments and ground map radars would allow a precision in the attack even better than could be obtained for short range ballistic missiles( SRBM) as SS 1 SCUD. The missiles SCUD could carry a conventional warhead of the HE ( High Explosive) of 500 Kg ( 1102 lb), therefore a formation of four MiG 25 RB would attack a target with an equivalent strength of 21 missiles SS 1 SCUD for each mission, with the advantage that fighters MiG 25 RB would make the reconaissance of the target and the damages had been obtained in the attack at the same mission. The possibility of those MiG 25 RB attack a civilian objective it would be very remote, unlike the missiles SCUD that were susceptible to deviate of the objectives since some failures in this guiadance system and then by this to reach civilians areas.

Some very controversial speculations about the operations of the MiG 25 RB were that its ability to strike was not only due to the possibility to carry non-guided bombs, but to provide guidance to missiles fired by other platforms (air, land and sea).In its first generation MiG RB would use its navigation system called Peleng for getting its position with relative accuracy and then illuminate the target area with beam from his own radar. With the target area illuminated from high-altitude and distance the MiG 25 RB would be out of range for air defenses allowing long-range missiles as SS 1 SCUD were directed against the target area had been guided for radar beam reflected from the target area as a missile with a SARH seeker.

Among the ground-strike missile that could be targeted by MiG 25 RB were the: the Kh 22 Kitchen from strike aircraft, ASCM from submarine-launched missiles, ASCMs from warships and SS 1 Scud SRBM as mobile tactical ballistic missiles. But most speculation was that the anti-aircraft ground-air system of long range SA 4 Ganef that could had a secondary mission that would be directed against targets on the surface by illuminating the target by MiG 25 RB. In the initial a middle phase of the flew of the SA 4 missile and others ASCMs would be guided by radar stations of the battery, while in approaching of the target area at high altitude, this would be guided by the radar beam from MiG 25 RB received by antennas on the tail of the missiles, and in the final phase the missile would be guided by reflecting of the radar signal from the target.

The SRBM SS 1 Scud would be guided in the initial and middle phase of the flew by his own INS ( Inertial navigation system) and when this missile had been entered in its final phase of the flew it would receive a radar signal sent by MiG 25 RB in an passive homing seeker from the missile reflected by the target area. The reason for some speculations about the final versions of the SS 1 Scud had been assembled with passive homing seeker were the poor accuracy of the INS when the missile could be carrying conventional warhead with HE ( high explosive) that demanded better accuracy to be effective than nuclear warhead .

The missile SS 1 SCUD had a precision that is measured as CEP ( Circular Estatistic Probability) with radius of 1 Km ( 3281 ft). The CEP is measuring method that could be an decription as about an surface with radius of 1 Km ( 3281 ft) would be this reached by 50% of the missiles fired like SS 1 SCUD .In the case of an target with radius of 250m ( 820 ft) that should receive almost 1000 kg ( 2204 lb) of HE to be severy damaged would be necessary the fire off 64 missiles as SS 1 SCUD with warhead of 500 kg ( 1102 lb) of HE and CEP of 1Km ( 3281 ft) to assure that probability at least 2 missiles reached the target with 250m ( 820 ft) of radius.

In this case that missiles as SS 1 SCUD could be equipped with a SARH seeker that in the final phase of approaching of the objective this missile would be guided by the refleted emission of the radar beam from MiG 25 RB ,with its high adavanced and accuracy PELENG navigation system, that could be illuminating the area of the target out of the range of the opponent's air defenses, and this way if it increased in several orders the precision of SS 1 SCUD for the suppose CEP of 250 m ( 820 ft), the same target with a radius of 250m ( 820 ft) could be hit for two missiles with an equivalent load of 1000kg ( 2204 lb) of HE, in this mode would be necessary to fire 4 missiles instead of 64 missiles with a CEP of 1Km ( 3281 ft).

In this case of the SA 4 Ganef this could be used against slightly armored targets, such as advanced air bases or dispersed air bases and mainly against strikes from heliborne and airborne forces of the NATO. Indeed these possible airborne and heliborne assaults from NATO were considered by the High Command of the Soviet Union as a great threat. The USSR saw a large-scale air assault as a major threat to their concept of heavy armored divisions, as these were considerably slower to be moved quickly in order to stop the air assaults. The use of fighters and fighters-bombs against a NATO air assault was a little advantageous option for the strategists of the USSR, since this was a terrible experience during the beginning of World War II in which the technological superiority of the Luftwaffe caused catastrophic losses at the VVS with their numerical superiority. After this tragic experience for the USSR the use of aviation should be done in order to achieve surprise and speed in air strikes, and to avoid at all costs the use of the aircraft power against targets when the enemy has the technological advantage and his fighters were prepared for battle over this predictable target.

As these transport aircraft from air assault of the NATO could be out of the radar range or below the horizon of the SA 4 Ganef battery, the missiles could not be targeted by the MiG 25 RB against those aircraft, but this would be the area where the aircraft or assault troops ashore in order to employ the heavy fragmentation warhead with proximity fuse using programmable under the ground to try to damage or destroy the aircraft in the area and the troops already landed.

At least one battery from system SA 4 Ganef was sent to Egypt at the same time that the MiG 25 RB had been operating in Egypt. With the return of the MiG 25 RB for the Soviet Union was also the return of SA 4 Ganef battery , which increased speculation that the Soviet Union had invested considerable resources in this heavy and expensive Surface - Air missile system that many experts saw as ineffective against the NATO fighter bombers due to lack of maneuverability of these heavy missiles, that could be considered effective only against large bombers or large transport aircraft.

The choice of the ramjet propulsion for the missile SA 4 Ganef with fragmentation warhead of 250Kg ( 550 lb) and missile SA 6 Gaimfull with fragmentation warhead of 100kg ( 220 lb) were attributed by some experts at the possibility to increase the range against ground targets, since there are speculations that those missiles could has two modes of operation of the ramjet engine of the missiles that would be chosen the mode before its launch. The first would be against air targets that should be engaged at high supersonic speed, and another against ground targets at long range that the supersonic speed would be reduced to obtain greater range. The complexity of liquid fuel ramjet engines of the SA 4 Ganef and SA 6 Gainfull had been made these systems more expensive and complex when compared to SA 3 Goa and SA 5 Gamon system operated by the IA PVO with rocket engines with solid and liquid fuels.

