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Thread: Russian Navy Thread

  1. #901
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    Task of Russian navy is much bigger than Soviet Navy. large navy is needed as instrument of economic power.
    http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/...8FC5EB20120412
    I expect it will reach 100 sub and 150 surface fleet navy.
    BSF is the most important one. The more Russia threatens Arabs. The lessor Arabs have confidence on West/China in defending them.The higher the energy price . the faster is decline of Europe. No one is signing big weopons contracts with EU firms after libyan war and not so strong postion on Syria. Sarkozy has lost his shirt trying to sell Rafale. combined that with austerity drive. EU will cease to exist as military power in less than 5 years. so i don see the need of big Baltic Fleet. in less than 10 years with arrival of S500. Nuclear arsenal of France/UK will be too small to penetrate it.
    Last edited by JSR; 28th April 2012 at 02:38.

  2. #902
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    And then you woke up and stopped dreaming.

  3. #903
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    This is w.r.t India's SLBM. From the interview a figure of 10 meter have come up and I believe it is likely to be the max depth from which our SLBM will be launched.
    VKS: The technologies involved in both missiles are different. An underwater missile has to deal with the pressure of a 10 metre column of water above it. Hence the configuration of the missile is different. It is heavier, the structure is different. Unlike the Agni missile, this missile carries a lot of dead weight.
    The figure for Klub family is 14 meter. So wanted to know what is the max depth from which the Russian SLBMs are ejected.

  4. #904
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    Varies from 30 to 50 meters. Excepth for R-13
    Last edited by El_Indigo; 28th April 2012 at 17:22.

  5. #905
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    Quote Originally Posted by El_Indigo View Post
    And then you woke up and stopped dreaming.
    100 subs and 150 ships will atmost cost $250b (1/3 of armament programe). i am not saying everything will be built before 2020. but atleast money will be allocated and there is nothing stoping them from allocating more money after 2020.

  6. #906
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    Quote Originally Posted by JSR View Post
    100 subs and 150 ships will atmost cost $250b (1/3 of armament programe). i am not saying everything will be built before 2020. but atleast money will be allocated and there is nothing stoping them from allocating more money after 2020.
    And then you woke up and stopped dreaming.
    Last edited by Sintra; 29th April 2012 at 22:44.

  7. #907
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    Quote Originally Posted by JangBoGo View Post
    If I'm not wrong Borei was displayed with a pumpjet.
    I've done some digging and neither Dolgorukiy nor Monomakh were depicted with ANY sort of propulsion detail actually:

    http://submarine.id.ru/galery/t275.jpg

    http://topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2012-...ir-monomax.jpg

    Monomakh's plate doesn't even show anything below the waterline and what is shown can't be called accurate either...

    Kazan's silhouette certainly matches the real Severodvinsk a lot more closely, but given the patchy record of these engravings in terms of faithful rendition I would hesitate to make a final judgement before we see photos of her launch.

  8. #908
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    Quote Originally Posted by El_Indigo View Post
    And then you woke up and stopped dreaming.
    Quote Originally Posted by Sintra View Post
    And then you woke up and stopped dreaming.
    +1!

  9. #909
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    Quote Originally Posted by TR1 View Post
    Don't forget North, they have SSKs to replace.
    The Arctic does not strike me as an ideal place to operate SSKs - I doubt the Northern Fleet would miss them all that much if they had 8 top of the line SSNs/SSGNs to play with (even for the Pacific the case is tenuous, IMHO).

  10. #910
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    Quote Originally Posted by Trident View Post
    (even for the Pacific the case is tenuous, IMHO).

    Why ? A fleet of 15 SSK's would be a bigger deterrent for the Japanese not to think about the kurils, rather then stationing troops, SAM's and anti coastal systems there. The SSK are basically ideal for the defence of the EEZ.

  11. #911
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    So apparently the two incomplete 949A hulls (Volgograd and Barnaul) @ Sevmash, have been cut into sections. Perhaps their use for 955A boats is very possible...the large size would explain the increased missile compliment.
    http://img818.imageshack.us/img818/9098/rsz11rsz3807.jpg

  12. #912
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    Well guess they are scavanging every thing that can to be of any use .....rather then let the hull just lay and rust better to use it any ways.
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    Trotsenko: Russian Navy to Get 60 New Ships by 2020

    Russian Navy will receive about 60 new surface ships and submarines under the state rearmament program by 2020, said the president of United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC) Roman Trotsenko on Apr 27.