In returning the Soviet MiG 25 RB to Egypt in 1973 during the final phase of the Yom Kippur War, there were considerable speculation that they could participate the war to guide supersonic cruise missiles launched from Soviet submarines close to the Israel coast against targets in the Sinai or even Israel cities. According to some sources this possibility of strike against Israel was informed by the U.S. government, and contributed for Israel to accept a ceasefire, since it was unwilling to accept a ceasefire because the great victories that put the capital of Egypt and the capital of Syria en route to its army in that advances .

The U.S. reportedly informed that even the YF 14A Tomcat that could be employed to protect Israel from attacks by Soviet MiG 25RB with free-fall bombs, they would be less effective against cruise missile attacks in which the supersonic MiG 25 RB could be operating long range so as to be beyond the reach of the few YF 14A with AIM 54A Phoenix missiles . The SAM MIM 23A Hawk and F 4E Phamtom with AIM 7E Sparrow missile of Israel were not effective against the MiG 25 RB due to the high altitude and speed in which they could carry out bomb attacks free-fall in the attacks, much less supersonic cruise missile directed by MiG 25RB.

Indeed t the MiG 25RB had returned to Egypt in the last week of the conflict in order to achieve broad recognition of the situation of war, which at this stage was disastrous for Egypt and Syria. Even under total air supremacy of the Israeli Air Force at this stage of the war the MiG 25RB had completed the mission without any loss or damage. This operation has gathered information from the rearguard of Israel that were used to persuade all in the military high command of Egypt to accept the ceasefire, due to fact that even suffering disastrous losses had yet who wanted to continue the fight against Israel. As confirmed recognition mission from MiG 25 RB, the continuing of the war could put the capital Cairo from Egypt under attack by the Israeli army.

The Soviet Union had pushed the U.S. to persuade Israel to accept a ceasefire, which had been reinvigorated with new weapons sent by the U.S. and exploring strategic mistakes of Egypt and Syria, Israel was in the edge to completely defeat those nations, there were many who wanted it. Indeed could be proved as the international airport of Damascus capital of Syria was under attack by the artillery army from Israel at this stage of the war. Under U.S. pressure, Israel was persuaded to accept a ceasefire, since if it did not do so would be attacked by the USSR on a large scale, possibly with the use of MiG 25RB.

This short summary about the threat posed by MiG 25RB demonstrates how its skills were impressive. But it was the interceptor MiG 25P which was better known and in many cases ended up ranked by many as an aircraft or even obsolete up to the time that went into operation or had been created by propaganda purpose. The truth should be more complex, since it will always be under a cloak of secrecy and misinformation.




To see the complete files will be necessary to link:https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm...over-the-sinai

REFERENCES

ASAS - ASAS Magazine - www.revistasas.com.br

APA - Australian Power Analyzes Website - www.ausairpower.net

AIRFORCES - Air Forces Monthly Magazine - www.airforcesmonthly.com

GORDON, Yelfin. MiG 25 and MiG 31: Defensive Front Line. Leicester - UK: Midland Prublishing Limeted, 1997.

HACKETT, General Sir John, BARRACLOUGH, Brigadier Sir Jonh, BURROW, Sir Bernard, HUNT, Brigadier Keneneth, McGEOCH, Vice-Admiral Sir Ian, MACRAE, Norman, STRAWSON, Major-General John. THE THIRD WORD WAR - AUGUST 1985. New York - USA: Macmillan Publishing, 1978.

BOLLARDIÈRE, Jacques Paris, PRATS, Juan P. , KISTER, Pierre. THE WAR AND THE DISARM. Editions Grammont. Lausanne - France, 1979.

OVERSCAN'S GUIDE TO RUSSIAN MILITARY AVIONICS - avionics@overscan.co.uk

WIKIPEDIA - Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. www.wikipedia.com

MiG 25 FOXBAT - www.vectorsite.net

FAS - Federations of American Scientists - www.fas.org

Google Images: Imagery Sources - www.images.google.com
I

[Sens]

All that claims have no idea the "October War" was about.
a) to restore military honor = achieved for Egypt and Syria
b) to reach the passes = failed for the Egyptians [just ~10 km from the Canal till ceasefire]
to reach the western escapement of the Golan = failed for the Syrians [just ~20 km into Golan temporary and none till ceasefire]
c) to get a political solution = achieved by the Egyptians with US support and the international intrest to reopen the Canal
to get a political solution = failed by the Syrians without US support

Sunday October 7 was the second day and the one with the most losses for the Israelis. Their AF was forced to win time to allow the Israeli main force of reservists to reach the front lines and do the related air-cover in need. From day four October 9 most of the tactical surprises were learned to deal with that.
Despite their optimal force-ratio and Russian tactics Egypt/Syria had not reached their limited lines of advance, which may have allowed to reach a cease-fire within two days.

[Levsha]

Chapter 2 - MiG 25 RB Foxbat X YF 14A Tomcat II in
The Yom Kippur War

Why YF-14?
I believe that production of regular production F-14As had been in production since 1972 and certainly many USN pilots had converted to it by October 73 - even if they had not been carrier qualified on type?

[Sens]

Why YF-14?
I believe that production of regular production F-14As had been in production since 1972 and certainly many USN pilots had converted to it by October 73 - even if they had not been carrier qualified on type?

I see it similar about the F-14A. The MiG-25RB was useless against tactical ground targets. For tactical recce the MiG-21R was enough. The first full MiG-23M interceptor came into SU frontline service after 1973 only.

[Phaid]

What on earth is this wall of text supposed to be about?

[maurobaggio]

1) Why YF 14A?

Good question, I was afraid someone would ask me about why YF 14A Tomcat II instead of F 14A Tomcat. As this mission was not public knowledge, the little information I have much the fighter, pilots and crew were sent and those with more hours flew because the reliability of systems and high experience. In any case the fact would be more correct to refer to it as F 14A Tomcat II instead of YF 14A.

2) There are many reasons why countries and people to war, but most of these reasons can be interpreted, however in all wars is hard to find intelligence in its purpose.
The October War in 1973 that had its origins in the nations involved was also a battle of the Cold War by observing the actions of the superpowers, and the MiG 25 Thread RB X F 14 A and a possible interpretation of this clash between the superpowers (USA X USSR ).

[Sens]

None of the claimed fighters were near the battle fields of 1973. None of that may have had any impact in that limited war.

[maurobaggio]

On October 22 of the 1973, at the request of the Egyptians, four Soviet MiG 25 RB Foxbat were moved to the country and made an urgent recognition of the region of the Suez Canal gathering indisputable evidence on the threat that faced on the 3rd Egyptian Army due to the offensive of the Israel Army led by General Ariel Sharon. With the information collected by MiG 25 RB showed the irreversible situation for Egypt the President Anwar Sadat convinced to accept a ceasefire in October 24.

[ActionJackson]

What on earth is this wall of text supposed to be about?

about getting people to click on links if u ask me....

[Sens]

On October 22 of the 1973, at the request of the Egyptians, four Soviet MiG 25 RB Foxbat were moved to the country and made an urgent recognition of the region of the Suez Canal gathering indisputable evidence on the threat that faced on the 3rd Egyptian Army due to the offensive of the Israel Army led by General Ariel Sharon. With the information collected by MiG 25 RB showed the irreversible situation for Egypt the President Anwar Sadat convinced to accept a ceasefire in October 24.

There was no Israel Army led by General Ariel Sharon. He was just the commander of the 143. division. Its task at that time was to secure the crossing site at Deversior, when elements of a para-brigade from his division followed the sweet-water channel west of the canal to the road Ismaelia-Cairo.
Two other Israeli divisions were tasked to rich the Gulf of Suez west of the canal. Sadat demanded a cease-fire from October 22 to prevent that. The resistance of the Egyptian forces allowed the Israelis to ignore that claim against US-pressure and rich a full encirclement of the 3rd Egyptian army area till October 24. The recce flights of the MiG-25s over the Egyptian side of the canal had the purpose to verify the line of advance of the Israeli troops west of the canal till cease-fire. It took some hours before the UN-observer from the canal, evacuated by the Egyptians during their attack October 6, returned from Cairo to the new cease-fire line. A prominent point of that was km 101 at the Suez-Cairo road f.e.
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...7&d=1304789914
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/mi...f2backgr2.html

http://www.spyflight.co.uk/foxbats.htm
The claim from the 70s has still some obvious mistakes.

[maurobaggio]

Thanks SENS for the high quality information's and congratulations for not believing before checking the information from other sources, once you have found out doubts.

How do you even had found out the MiG 25RB Foxbat were in fact at the end of the war of October 1973. This fact were known to both sides (USSR and USA) and admitted this. However on the F14A Tomcat II were kept in secret to protect the Nickel Grass Operation performed by transport aircraft from USA at most, which due to the prestige of this superpower wouldn't admit that it was necessary to use a fighter still in the initial phase of operation for this purpose.

While the USSR to demonstrate the MiG 25 Foxbat and its supposed ability to intercept the SR 71 Blackbird was a priority from USSR.

The October War in 1973 may could be a limited conflict, but had a great geopolitical impact once caused the first oil crisis which affected much the USA economy and its allies during the Cold War.

The text dropped into this thread is intended to present the full text of the links in this case for who does not want to follow a link that is still under construction, and worse, and my first and last. Links in the other chapters are in full mode with images and gif's once its not possible dropped here. This thread is the chapter 2 and the total will be 7. The goal is to share information's and receive new information's and to be criticize, that is through these that it becomes possible to do something better.

[Phaid]

Could you provide a direct source for this notion that YF-14s were sent to Israeli airports to protect the Nickel Grass flights from Russian MiG-25s? There are many aspects to that claim which make no sense. And how did these jets operate from airports in Israel for 32 days without anyone ever reporting it?

There were 14 F-14 prototypes ("YF-14"), of which 12 were instrumented. Of those 12, 2 had been lost in crashes by October 1973 and not all of them were mission capable. One had been re-engined with F401 engines. Further, we know that flight testing continued to take place throughout 1973 including the October-November time period.

Meanwhile VF-124, the Fleet Replacement Squadron, began receiving production F-14As in October of 1972, and the first two operational squadrons VF-1 and VF-2 began receiving their F-14As in July of 1973. By October of 1973 there were a total of 12 F-14As between those 3 squadrons.

[Levsha]

There were enough F-4Es in the USN and USAF to deal with any threats to operation Nickelgrass, and I'm sure that they were more than good enough to deal with any aircraft the Syrian air force. Why would the Americans rush into service an aircraft which just isn't ready? The MiG-25 interceptor variant wasn't more combat ready in the Soviet air force.

[Sens]

Despite some political claims from both sides. Egypt limited its military attacks to the occupied Sinai only. There was never an attempt from all sides to attack the resupply flights. From October 10 Syria and Egypt had an airlift from the SU and from October 14 Israel had an airlift from the USA. All the related airports were off limits for all sides and never attacked. The Israeli fighters on AD duty had more the role to verify the radar-contact of the approaching USAF transports than than protect that transports from Arab fighters at first.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_Attrition

Nickel Grass was a result from the US forced ceasefire in August 1970. "As long as Israel do not attack Egypt the USA will resupply all losses from encounters between both for free." The "peace-patch" deliveries after August 1970 were part of that already. Under the pressure of the October War Israel was not willing to wait for the second "peace-patch" after the cease-fire and exercised political pressure to get the replacements during that conflict already. At least when the SU had started their resupplies some days before to prevent the crack down of Syria after the failed attack on the Golan at first.