    According to Trotsenko, Russian Navy "began actively ordering warships; that will help it to reach crucially new level by 2020 and meet all present-day challenges", reports ITAR-TASS.

    The USC president pointed out that "the Navy has already contracted 'long' series of surface ships and submarines". In particular, the question is Project 636 diesel electric subs built by Admiralteyskie Verfi, six Project 885 Yasen nuclear-powered cruise missile subs built by Sevmash shipyard, and series of corvettes built by Amur Shipyard.

    "And now shipbuilders must work hard to execute all orders in time and at high level, not to let partners down", Roman Trotsenko emphasized.

    By 2020, Russian Navy will receive 23 new types of surface ships and submarines; Defense Industry Development Federal Program provides RUR 292 bln for that purpose, said academician Valentin Pashin, research manager and director general of the Krylov Central Scientific & Research Institute. According to Pashin, 23 new types of surface ships and submarines will be laid down and delivered to Russian naval mariners. Overall displacement of ships will make 800,000 tons. Major part of tonnage (550,000 tons) will be displaced by new ships, the rest – by those subject to modernization.

    "Shipyards are ruled by the Defense Industry Development Federal Program. Only its naval section is financed by RUR 292 bln. This sum is quite enough to modernize production, introduce scientific innovations, and train high-qualified personnel", said the scientist.
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  14. #914
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    Refrence to Zircon-S hypersonic cruise missile was made earlier by V Popovkin , I think the S in there stands for submarine

    link

    According to deputy defense minister Vladimir Popovkin, the program provides "construction of eight nuclear-powered submarines armed with Bulava ballistic missiles... and about 100 surface ships of different classes. Designing of key assets for general-purpose naval force is in progress; they are Project 885 Yasen nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), Project 22350 frigates, and Project 20380M corvettes". Besides, according to a high-ranking official, experts of appropriate agencies "are developing design of a new 5-generation SSN and a new destroyer"; by the way "basic weapon of those projects will be advanced shipborne missile system Caliber operating both antiship cruise missiles 3M-54 and long-range cruise missiles 3M-14 capable to destroy enemy's land objects". Moreover, "development of Zircon-S ship-based hypersonic missile system is also scheduled", said Popovkin.
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  15. #915
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    Quote Originally Posted by El_Indigo View Post
    Why ? A fleet of 15 SSK's would be a bigger deterrent for the Japanese not to think about the kurils, rather then stationing troops, SAM's and anti coastal systems there. The SSK are basically ideal for the defence of the EEZ.
    SSKs for arresting fishing boats? How does that work?

    As for the Kurils - have you looked at the islands that Japan disputes? They're not the whole island chain, just the four (plus some rocks & islets) closest to Hokkaido, i.e. the 1855 maritime boundary, not the 1875-1945 boundary. You can see Japan from two of them.
    Juris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.
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  16. #916
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    They are gradually cutting down the numbers, last year it was a hundred. Getting more realistic after the elections.
    Bits from two 949A are intended for 4th and 5th Borey, probably something will be left over for the 6th. 885M should be completely new builds, hard to say when the second will be laid down.

  17. #917
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    In all probability this 'Zirkon-S' will be to BrahMos 2 what P-800 Oniks is to BrahMos 1, including MTCR restrictions (unfortunately for India).

    IIrc, DRDO is currently building a brand new hypersonic wind tunnel and research centre in Hyderabad.

  18. #918
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    Mostly likely different design bureau working on different hypersonic project and NPO Mash-DRDO project is one of them. The Brahmos-2 would be ready only by some where 2020 ish.
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  19. #919
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    Quote Originally Posted by swerve View Post
    SSKs for arresting fishing boats? How does that work?
    blocking/patrolling obviously.

    Quote Originally Posted by swerve View Post
    As for the Kurils - have you looked at the islands that Japan disputes? They're not the whole island chain, just the four (plus some rocks & islets) closest to Hokkaido, i.e. the 1855 maritime boundary, not the 1875-1945 boundary. You can see Japan from two of them.

    Four that would compromise the PF. And it's not 1855. They lost them and Russia got them. End of story.

    Anyaway, historically wasn't Russia the first country which had an official control over the islands ?
    Last edited by El_Indigo; 2nd May 2012 at 13:58.