"...Soon after the fighting started, the war developed into an international crisis, not least because Washington and Moscow had significant interests in the region. For both superpowers, credibility was a central consideration. And as Nixon put it, several weeks into the war, "No one is more keenly aware of the stakes: Oil and our strategic position." (Note 9) Both states had already armed their respective Arab and Israeli clients and both launched massive airlifts to sustain the battlefield strength of their allies. Although the Egyptians and Syrians suffered battlefield reverses, their resolve and a determined Israeli counter-attack kept the fighting going. Angered by the U.S. airlift, the Arab petroleum exporting states embargoed oil deliveries to the United States, thus producing a significant energy crisis. While both Moscow and Washington recognized the danger of confrontation and intermittently supported cease-fires, their political commitments made that support equivocal with destabilizing consequences. Superpower tensions over Israeli violations of the 22 October cease-fire escalated to the point where the Nixon administration staged a Defcon III nuclear alert, yet with all of the strains, détente prevented a serious clash.
The need to avoid U.S.-Soviet confrontation made it all the more essential for Kissinger to press Israel to let non-military supplies reach the beleaguered Third Army. The U.S. intervention on behalf of Sadat and his troops foreshadowed Washington's new diplomatic role, the development for which Sadat had waged war. In late October, Israeli and Egyptian senior officers began meeting to work out the details of the cease-fire which culminated, after Kissinger became involved, in the "Sinai I" disengagement agreement of January 1974. Consistent with Sadat's nationalist orientation, Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory was his principal objective and it was largely attained before his assassination in 1981. ..."

[maurobaggio]

Thanks SENS for the information that due to these I am learning more about the war in October 1973. I hope you find it interesting that I put the information here. I would like to invite everyone to read the Chapter 1, which also has the title of SR 71 Blackbird Against Moscow - Judged By The Murphy Law will be in all seven chapters, this thread is the second.


The air effort to carry new weapons and equipment's has known as Operation Nickel Glass at Israel had began on 09 October 1973, and aircraft's were used in this operation as C 5A Galaxy and C 141 Starlifter from U.S.A in more than 566 missions that transported more than 22,000 tons of equipment, as well as civil aircraft B 707 and B 747 of the EL AL from Israel that transported nearly 5,500 tons. The Soviet Union also sent more than 15,000 tons of equipment to Egypt and Syria by air in more than 934 missions from the 09th of October 1973.

Israel also received fighters directly from the U.S. Air Force as F 4E Phantom II and A4 Skywank, due to the urgency of fighting some F 4E received only the marks from Israel but with the colors of USAF cloaking why there was no time to paint aircraft in the pattern of the Israeli Air Force.
The Soviet Union also sent fighters to Egypt and Syria during the conflict.

On 14 October Israel had launched a major air attack against air bases of Tanta-el and el-Mansourah which resulted in one of larger air combat of the entire war, only Egypt has employed more than 50 MiG 21M/MF this battle to protection of the bases, and there was speculations about Soviet aircraft transport unloading in these bases, however this attack the bases were not severely affected by what were known and no Soviet aircraft was hit or damaged.

On 18 October the base of el-Arish in the Sinai had been occupied by Israel since 1967 was attacked by eight Mirages 5DE from Egypt. This base was hit with 400kg bombs as SAMP 400 while transport aircraft from U.S.A and Israel unloaded supplies. There were no reports of aircraft hit or damaged from the U.S.A and Israel in this attacks.

[maurobaggio]

LEVSHA your question about whether the F 4E Phantom II from Isarel or even the USA would not be enough, the answer to the case of the MiG 25RB Foxbat is not, as these aircraft were using the missiles of medium range AIM 7E Sparrow that had demonstrated before the conflict of 1973 and during the war Iran / Iraq had no capabilities to intercept the MiG 25 when they flew at maximum altitude and speed. Only when it appeared AIM 7F Sparrow version that was first used by Israel in 1981 was able to achieve the MiG 25 Foxbat.The AIM 7F Sparrow had a new digital electronics circuits more compact and because this the rocket motor with more powerful that doubled the range in relation to AIM 7E.
Until this time only the AIM 54A Phoenix missile that had been equipped the F 14A Tomcat II, and the AIM 54A weren't available to F 4E Phantom II due the restrains of the fire control system of this fighter. The AIM 54A had range of t 160Km and maximum climbing of 30.000 m could intercept the MiG 25RB Foxbat in its maximum altitude and speed.

PHAID the source I have is not bibliographic, is based on other sources.
Your information is correct, but these are information officers, and the presence of F 14A Tomcat II in an Air Force base in Israel is not official, the little I know they were not involved in the conflict, and only performed training missions over the Mediterranean sea in routes used by transport aircraft at all times during the night.

The alleged air base of the Israel Air Force that it the F 14A were sent belongs to Israel but the presence of U.S. aircraft and personnel were constant , since even before the 1973 war the U.S.A had much concern about weapons systems such as surface-air missiles and its alert and fire control radars of Soviet origin that had been operated by Egypt and Syria . Due to the Soviets programs as Tu 22M Backfire and MiG 25 P / RB Foxbat the U.S. had accelerated the program F 14A Tomcat II beyond the disclosed because of its urgency since it was a highly complex aircraft in several ways, but still went into operation before F15A Eagle that were less complex than the F 14A.

The F 14A probably had arrived after the beginning of the conflict with the operation Nickel Glass, as the Egyptians hasn't in fact the MiG 25 Foxbat in secret, and also because of this had not been used in attacks against the Operation Nickel Glass, the F 14A were maintained in shelters during the day and were protected by U.S. troops in uniform of Israel as well as all others involved in this operation. This installations as far I known are isolated from the rest of the base.

As for anyone not knowing this haven't been correct to affirm, the correct is that nobody was crazy enough to say this before with no proof to show as e.g as pictures.

[maurobaggio]

http://globalmilitaryreview.blogspot...escorting.html

The team's demonstration Russian Knights from Air Force Russian equipped with Su 27 Flanker were escorted during their journey through Iran toward the Bahrain International Airshow 2012 event by interceptors F 14A Tomcat II belonging to the Air Force of Iran.
The Iranian Air Force has indicated by some estimates with 25 F 14A Tomcat II in operation today of the 77 had received from USA before the 1979 revolution in Iran. The F 14A Tomcat II interceptors are still more powerful than Iran has in its inventory even 32 years after its delivery that began in 1975.
The supply of F 14A Tomcat II to Iran was criticized in debates of USA Congress, but the decision to provide this advanced fighter at the time was motivated by the mission of the MiG 25RB Foxbat from Soviet Union on the border with Iran, in which F 4E Phamton of Iran were not able to intercept.

[Sens]

Back to reality. The MiG-25RB is useless in the strike role when limited to non-atomic weapons and even with atomic weapons it is limited to targets with a size of a city to hit something important at all. The MiG-25RB got that limited strike capability to attack NATO port and air-port areas to delay the sea/airlift from the USA in Central Europe at first. The MiG-25RB of the IrAF in the 80s showed the limitations of the MiG-25RB in that role too.

[maurobaggio]

Reality can be considered as the interpretation of facts, and when new facts emerge could be alter our reality. The authorization for the sale of F 14A Tomcat II to Iran in the 70s was granted due to the threat of the MiG 25RB Foxbat
that invaded Iran in order to make recognition of the U.S. secret facilities in the territory of Iran what were destined to spy by electronic means at the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union performed these MiG 25RB missions in order to pressure Iran to the United States withdraw these facilities the same, and as the F 4E Phamton II equipped with missiles AIM 7E SparrowII of Iran were not a threat to MiG 25RB.
The U.S. had authorized the sale of F 14A Tomcat II with long-range missiles AIM 54A Phoenix. With the entry into operation of the F 14A in the Iran Air Force the invasions of Iran from MiG 25RB ceased.

During the Iran / Iraq the Iraqi MiG 25 RB often manned by pilots of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations in the beginning of the war due to lack of fully trained Iraqi pilots since the preparation of the MiG 25 pilots had required a longer training , made many strike missions against Teeram and petroleum terminal on the kark Isle .
These attacks only began to decrease in intensity as the F 14A Tomcat II were being put into operation again, due to the U.S. embargo and the Iranian pilots and their crews to develop new tactics to face the MiG 25RB.
Faced with increasing rates of losses of the MiG 25 RB in combat against the F 14A Tomcat II the Iraq began to acquire SS 1 Scud missile , and then went on to produce copies of these missiles for use against Iran.

The importance of F 14A Tomcat II was so high that in many battles that these crews were ordered not to engage Iraqi fighters, should only guide the F 4 Phantom II and F 5E Tiger II against these targets through radar AWG 9 from F 14A , to prevent loss of F 14A as well as save the missile AIM 54A Phoenix, since these were the only defense against the Mig 25RB .
Even with these restrictions the F 14A Tomcat II had obtained may have more than 120 victories throughout the war with Iraq, possibly including 10 MiG 25 RB / PD.
Iran was the only country that had to face large-scale attacks of MiG 25RB did not consider these as useless, in fact considered them very dangerous, so always tried to preserve tis strength of the F 14A Tomcat II even when they could cause more loss to Iraq.

[Sens]

To stick to some facts about Iran first and Iraq later. The 70s like the years before saw several US recce-flights from Iran into the SU. After their positiv experiences in 1971-72 with the X-500 alias MiG-25R/RB in Egypt the Russians did something similar about the Iran for own recce purposes.

"In August of 1973, the IIAF selected the F-14 Tomcat ( From 1970 Iraq was in contact with French government to equip their Air Force with Mirage F-1, this was another factor for IIAF to choose F-14 and start planning for purchase, operation and training for F-14). The initial order signed in January of 1974 covered 30 Tomcats, but in June 50 more were added to the contract.At the same time, the Iranian government-owned Bank-e-Melli stepped in, and agreed to loan Grumman $75 million to partially make up for a US government loan of $200 million to Grumman, which had just been cancelled. This loan save the F-14 program and enabled Grumman to secure a further loan of $125 million from a consortium of American banks, ensuring at least for the moment that the F-14 program would continue. Thanks to Bank-e-Melli.

The Iranian Tomcats were virtually identical to the US Navy version, with only a few classified avionics items being omitted. The base site for Iranian Tomcat operations was at Isfahan’s (Khatami Air Force Base) and 1 Squadron at Shiraz Tactical Fighter Base. Imperial Iranian Air Force aircrews began to arrive in the USA for training in May of 1974,The crew were mainly veteran F-4 pilots."
"The first 2 of 79 Tomcats arrived in Iran in January of 1976. By May of 1977, when Iran celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Royal House, 12 had been delivered. At this time, the Soviet MiG-25 Foxbats were still making a nuisance of themselves by flying over Iran, and the Shah ordered live firing tests of the Phoenix to be carried out as a warning. In August of 1977, IIAF crews shot down a BQM-34E drone flying at 50,000 feet, and the Soviets took the hint and Foxbat over flights promptly ended."

Five years later and no USN F-14As deployed to Iran in 1974 to counter the Russian "thread" for a further 4 years nearly.

The Iraq-Iran war from sept. 1980 till jul 1988 lasted 9 years nearly and the AFs of both sides played no decisive role in that war.
Just from 1981 the Iraq operated MiG-25P/RB in a single squadron. The Iraq lost its first MiG-25RB in a recce mission over Iran in 1982 by a F-14A.
During the war the Iraqi inventory rose to two squadrons of MiG-25P/PD/PDS and a single squadron of MiG-25RB/RBT. Till the end of that war a limited force only.
Till 1985 the MiG-25RBs were operated in recce missions only, by the lack of bomb racks and bombs withheld by the Russians. Just a makeshift modification by the Iraqi in 1985 changed the mind of the Russians. Only a few MiG-25RBs were used in a limited number of bombing mission with questionable results as I claimed before.