  20. #920
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    1. That's not an explanation. It isn't at all obvious. There are good reasons why nobody uses SSKs for enforcing fishing limits & the like, & you've not addressed them.

    2. Another nonsensical answer. Firstly, it was uncalled for. I was clarifying your imprecise & misleading terminology, not entering into a debate about the rights of the case.

    But since you started it -

    Of the four, three are so close to Hokkaido that they don't compromise the Pacific Fleet any more than Hokkaido does. Those three were never Russian territory before 1945. The fourth (the largest & most northerly) had a Russian settlement for a few years in the late 18th century, but it had previously been explored & claimed by Japan, which was the first country to establish a government presence. The other three were settled by Japan before any Russian presence. Russia never disputed Japanese ownership of any of the four until 1945. The USSR offered in 1956 to recognise Japanese sovereignty over the two islands closest to Hokkaido in exchange for Japanese recognition of Soviet ownership of the northern two.

    BTW, parts of Sakhalin had Japanese settlers well over 100 years before the first Russians, but I don't see you citing that as grounds for handing it over to Japan.
    Last edited by swerve; 2nd May 2012 at 16:28.
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  21. #921
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    Are you being daft on purpose or what ? Who said anything about enforcing fishing limits with SSK's ? I meant for patrol or defense of EEZ or better yet I should say territorial waters against enemies surface combatant ships and vessels.


    And about the kurils. I was going to write a long reply ..but chance of you acting daft again. I ain't going to bother.


    End of the day is. You lost them, the Russians got them. Get the **** over it or retake them.
    Last edited by El_Indigo; 2nd May 2012 at 17:29.

  22. #922
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    I don't think Swerve is actually saying Japan needs to retake them.
    At this point, Japan missed its chance, everyone knows it, they wont be getting anything back. And I won't be shedding any tears over it.

    So, we know many of the new ships, both sub and surface will be getting the domestic Club, Caliber. Anyone know if the supersonic final stage variant is planned, and if so, what is the range of the domestic variant? Seems like a superb and unique weapon to me, and given the range of Caliber vs Club, one does wonder....
    http://img818.imageshack.us/img818/9098/rsz11rsz3807.jpg

  23. #923
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    Quote Originally Posted by El_Indigo View Post
    Are you being daft on purpose or what ? Who said anything about enforcing fishing limits with SSK's ? I meant for patrol or defense of EEZ or better yet I should say territorial waters against enemies surface combatant ships and vessels.


    And about the kurils. I was going to write a long reply ..but chance of you acting daft again. I ain't going to bother.


    End of the day is. You lost them, the Russians got them. Get the **** over it or retake them.
    Are you deliberately misunderstanding me? Patrolling EEZs (not territorial waters - very different things) is a matter of enforcing economic rights, not military defence. Hence what I said about fishing boats. Arresting them is the sort of thing EEZ patrols do, & SSKs are completely unsuited for it.

    Since you have now changed what you propose SSKs should do from EZ patrol to defence of territorial waters, you should be apologising for having posted in error, not accusing me of being daft. You have, after all, tacitly admitted that I was right.

    As to 'getting over it', you forget who raised the matter. It was you. You're the person who needs to 'get the **** over it'. All I did was point out your geographical & historical mistakes.

    You've made the classic mistake of allowing your own attitudes to colour what you read. That led you to read beyond what I wrote, & draw false conclusions about why I wrote it, & what I meant. For example, if you'd been paying attention, you'd know that I'm not Japanese, but you assumed that only someone Japanese would bother to correct your mistakes on a matter concerning Russia & Japan.

    You could treat this as a learning opportunity. :diablo:
    Last edited by swerve; 4th May 2012 at 08:57.
    Juris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.
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  24. #924
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    Oh, lord. Patrolling and defending/blocking of the EEZ from enemies surface combatant ships and vessels. Is what I meant. I assure that everybody understood what I meant. When I first said this "SSK are basically ideal for the defence of the EEZ"

    I don't know were you got the bit about SSKs arresting fishermen from ...but if you assume I meant that, then frankly you're a fool.

    I do admit, I should have said territorial waters though.
    Last edited by El_Indigo; 4th May 2012 at 14:16.

  25. #925
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    You don't block surface combatants from your EEZ except in time of war. It isn't your territory. If you're at war, the boundaries of your EEZ are irrelevant to where you engage enemy ships.