[maurobaggio]

http://www.uskowioniran.com/2008_06_01_archive.html


http://www.irandefence.net/showthrea...t=11463&page=2

The Sky Hawk program began in 1986 during the Iran / Iraq was intended to equip the F 14A Tomcat II with the Iranians missiles MIM 23 Hawk that were originally operated as SAM (Superfice Air Missile). The purpose is to equip the F 14A with a SAM missile like the MIM 23 Hawk were because Iran had been need to find a replacement for the AIM 54A Phoenix.
Once the number this missile in the inventory had been reduced by the war, and how the AIM 7E Sparrow weren't able to intercept at MiG 25 Foxbat, the alternative was to adapt the MIM 23 Hawk to be released by F 14A Tomcat II, once the MIM 23 Hawk had a much greater range than when compared to the release of land as SAM . This fact shows how Iran considered a high threat from MiG 25 RB / P Foxbat.

On October 3 of the 1978 an MiG 25RB from Soviet Union was trying to enter into Iran but was blocked by F 14A Tomcat II from Iran that keep this intruder locked in their radar even when MiG 25RB engaged its own jamming system but this could not jamming the radars AWG 9 from F 14A Tomcat. If F 14A had received permission to launch the AIM 54 missiles the MIG 25RB had been intercepted. After this episode, the MIG 25 RB's from Soviet Union did not invaded the Iran until the beginning of the Iran/Iraq War.

The purchase of the F14A Tomcat II were motivated too by the introduction into service of the MiG 25 and MiG 23 Foxbat by the Soviet Union, once during the 70 years the greatest threat to Iran it was with the Soviet Union due by the alignment of Iran with the U.S.A.

On 22 September 1980 to 14:00hrs the Iran Air Force attacked the air base Shoibah from Iraq , after only two hour after the air offensive from Iraq. This base had been equipped with 24 MiG 25, and only 04 of these were under Iraqi command, the others were under the control of Soviet Union. This was the first attack against the Iraqu by the Iran Air Force and was just at the base of the MiG 25 which shows the threat that were represented by the MiG 25.

From August 1982 the MiG 25 RB had started its first offensive against the oil facility in the Kark Island. In the face of the offensive the F 14A TomcatII went keeping in 24-hour patrols over Tehran from the month of September after several attacks with loss of life among the civilian population of the Iran. On September 16 was shot down the first MiG 25 RB while he was in the approach route for Kark Island by AIM 54A Phoenix missile launched from an F 14A.

Until the end of the war Iran had to face the MiG 25, on three different occasions since 1987 the Soviet Union had sent the MiG 25 BM which were designed to attack radar stations in missions against Iranian radar , several radar stations and SAM radar systems were attacked and destroye. In one of these missions a MiG 25 BM was hit and damaged by an AIM 54A Phoenix launched from an F 14A,the Soviet MiG 25 BM was able to return at its base but after the landing had suffered damage that it was declared a total loss.

[Sens]

To stay polite, but the ACIG claims are more fiction than reality. Just a good read but nothing more than to generate a number of hits. On the June 22th just the Iraqis attacked 10 Iranian ABs in a surprise opening strike.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita.../iran-iraq.htm
There were no SU MiG-25s at Shoibah AB near Basra in 1980 as claimed by:
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_247.shtml

See Google Earth at 30°25'41'' N and 47°38'27'' E about that. Make up your mind about the distances to the borders of Iran and Kuwait from that and why no military and least the Russians had not based a MiG-25 there even temporary for safety and political considerations alone after the bail out of the US from Iran.
The Iraqis ordered their examples in 1979. The pilots/personal were converted in the SU and the first examples Ps and RBs arrived in Habbaniya 1981 with 87. squadron.

[Sens]

http://www.iiaf.net/aircraft/jetfighters/F4/f4.html

Here the claim what the Iranians attacked at

The first Iranian air attack into Iraq saw the successful bombing of Al-Shoibiya naval base, near the port city of Um-Al Qassr, by four F-4s from Bushehr AB, using 1,000lb (450kg) bombs. Among the targets were several anti-shipping missile batteries. This Iranian retaliation was so swift that Iraqi air defense positions had been caught by surprise right across the flight route. The next day, up to 140 Iranian fighter-bombers, including significant numbers of F-4s from Bushehr, Tehran and Hamedan, attacked a number of Iraqi air bases and military installations with almost total impunity.

Here something about the numbers of advisers in Iraq [Afghanistan was of prime intrest at that time-scale! December 1979 – February 1980: Occupation]:
"In
1975 alone Soviet [military] aid was estimated at US$1 billion. Soviet deliveries of
military hardware of increasingly higher quality between 1976 and 1980 were estimated
at US$5 billion. Until 1980 nearly 1,200 Soviet and East European advisers, as well as
150 Cuban advisers, were in Iraq. Iraqi military personnel were also trained in the use of
SAMs, and observers estimated that between 1958 and 1980, nearly 5,000 Iraqis received
military training in the Soviet Union” (Metz 1987)."

[maurobaggio]

The contract signed in 1979 between Iraq and the Soviet Union comprised: 12 Mil Mi 25 Hind, 10 II-76, An12 24, 48 Su 22MK3, 104 MiG 23, 90 MiG 21, 1000 SAM missiles (50 batteries of SA 2, SA 3 SA 6) and especially 24 MiG 25.The Iraq had the greatest interest in the MiG 25 Foxbat due the threat represented by F 14A TomcatII from Iran.

Iraq had accepted the aircraft systems were standard less advanced when compared by Soviet pattern, and the number of Soviet military advisers military were incremented from 6,000 to 18,000 advisers, and at this time of the effective from Iraqi Air Force had 14,000 persons.

Another concession had been obtained by the Moscow was the control of the Shoibiah Air Base, where they placed: 16 MiG 21MF, 20 MiG 23 and 24 MiG 25. The purpose of the location of the base was to surveillance the ships over the Persian Gulf and especially from US Navy Fleet .

After the attack of September 22 by 4 F4E Phantom from Iran, Iran attacked again Shoibiah base and severely damaged it. After this attack the Russians had moved to H3/Al-Wallid in western Iraq with its MiG 25 to avoid new attacks from Iran.