    What you patrol your EEZ for is illegal fishing, polluting of maritime habitats, infringements of oil & gas drilling zones, etc.

    You proposed using submarines for patrolling the EEZ. In view of the above, this does not make sense. You must, logically, therefore have meant that they should be patrolling it for infringements of your economic rights, e.g. arresting boats fishing illegally, or meant patrolling territorial waters, or been gravely mistaken about national rights over EEZs.

    I pointed out the absurdity of this, in the hope that you'd recognise your mistake, & reply along the lines of "Ooops! I meant territorial waters". Instead, you've admitted your mistake, but claimed that I'm a fool for spotting it & bringing it to your attention.

    Now, do you want to reconsider your inflammatory language?
    Juris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.
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  26. #926
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    Quote Originally Posted by El_Indigo View Post
    Patrolling and defending/blocking of the EEZ from enemies surface combatant ships and vessels. Is what I meant. "SSK are basically ideal for the defence of the EEZ"
    Within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing natural resources, both living and nonliving, of the seabed, subsoil, and the subjacent waters and, with regard to other activities, for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone (e.g., the production of energy from the water, currents, and winds).

    Within the EEZ, the coastal state has jurisdiction with regard to establishing and using artificial islands, installations, and structures having economic purposes as well as for marine scientific research and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.

    Other states may, however, exercise traditional high seas freedoms of navigation, overflight, and related freedoms, such as conducting military exercises in the EEZ.

    Article73

    Enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal State

    1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.

    2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of reasonable bond or other security.

    3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries laws and regulations in the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of agreements to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment.

    4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall promptly notify the flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed.
    http://www.un.org/depts/los/conventi...clos/part5.htm

    see also
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusive_economic_zone
    http://www.fao.org/docrep/s5280T/s5280t0p.htm

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    Last edited by Austin; 6th May 2012 at 11:52.
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    Renaissance of the Russian Navy?
    Proceeding Magazine - March 2012 Vol. 138/3/1,309 [2]
    By Captain Thomas R. Fedyszyn, U.S. Navy (Retired)

    Russia’s warship construction may be on the rise again, but the Russian naval mission of the 21st century appears markedly evolved from the Soviet naval mission of the 20th century.

    The maritime-strategy world is getting accustomed to hearing about the growth of the Chinese navy, but then–Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead caught everyone off guard when he announced that the “Russian navy is moving again” during his March 2011 testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Defense Subcommittee. 1 Several scholars already have noted that Russia is developing the capacity to once again become a maritime threat to Western naval power, particularly in light of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s support of the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. 2 However, deeper analysis of recent events suggests a counterintuitive conclusion: The slumbering bear is awakening, but this time as a new, less combative and aggressive animal. In terms American naval strategists might appreciate, Russian naval power seems to be heading down largely the same road as that prescribed in our Sea Services’ directive, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower .

    Few American naval officers study Russian naval tactics and capabilities these days. The Soviet Union’s demise prompted tectonic shifts in the global balance of naval power. The Soviet Navy, the main opponent of the U.S. Navy throughout the 1980s, shrank markedly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. By most estimates, the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) of 2007 was approximately one-fourth the size of the Soviet Navy at its peak. The submarine force, once the jewel in Moscow’s crown, deteriorated even more sharply, shrinking from a high of almost 400 boats in 1985 to 65 in 2007, with estimates suggesting that less than half of those were fully operational. Active-duty personnel dropped from almost a half million in 1985 to 146,000, many of whom were conscripts. Russia’s volatile transition from a military-oriented, centrally planned economy to a capitalist experiment moved in fits and starts. The state was unable, and perhaps unwilling, to invest properly in its navy. And it showed.

    New Strategy for a New Era

    However, beginning in 2008 the Russian navy began sending messages that it was on the rebound. Startling headlines from Moscow announced plans to build nuclear-powered aircraft-carrier strike groups and the RFN resumed operations in theaters it had not seen for a generation. 3 Specifically, Russia’s two showcase ships, the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and nuclear-powered cruiser Pyotr Veliki ( Peter the Great ), deployed to the Mediterranean and Caribbean in flamboyant fashion, operating with former Cold War allies and adversaries alike. Russian naval aviation began flying patrols in the Norwegian Sea and off Alaska with regularity. In effect, Moscow was announcing that the Russian navy was back. What changed?

    A nation’s grand strategy rarely changes quickly. In 2000, however, newly elected President Vladimir Putin made it clear that in the 21st century, Russia would once again be a global leader. The strategic documents issued shortly after his election insisted on Russia’s pride of place in the international order. However, words and attitude alone were insufficient to improve and modernize Russia’s armed forces. The mineral-based Russian economy continued to lag behind the West, and the hoped-for transformation of the Russian military sputtered without strong budgetary support.

    After economic expert Dmitry Medvedev became president in 2008 (with Putin staying on as prime minister), the world witnessed both a nuanced change in official Russian strategic thought and budgetary priorities. While Russia still strove to be a “world leader,” its new strategic guidance, Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020 , reflected maturation in the understanding of all elements of national power. 4 In particular, the new strategy viewed military power increasingly as a means to a new end: economic well-being and prosperity. Indeed, it made the following noteworthy points:

    • Russia’s development will follow the path of globalization and the interdependence of the international system; Russia intends to join the ranks of the top five countries by size of GDP

    • International politics will focus on energy resources, particularly in the Arctic Ocean and Caspian Basin

    • Russia’s top two national interests are to enhance the competitiveness of its economy and to regain standing as a world power

    • National defense will be provided on the principle of reasonable sufficiency and will include public diplomacy, peacekeeping, and international military cooperation

    • Terrorist organizations remain a threat to national security.

    The Russian national security strategy’s emphasis on economics and quality of life as principal issues, as well as its insistence on not matching the American military dollar-for-dollar, suggests a competitive, but not confrontational, Russia. In this strategy, Russia portrays itself as no longer a prisoner of the Eurasian landmass by emphasizing the Arctic, Caspian, and Far East (Pacific) regions of growing importance, along with those of global trade and interdependence. Moscow willingly volunteers to engage in international peacekeeping operations worldwide and to vigorously pursue terrorist extremist groups.

    Economics Trumps Bellicosity

    While the Russian equivalent of our national military strategy, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation , always was notoriously hard-line on defense issues, its most recent version (February 2010) is decidedly less confrontational. The publication’s “main tasks for the military” include: multilateral cooperation with partner states, combating piracy, ensuring the economic activities of the Russian Federation, participating in international peacekeeping activities, and combating international terrorism. 5

    Over the past decade Russian naval strategy has been considerably harder to distinguish than its more general and far-reaching national security strategy. In fact, Russia has not produced a formal and comprehensive naval strategy since 2001. 6 Given the navy’s historically inferior position in the Ministry of Defense, it is more useful to consider ministerial guidance as well as official pronouncements and news releases to understand the thrust of contemporary Russian naval policy.

    As early as 2004, the Russian Ministry of Defense’s blueprint for a future navy revolved around eliminating a blue-water or “ocean” capability and focusing instead on the 500-kilometer zone of territorial waters. 7 The 2010 Russian National Maritime Policy , published together with the Ministries of Trade and Commerce, touched on naval strategy, since its central theme was unfettered use of the world’s oceans to support the growth of the Russian economy. The navy’s role in this national strategy is mentioned, but only after lengthy discussions of shipping, fishing, minerals and energy, and scientific activities. While naval roles include the obvious missions of deterrence and protection of sovereignty, there is even more extensive discussion of peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, mineral exploitation, maintaining freedom of the seas, and showing the flag.

    The section on regional naval priorities makes clear that the Arctic and Pacific theaters, followed closely by the Caspian Sea, matter most. The discussion focuses on providing access to the Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean and on ensuring complete control of the Northern Sea Route through an Arctic Ocean that has become ice-free for longer periods each successive year. Not surprisingly, maintaining superiority in the development and deployment of nuclear-powered icebreakers remains a priority. Discussion of the Pacific also revolves around sea-based economic activity and the intensification of exploitation of mineral resources. This, in turn, calls for the development of coastal-port infrastructure in the Kuril Islands, an area of contention with Japan.

    The Caspian regional priority can be summed up in one word: oil. For Russian national maritime policy, economic issues—mineral exploitation, maritime transport, and pipeline security—represent Russia’s principal interests.