The interceptor MiG 25 P Foxbat were heavily dependent from Ground Control Interception to carry out their missions. The GCI had to provide all data for this mission and the GCI were equipped with radars and communications equipment for the long-range to be able to accomplish its MiG 25 missions .
In case of GCI had been damaged, but specifically its radar and communications antennas, the MiG 25P and even in some cases MiG 25RB could not accomplish its missions.

If you were the CEO (commander in chief) of the Iranian Air Force, in preparation for an massive attack that would be in the next day, which targets would you chosen ?
A) a supposed anti ship missile system;
B) a command and control system dedicated from interception missions for the MiG 25 fighters that were most powerful air threat in the Iraq territory, which would represent a major threat to Iranian offensive in the next day;

In war the first casualty is always the truth.

[Sens]

In war the first casualty is always the truth.

I have to look into my data from that years now for the benefit of all, but it will take some time.
The Iranian revolution from 1979 changed all for the Iranian forces and by that for the Iraq of Saddam too. Both countries had a peace-treaty from 1975 and not to suspect an attack from the other side at first with the exception of some limited border skirmishes related to the Kurds at first. In Sept 1980 the Iran was caught the "pants" down and it took weeks to recover from the Iraqi surprise attack. Most of the claims were done later to better the own role at first. After the defection of Belenko in 1976 the MiG-25 becomes available for export. When it is a superb tool for recce purposes it is much more limited as an interceptor and becomes useful at high altitude only. The MiG-25P had no look down capability to make some use from its higher altitude capability against something like the F-14A. That in mind the Iraqi MiG-25s were used in defence of Bagdad and for recce missions at first. In 1980 no MiG-25s were reported in Iraq. Shoibiah AB is just 60 km from Abadan or 120 km from Kuwait City and by that under constant radar coverage from Iran and Kuwait. There was no chance to operate MiG-25s in that area undetected. The SU had ELINT trawlers in the limited Persian Gulf and by that a constant picture of shipping in that area at all. The general intrest of the SU was to have secure port facilities for that to allow more staying time for the ships in that area. To cut a longer story short. There was no report of MiG-25s in Iraq before 1981.
Maybe you can prove me wrong about that claim and give some other links about that.
The attack of 4 F-4s near Umm Qaser and the al/az Zubajer/Subiyah waterway whatever transscription was used was an easy target for a makeshift attack at first. At that time-scale the Iranians had no idea about the coming Iraqi ground invasion, its scope and its intentions and by that no idea how to respond in general. Even in the hindsight the Iranians had not missed the opportunity to claim a successful attack against an Iraqi base with MiG-25s.

[Sens]

"On the following day another strike was flown, damaging the airfield sufficiently to force the whole Soviet contingent to be evacuated to H-3/al-Wallid AB, in western Iraq." a claim by ACIG.

"The attack on Iraq's oil field complex and air base at Al Walid, the base for T-22 and Il-28 bombers, was a well-coordinated assault. The targets were more than 800 kilometers from Iran's closest air base at Urumiyeh, so the F-4s had to refuel in midair for the mission. Iran's air force relied on F-4s and F-5s for assaults and a few F-14s for reconnaissance." a claim by Iran Chamber Society.

No claim about MiG-25s there.

[Sens]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Iraq_War

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Sov...%80%93Iraq_War

For a first read to understand the events of nine years of war.
Most of that was a kind of "trench" war.
The first phase from sept 1980 was the Iraqi attack into Iran coming to a standstill in dec 1980 without reaching all objectives. From that time-scale the Iraqis tried to hold their lines against sporadic Iranian attacks.
The second phase from sept 1981 started with the Iranian counter offensive. From 1982 Saddam troops were forced behind the border lines and Saddam was seeking an armistice to end that war as fast as possible.
In 1983 the Iranians tried to break the Iraqi lines between Bagdad and Basra to defeat Saddam. To prevent the coming defeat the desperate Iraqis used chemical weapons in a large scale similar to WW1. After that both parties were exhausted and down to a trench war again. Both parties were in a desperate need for new weaponary to make up for their huge losses of that. From that time-scale the SU had realized the danger of an Iraqi defeat and resumed weapons-deliveries in a large scale with the money for that coming from the "Gulf states".
The third phase started with an Iranian offensive in 1984 stopped by the use of chemical weapons by the desperate Iraqis again.
The war against cities saw the use of Scuds from both sides and Iraq attacked the international shipping in the Gulf to escalate the "tanker war".
1985 the Iraqis tried an offensive in the south but failed as the Iranian counter offensive too.
1986 both sides managed to get hold of some areas across the national borders and tried to recover from losses.
In 1987 the Iranians started a new offensive in the south and were stopped by Iraqi chemical weapons again. The fighting along the front-lines was reduced to small skirmishes without noticeable results. To go active in the north with Kurdish support resulted in the infamous Iraqi chemical attack against the civil town of Halabja to force the Kurds not taking side with the Iranians in 1988.
The fourth phase in 1988 saw the Iraqi offensive in the south to force the Iranians from the area south of Basra. The overhelming ratio in favor of the Iraqis brought the much need success to offer the Iran a new armistice. That major setback with a desperate economical situation which did not allow a recovery of military strength any longer forced the Iran to accept that.

Nearly all ground battles were fought without a noticeable impact of the related air-forces.

[Sens]

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA222452

Here are some details of the last phase of that war including air-activity to strangle the economy of the Iran and the role of the SU to both countries.
Not noted but the manyfold in Iraq arms came from creditors money mainly. The most important one Kuwait becomes a "victim" of that in 1990. :diablo:,
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/i..._iraq_war3.php
Here you can read about the role of the SU too. It stopped weapons-deliveries in 1980 and resumed that to the Iraq after 1981, when the Iranians got the upper hand.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA232451&Lo
Here you can read about the limited impact of air-power in the ground war and from p 106+ about the US view of the air-power from both sides.

[Sens]

In total, since the autumn of 1958 up to the beginning of 1990 8200 Soviet military experts and advisers worked in Iraq. The Colonel in reserve Ivan Litovkin told about that in his interview to the Krasnaya Zvezda – the edition of the Russian Ministry of Defense in April, 2003. He headed the group of the Soviet military engineers that worked in Iraq in 1973-77.