    Two themes characterize Russian strategic guidance to its military. First, all branches of the military will be reformed through downsizing and professionalization. Those most in danger of severe cutbacks are those not optimally responsive to the ends of Russian grand strategy. Second, Russia’s economic interests require a complementary military force to provide security and expansion. These considerations shape Russia’s thinking about its navy.

    From ‘Irreversible Collapse’ to Accelerated Construction

    Russian naval leaders saw the fleet degrade over the generation following Admiral Sergey Gorshkov’s death in 1988. With the advent of the Putin administration in 2000, some began to talk—only talk—of how Russia would restore its former naval greatness. Then came two setbacks. First, political leaders decided that the Russian Infrastructure Fund, amassed after the turn of the 21st century, would not be used to rebuild the Russian military. Next, the global recession led to a sharp drop in the price of oil—the source of most of Russia’s wealth. Western naval analysts dubbed the Russian navy the “fleet that has to die” citing a study by the Moscow-based Independent Military Review , which saw Russian naval shipbuilding in a “situation of irreversible collapse.” 8

    Soon after (and in some cases simultaneously), however, there were more positive developments as well. First, the new Russian defense minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, known primarily for his business expertise, called for wholesale reform of the armed forces. This included the elimination of the Russian navy’s aging and obsolescent platforms—along with a large portion of its officer corps. Further, Russian shipbuilding corporations were consolidated in an attempt to reduce redundancy and make the surviving shipyards more efficient, enabling the skilled shipbuilders to concentrate. Finally, the Medvedev administration announced an expanded investment plan for the Russian military and allocated 25 percent of its military investment budget to the navy, a percentage vastly exceeding that of the past generation. 9 This proposal should be considered realistic, as the price of oil is once again hitting record highs. Russia, the world’s largest exporter of oil, natural gas, and numerous precious minerals, will be a principal beneficiary of what some economic analysts see as an inexorable cost-growth of all extractive commodities. 10

    Russia’s streamlined shipbuilding capacity is beginning to show progress in the construction of several types of warships. The most publicized project is the development of the new Borey-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN), planned to initiate eight hulls by 2017. The class leader, the Yuri Dolgorukiy , was commissioned in 2009 in St. Petersburg, following 25 years of sporadic construction, but follow-on building is adhering closely to original schedule. This class will replace the obsolescent Delta III and IV classes of SSBNs as the navy’s contribution to Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. The Yasen class of up to ten nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) is led by the Severodvinsk , which was commissioned in 2010 after a 16-year building process. The Kazan , the second of the class, is scheduled for commissioning in 2013, only four years after construction began. Accelerated construction times for both classes of submarines are attributed to the “resumption of regular funding of defense contracts and newly established industrial cooperation.” 11

    Surface-combatant construction is following the same trend. The 2007 launching of the Steregushchiy , a 2,100-ton corvette touted for her low-observable design along with a high degree of automation and combat-systems integration, signaled Russia’s return to developing its own surface-warfare fleet. While the lead ship took more than six years to deliver, her successors, the Soobrazitelniy (recently commissioned), Boiky , and Stoiky , are expected to follow in considerably less time. The plan is for 10–20 ships of this class, intended for coastal patrol and escort duties. Further, Russia has built frigates for the Indian Navy and is now beginning to produce three identical Project 11356 frigates for itself, scheduled to be homeported in the Black Sea. More formidably, Russian shipyards have just commissioned the first Admiral Gorshkov –class frigate. This 4,000-ton warship is equipped for modern antisubmarine and antisurface warfare as well as escort duties.

    Arctic, Pacific, and Caspian Concerns

    The Russian icebreaker inventory is a special case, dwarfing the rest of the world’s fleets. Her six nuclear icebreakers (four oceanic, two coastal) are designed to maintain the Northern Sea Route for commercial as well as military purposes. The aging Russian fleet will be augmented by a third-generation nuclear-powered vessel, capable of operating near the coast as well in the deep waters of the Arctic Ocean. Russia expects to build three or four of these icebreakers, the first of which will be operating in 2015.

    Development of offensive strike platforms—aircraft-carrier strike groups—is the lone area where Russian actions do not match Russian words. For several years, Moscow’s official policy has stressed the importance of aircraft carriers, maintaining that they are a staple of all great navies. In early 2008, former Russian naval commander Admiral Vladimir Masorin ordered Russia’s design bureaus to draw up plans for nuclear-powered carriers displacing 60,000 tons. 12 President Medvedev even announced a goal to build “five or six aircraft carrier task forces” designated for operations in the Pacific and Northern Fleets regions. 13 However, in striking defiance of earlier pronouncements, Defense Minister Serdyukov confirmed that their construction will not begin until at least 2020, and that there was no longer any discussion of building new ocean-class cruisers. 14

    In all likelihood, the Russian nuclear aircraft-carrier striking fleet will remain an expression of future aspiration, and its only cruisers will be repaired versions of its four aging capital ships. The more realistic naval-aviation scenario is that Russia will maintain this capability through its purchase of French Mistral -class large-deck amphibious platforms. Russia hopes to buy two and then construct two more of these platforms, whose specialties include troop deployment as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

    As important as what the Russians are building is how and where they intend to operate these ships. The Northern Fleet, always preeminent in the Russian navy, will continue to receive a disproportionate share of new warships. However, beyond the ballistic-missile submarines dedicated to strategic deterrence, most strategic discussion centers around Russia’s need to exploit Arctic mineral and trade resources. Russia’s second-biggest fleet, in the Pacific, is being similarly tasked. Given the country’s simmering confrontation with Japan over the Kuril Islands, most experts expect that at least one of the first two Mistral s—to be named the Vladivostok and Sevastopol —will be homeported in the Pacific, able to both deploy Russian naval infantry and perform missions of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

    The Baltic Fleet probably will continue to shrink but will increasingly be called on to safeguard Russian undersea gas and oil pipelines. While Georgia will occupy the Black Sea Fleet’s attention, this too is a region of growing Russian trade and oil commerce. The Caspian Flotilla, always a stepchild in strategic discussions, is being fortified with impressive Astrakhan -class patrol boats to ensure that Russia has the premier naval force in this oil-rich region. In an effort to gain more worldwide visibility and support for its antipiracy operations, Russia was actively engaged with Vietnam, Syria, and Venezuela (and up until March 2011, Libya), for logistics and repair services in their principal ports.

    Russian naval strategy—like all strategies—can be discerned through analyzing the allocation of defense resources. Several conclusions emerge as Russian naval activity is evaluated. First, the navy’s relative stature is growing in Russia. Ships are being built at a markedly faster pace and these ships are increasingly joining the Russian fleet, not only being sold to foreign countries. Thus, Admiral Roughead was correct in his assessment: The Russian navy is on the move again. Second, Russia is relying more on its navy to provide an invulnerable strategic second-strike capability, the seaborne deterrent SSBN force. Third, however, Russian shipbuilding projects (other than perhaps the Yasen-class SSGN) are not principally designed for countering other navies or for projecting offensive military power beyond territorial waters. Instead, their weapon systems allow them to conduct independent operations and to inter-operate with other navies, but not challenge them. Most new Russian ships are smaller than their forebears and designed to be multimission rather than to specialize in one warfare area.

    Naval Convergence Theory?

    Finally, Russian naval strategy, as manifested in its operations, pronouncements, and budgets, is becoming well aligned with Russian national-security strategy—perhaps as its principal military tool. This strategy, as noted earlier, seeks to enhance both national prosperity and Russia’s stature. Military power is aimed primarily at preventing war, but otherwise is considered another element of national power, used principally in support of Russia’s economic growth. This same message is repeated throughout our own guidelines, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower . 15

    While Russian and American strategies refer to regional warfighting capability in concert with allies, both nations’ military forces primarily exist to foster stability, trust, prosperity, and cooperation. Both strategies also acknowledge that, while sovereignty disputes and natural-resource competition may spark future conflict, each navy’s most likely principal challenges are terrorist networks, criminal elements, and natural disasters.

    This logic could likewise underpin the argument for the relative importance of American naval power, enabling us to become an “offshore balancer” after we withdraw from ground wars in the Middle East and Central Asia. However, it almost certainly argues for major changes in the size, shape, and composition of the future Russian military, and particularly in its navy.

    The historic Russian obsession with large standing armies of conscripts created an unaffordable military tool without a credible mission. Even the technologically sophisticated portions of the Russian military aimed at offensive operations against large nation-states have become problematic, and this leaves the need for a smaller, professional, military capable of defending Russian borders and combating domestic disruptions caused by terrorists and nationalist movements. It also calls for a military force whose principal role is to project the Russian image abroad and ensure the security of all Russian economic expansion. This is the strategic and ever-widening niche for the future Russian navy.