In that time-scale 1958-1990 British, Pakistani, Indian and French advisers f.e. were in the Iraq and no party there in 1980 reported about:
"....and the number of Soviet military advisers military were incremented from 6,000 to 18,000 advisers, and at this time of the effective from Iraqi Air Force had 14,000 persons."
Just the number of the Iraqi Air Force persons is correct. For every uninformed reader such an undisputed number masybe a proof of trustworthiness for all the other claims of a story too. I have no problem beeing proven wrong about my findings when I will learn more about that from other sources too.


"The Soviets have been building up Iraq, a country bordering Iran. They have built up Iraq's Air Force until it is now larger than Iran's and the Soviets have been using Iraq's Navy to gain a presence in the Persian Gulf waters, a vital artery in transporting oil. The USSR has 3,000 military advisors in Iraq and is now seeking a naval base in the area. They control Afghanistan and are wooing Kuwait and other important sheikdoms with military and economic aid (strings attached)."

"The Soviets have been building up Iraq, a country bordering Iran. They have built up Iraq's Air Force until it is now larger than Iran's and the Soviets have been using Iraq's Navy to gain a presence in the Persian Gulf waters, a vital artery in transporting oil. The USSR has 3,000 military advisors in Iraq and is now seeking a naval base in the area. They control Afghanistan and are wooing Kuwait and other important sheikdoms with military and economic aid (strings attached)."

http://en.citizendium.org/wiki/Sovie..._Iran-Iraq_War

"Moscow and Baghdad have a long history of well-armed friendship. Between 1958 and 1990, the Soviet Union concluded arms contracts with Iraq to the tune of $30.5 billion, "Izvestiya" reported on 25 March. Exports included: 4,630 tanks, 2,810 armored fighting vehicles, 2,714 armored personnel carriers, 3,279 pieces of artillery, 725 antitank rocket complexes, 325 antiaircraft rocket launchers, 1,593 portable Igla antiaircraft missiles, 1,145 military and transport aircraft, 348 helicopters, and 41 warships. Official cooperation came to an end in 1990 with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent imposition of UN sanctions." To that Moscow numbers one has to add weaponary of Soviet origin from Arab supporters of Iraq or by Warsaw Pact countries in agreement with Moscow. The numbers of advisers from that countries were in the dozens only.

[maurobaggio]

Before I even read your post's thought there was more news about the Iran / Iraq War, but I was wrong that our knowledge depends on the sources we use, and it is always possible to find a new source with different interpretations of what knew each other before.

Due to the political implications of the Iran / Iraq, most of the information came through the vision of the allies from Iraq, which were as e.g: USA, France, Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and many others. Formed a league of nations that had been assembled for Iraq was not defeated by Iran after Iraq's catastrophic offensive in the beginning of war.

Iran after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 was classified as a threat by other countries in the Persian Gulf, so that a hypothetical expansion of this should be contained. The U.S. despite not regarded Iraq as an ally in the 80's, it was of interest through the Iranian military reverses its fundamentalist government was weakened and removed from power, to enable a new rapprochement between Iran and the U.S.

In addition to the reserves Iran's oil their geographical position in relation to the Soviet Union was very important in the scenario of the Cold War.

In 1984 as I recall, the U.S. and even Israel had been supplied weapons and spare parts to Iran, which became a scandal known as Irangate. Among the items most requested by Ira were spare parts and kits useful life to span its AIM 54A Phoenix missiles and spare parts for F 14A Tomcat II, which would be essential in missions against MiG 25 PDS / RB from Iraq . This can be interpreted that the U.S. had an interest in Iran and the defeat of Iran was not the goal.

For the Soviet Union the revolution of 1979 in Iran brought more instability its border in the south than before when the U.S. and Iran were allies, since the Soviet Union feared that the revolution would spread among its republics with Muslim majority.

In addition to ample supply of weapons and training for Iraq, the Soviet Union had used the conflict to test new weapons such as MiG 25BM with anti radar missiles as Kh 58U and Kh 31P, whose were sent to Iraq and came under Soviet command in H 3 / Al-Walid AB , as that these fighters did several missions against radar stations from Iran, which were of U.S. origin.

Besides MiG 27 equipped with air-ground missiles Kh 29 T / L, which were extensively used against Iranian Offensive "Fatima Zahra", which had penetrated deeply into the territory from Iraq in 1985.

In general there are many conflicting facts in this war that killed more than 1 million people and had destroyed hundreds of billions of dollars from infrastructure of the two countries.

It is common to read about the fact that Iraq did not win the war that did not use their aircraft as it should. However when considering the losses of aircraft in Iraq and that this high investment made ​​in building shelters for its Air Force during the war, already should demonstrates that the Iranian Air Force was not disabled as many believed during the war.

However, the Iran Air Force could not afford to replace their losses and get new equipment's, thus it also used its air force to preserve it, avoiding the use of offensive missions that could cause many losses from Iran Air Force against Iraqi air defenses .

The U.S. had no interest in confirming or disclose the victories of their equipment supplied to Iran, since the official version was that without U.S. assistance, would be without their equipment operating conditions, to avoid new restrictions on the part of Congress U.S. to supply new weapons on unstable countries, and if they eventually broke agreements with the U.S. since it could not be capable of maintaining the equipment without U.S.A.

A source very interesting with many confirmed details about the events of the war in Iran / Iraq conflict deeply analyzed the conflict are the books by journalist and writer Tom Cooper and Fazard Bishop, who detailed the operations of F 14A Tomcat II and F 4E Phamton II in service by the Iran Air Force.

Regarding the lack of information about the Soviet Union from its MiG 25 Foxbat in Iraq even before the start of the conflict between Iran/Iraq and after the start of it, was to avoid criticism because the supply of advanced Western weapons to Iraq , once the Iraq was already very close to Moscow, and samples of those advanced weapons could be sent by the Soviet Union to review its technology, especially in the case of the Mirage F1 and their missiles and radars.