    These trends may result in a rise back into the upper crust of the world’s navies. However, we are more likely to see Russian warships operating in multinational antipiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden than trailing American carrier strike groups in the Pacific or the Mediterranean. These antipiracy patrols will increasingly be carried out by small, fast, stealthy multimission platforms. The very likely increased Russian presence in the Arctic Ocean will have more to do with global trade and oil security than it will with bastion defense of ballistic-missile submarines. Russian task groups in the Caribbean will be increasing Russia’s international stature as well as selling arms to Latin American nations, rather than threatening American military exercises. The U.S. task is to be able to discriminate those military activities required by an expanding economy from those that challenge vital U.S. interests as our national-security strategy moves into the second decade of the 21st century. The U.S. Navy’s maritime strategy just might have struck a resonant chord in Moscow.


    1. “Roughead says Russian, Chinese Navies Growing,”, http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/0...russian-chines... .

    2. LTCOL John A. Mowchan, “Russia’s Black Sea Threat,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , vol. 137, no. 2 (February 2011), pp. 26–31. Lee Willett, “The Navy in Russia’s Resurgence,” The RUSI Journal , vol. 154, no. 1 (2009), pp. 50–55.

    3. Vladimir Petrov, “Medvedev orders construction of aircraft carriers for the Russian Navy,” Jane’s Defence Weekly , 14 October 2008.

    4. “Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020,” 12 May 2009, http://rustrans.wikidot.com/Russia-s...rategy-to-2020 .

    5. “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on 5 February 2010,” http://www.sras.org/military_doctrin...ederation_2010 .

    6. “Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020,” approved by Vladimir Putin, 27 July 2001, http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/ar...olicy_2020.pdf .

    7. Andrei Kislyakov, “Will Russia create the World’s second largest Navy?” RIA Novosti , 13 November 2007, http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20071113/87843710.html .

    8. Reuben F. Johnson, “The Fleet That Has To Die,” The Weekly Standard , 15 July 2009.

    9. Keith Jacobs, “Russian Navy: Quo Vadis?” Naval Forces , vol. 30, no. 3 (2009), pp. 56–64.

    10. Jeremy Grantham, “Time to Wake Up: Days of Abundant Resources and Falling Prices Are Over Forever.” GMO Quarterly Letter , April 2011.

    11. “Nevsky and Novomoskovsk: Two Submarines for Putin,” RIA Novost , 15 December 2010.

    12. Milan Vego, “The Russian Navy Revitalized,” Armed Forces Journal , May 2009, pp. 34–47.

    13. Vladimir Petrov, “Medvedev orders construction of aircraft carriers for Russian Navy,” Jane’s Defence Weekly , 14 October 14 2008.

    14. “No New Russian Aircraft carriers until 2020,” Agence France-Presse , 10 December 2010.

    15. While the document comprehensively addresses all potential naval missions including large-scale warfare, its immediate and lasting impression is its emphasis on “soft power.” See Ann Scott Tyson, “New Maritime Strategy to Focus on Soft Power,” Washington Post , 17 October 2007.
    "A map does you no good if you don't know where you are"

  29. #929
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    http://balancer.ru/forum/punbb/attac...545&download=2

    Official response by MOD to a group of veterans concerned with fate of Kirov.

    "Currently work is being completed on determining the scope and process of modernization for the Nakhimov cruiser"
    "Inclusion of a second cruiser into the modernization project under GPV-2020, is planned for 2016".
    http://img818.imageshack.us/img818/9098/rsz11rsz3807.jpg

  30. #930
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    Quote Originally Posted by TR1 View Post
    http://balancer.ru/forum/punbb/attac...545&download=2

    Official response by MOD to a group of veterans concerned with fate of Kirov.

    "Currently work is being completed on determining the scope and process of modernization for the Nakhimov cruiser"
    "Inclusion of a second cruiser into the modernization project under GPV-2020, is planned for 2016".
    They're still only 'determining the scope and process of modernization'?

    And it won't be till 2016 that a second cruiser(let alone the third) is even brought into the project... Slow as molasses. This seems like another case similar to the two mothballed Project 941 submarines that the Russian Navy was interested in refurbishing but never found the funding to do so.
    Last edited by Witcha; 8th May 2012 at 04:55.

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